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PREFACE
Informational economics
Information is an important aspect of many economic situations: buyers typically
inform themselves about product characteristics and wish to search for the most
favorable price before buying; employers wish to ensure that workers do a satis-
factory job, but are often unable to directly monitor workers’ efforts; and firms
typically do not perfectly know the profitability of investing, prompting them
to infer about business conditions by carefully evaluating a variety of market
indicators before making their production choices.
All of these examples have in common that information is not freely available,
but is subject to frictions that make it a valuable resource. The pioneering study
asserting the importance of informational frictions is Stigler (1961). In this study,
Stigler analyzes the decision problem of a buyer who does not know the prices
charged by nearby stores. Just like in the first of the aforementioned examples, in
this case the optimal strategy of the buyer amounts to sampling a certain number
of stores and buying the good once he finds an offer that is sufficiently cheap. This
informational friction of buyers not knowing the full distribution of prices is a
first example of how the lack of knowledge may explain a systematically different
behavior than under a full-information benchmark.
Half a century later, informational frictions have become a core part of many
economist’s toolboxes. As of today, the field of informational economics can be
broadly divided into three areas.
Search Theory First, problems in the spirit of Stigler (1961) have become
known as search theory. Early groundbreaking works on search theory, such as
McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970), have formalized the ideas of Stigler in a
mathematically tractable framework that laid the foundation for later applications
of search theory. In particular, the study of the labor market has been strongly
influenced by the idea that the matching of firms and workers is subject to search
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frictions (e.g., Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). The success
of these models in shaping our understanding of unemployment as well as the
impact of search frictions on the economic discipline as a whole has been reflected
in the 2010 Nobel price being awarded to Peter A. Diamond, Dale T. Mortenson,
and Christopher A. Pissarides “for their analysis of markets with search frictions”.
Agency Conflicts Second, problems of asymmetric information as in the
second of the aforementioned examples have been studied in the literature on
agency conflicts. Early contributions to this literature have introduced frameworks
to think about asymmetric information in games (e.g., Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b)
and in market settings (e.g., Akerlof, 1970).
Later developments have studied the question of how either an outside ob-
server interested in efficiency or an agent interested in maximizing his payoffs
should design the “rules of the game” in order to optimally deal with informa-
tional asymmetries. Important directions of this field that has become known
as contract theory are the study of moral hazard problems in static settings (e.g.,
Mirrlees, 1976; Hölmstrom, 1979; Rogerson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1983) as
well as in dynamic settings (e.g., Hölmstrom andMilgrom, 1987; Spear and Srivas-
tava, 1987; Phelan and Townsend, 1991; Sannikov, 2008); the study of incomplete
contracts (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Nöldeke and
Schmidt, 1995); the study of relational contracts (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson,
1989; Baker et al., 1993, 2002; Levin, 2003); and the study of adverse selection
(e.g., Mirrlees, 1971; Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Baron and Myerson, 1982) as well as
mechanism design problems in more general (e.g. Myerson and Satterthwaite,
1983; Moore and Repullo, 1988).
Themethods developed in these papers have been employed in a greatmany of
applications. Some of the most impacted areas are the theory of the organization
of firms; the analysis of credit lending; the design of optimal auction mechanisms;
and most recently, the introduction of financial frictions into macroeconomics.
Reflecting the impact of agency conflicts on the discipline of economics, the 2001
Nobel price has been awarded to George A. Akerlof, Michael Spence, Joseph
E. Stiglitz “for their analyzes of markets with asymmetric information”; and the
2007 Nobel price has been awarded to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin, and
Roger B. Myerson “for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory”.
Dispersed information Lastly, the third strand of the informational eco-
nomics literature studies how in complex environments, where information is
dispersed across a large number of agents, these agents aggregate information
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from available sources and how this affects equilibrium dynamics.
Early works within this strand have focused on showing that Fama’s (1970)
efficientmarket hypothesis does not hold for dispersed information settings (Hell-
wig, 1980; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Laterworks on global games, in particular
Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998), have shown how
dispersion information in combination with strategic complementarity may pin
down a unique equilibrium in games that are characterized by multiple equilibria
under full information. Recently, the interest in this strand of the literature has
been newly sparked by studies, such as Woodford (2003), Lorenzoni (2009), and
Angeletos and La’O (2012), that have shown how learning from dispersed infor-
mation can explain many macroeconomic dynamics and comovements observed
in the data and can also give a theoretical underpinning to the popular view that
business cycles are driven by expectations and sentiments.
Overview
This dissertation consists of four chapters. The chapters are basedon self-contained
research papers that contribute to the three areas of informational economics
outlined above.
Chapter 1 The first chapter of my dissertation explores the idea that increases
in uncertainty among agents may be a reason why the recent financial crisis
has been so persistent. To this end, the chapter develops a dynamic macroeco-
nomic model with the unique feature that it combines two types of informational
frictions: (1) Informational asymmetries that give rise to a financial friction,
constraining firms’ production choices during financial crises. (2) Agents in the
model do not observe business conditions, but have to endogenously infer about
them by extracting information from market prices in a dispersed information
setting.
The model explains why large financial crises have a disproportionately severe
and long-lasting impact on the real economy. At the same time, the model also
explains why high-frequency fluctuations on the financial market during “normal
times” have only a little impact on the economy. That is, the model gives rise
to an asymmetry between small and large shocks; or put differently, the model
explains why the transmission of financial shocks is inherently nonlinear.
Underlying these findings is a novelmechanism thatmakes uncertainty among
agents endogenous. The mechanism is that during financial crises the production
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choices of financially constrained firms are not governed anymore by business
conditions, but are dictated by financial constraints. Accordingly, production
choices of firms stop reflecting economic fundamentals, so that less can be learned
by observing the economy during financial crises. This means that uncertainty
among agents is endogenously increasing during financial crises.
As a corollary to these results, the model also make a number of predictions
that are consistent with empirical data and that lend support to the theoretical
mechanism discussed above: First, risk premia are high during financial crises; a
natural consequence of increasing uncertainty. Second, asset price movements
become endogenously amplified during financial crises, explaining the high
volatility of asset prices in crisis times. Third, the cross-sectional diversity of
opinions is increasing during financial crises.
Chapter 2 The second chapter of my dissertation aims at filling a gap in the
political economics literature. While the literature has studied various transition
mechanism, the properties of these mechanisms, in particular the resulting distri-
bution of political systems, has been largely unexplored. To this end, Chapter 2
develops a model of political transitions in which the types of political systems
and the likelihood of transition events are determined endogenously.
Importantly, the study rests on the co-existence of reforms (changes to a
political system that are initiated fromwithin a regime) and revolts (changes to the
political system that are enforcedby outsiders of the regime) along the equilibrium
path. To ensure this co-existence, the model is based on the assumption that
potential insurgents against a political regime are imperfectly informed about the
regime’s ability to defend itself against upheavals. This gives rise to a signaling
game which limits a regime’s ability to reduce revolutionary pressure by making
political concessions, ensuring the prevalence of revolts along the equilibrium
path. This is because, in equilibrium, concessions would be interpreted as a sign
of weakness, helping potential insurgents to coordinate their protest, and thereby
undermining the efficiency of concessions in reducing revolutionary pressure.
Within this framework, Chapter 2 of my dissertation answers two questions:
First, what types of regimes will endogenously emerge in equilibrium? Second,
which types of regimes will be political stable?
Regarding the types of political systems that arise in equilibrium, it is shown
that revolts generally result in autocracies, whereas political reforms generally
enfranchise the majority of the population. This suggests that only peaceful
reforms can lead to sustainable democratization, lending theoretical support to
a long-lasting view in political science according to which members of former
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autocracies are key actors in the establishment of democracies (for references,
see the introduction of Chapter 2).
Regarding the stability of regimes, it is shown that democracies are intrinsically
stable, leading to long episodes without political change. In contrast, autocracies
are subject to frequent regime changes. Yet, autocratic systems are persistent over
time as they are frequently overthrown by small groups of insurgents, resulting
in political systems similar to their predecessors.
Taken together, these results imply both a polarization of regimes into extreme
types during transitions and a persistence of extreme political systems once they
have emerged. Accordingly, the long-run distribution of political systems is
double hump-shaped with mass concentrated on the extremes.
These findings are consistent with cross-country data on political transitions
and regime types for nearly 100 years of recent history. To show this, Chapter 2
combines three recent datasets, merging information on political systems with
data on political transitions.
Chapter 3 The third chapter of my dissertation contributes to both the lit-
erature on search theory and agency conflicts. The chapter is motivated by the
observation that searching is not only an important friction by itself, but is often
delegated to an agent. For instance, recruiting agencies are hired to search for
job candidates. Real estate agents are contracted to search for prospective buyers
or, alternatively, to search for attractive houses. And insurance brokers are often
hired to find new clients.
Chapter 3 analyzes such a situation when search is delegated to an agent. The
interaction between the agent who realizes the benefits from searching (i.e., the
“principal”) and the agent who conducts the search is governed by two kinds of
informational asymmetries. First, samples are drawn from a distribution that is
only known by the agent, giving rise to an adverse selection problem. Second,
search itself cannot be observed by the principal. Thus, the principal’s problem
is to bring the agent to reveal the optimal search policy and, simultaneously, to
induce him to actually search according to this policy.
Chapter 3 shows that search in this case is optimally delegated through the use
of a screeningmenu, which is exclusively comprised of simple bonus contracts (as
are widespread in many industries). Moreover, search policies are almost surely
inefficient; either search is terminated prematurely, or it is completely undirected.
In contrast, if either of the two informational asymmetries is resolved, the first-
best outcome can be supported in equilibrium.
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Chapter 4 The final chapter of my dissertation is motivated by a well-known
regularity of airline pricing. Namely that prices for airline tickets rise as the
scheduled departure date approaches. Previous studies that aim at explaining this
fact heavily rely on the assumption that airlines can commit to state-independent
pricing schemes. This assumption appears, however, to be undermined by recent
developments in the airline industry. First, the usage of modern databases and
computer systems made it easy for airlines to collect and process information
about current demand conditions and to project them into the future. Second,
the emergence of online booking platforms have led today’s airlines to make use
of these information by employing sophisticated dynamic pricing schemes that
condition on all available information.
Chapter 4 aims at filling the theoretical gap arising from these developments.
To this end, it develops a novel theory of dynamic pricing in industries that
are characterized by short-term capacity constraints. The key mechanism is
that when supply is fixed in the short term, firms price more aggressively in
earlier periods in order to relax competition in the future. Accordingly, prices
are increasing over time precisely because firms do employ state-contingent
pricing schemes. Applied to the airline industry, this explains why ticket prices
rise close to the scheduled arrival date, even if airlines are unable to commit
to future prices. Importantly, while the costs of pricing aggressively is born by
individual airlines, the benefits of altering the market structure are enjoyed by
all competitors. Accordingly, dynamic airline pricing constitutes a public goods
problem from the perspective of individual airlines, implying that prices are
intertemporally less dispersed on more competitive routes.
The second contribution of Chapter 4 is to introduce a novel, hand-collected
dataset of 1.4 million airline ticket prices on 92 intra-European routes. Using this
dataset, the theoretical predictions are tested successfully.
Organization
To retain the self-contained character of the individual chapters of this disserta-
tion, each chapter has its own appendix and list of references. All formal proofs
in this dissertation are deferred to these appendices. I use the usual Halmos sym-
bol to mark the completion of a proof; the conclusion of important sub-steps
or lemmas that are a part of larger proofs are marked by a variation thereof◇. An
in-depth overview over the contents of each chapter is provided at their respective
beginnings.
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Abstract
This chapter of my dissertation examines how financial crises affect the ability
of agents to learn about economic fundamentals, and how this in turn affects
the transmission of financial shocks through the economy. To this end, we
introduce a model where noise in the financial market drives business cycles.
Agents endogenously learn about fundamentals frommarket prices, but financial
constraints systematically destroy the informational capacity of prices in financial
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crises. This is because financially constrained agents stop responding to available
information, reducing the efficiency of prices in aggregating information that is
dispersed across the economy. As a result, times of financial crisis are marked by
both endogenously increasing uncertainty and increasingly persistent pessimism,
providing a powerful amplification mechanism for financial shocks. Importantly,
this mechanism is inherently nonlinear. Whereas small or positive financial
shocks have only a little influence on the economy, unusually adverse shocks
virtually shut down market learning and result in disproportionately severe and
persistent crashes—characterized by substantial losses in employment, output,
and asset prices; and high levels of uncertainty, volatility, and risk premia.
Keywords
Credit crises, endogenous uncertainty, financial frictions, heterogeneous infor-
mation, asymmetric and nonlinear business cycles.
JEL codes: D83, E32, E44, G01.
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1. Introduction
Observers of the recent financial crisis often emphasize the role of uncertainty for
the transmission and amplification of financial shocks. In particular, a widespread
idea is that increasingly uncertain business conditions are a key factor for the
persistence of the crisis. For instance, IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard
argues that: “(Financial) crises feed uncertainty. And uncertainty affects behavior,
which feeds the crisis. Were a magic wand to remove uncertainty . . . the crisis
would largely go away.”1
Understanding these ideas requires thinking about uncertainty as being en-
dogenous to the state of the economy. This chapter of my dissertation examines
how financial distress affects the ability of agents to learn about economic funda-
mentals, and how this in turn affects the transmission of financial shocks through
the economy. Specifically, we study a dynamic macroeconomic model where
agents learn about economic fundamentals from market prices. The presence of
financial frictions endogenously determines the efficiency of the pricing mech-
anism in aggregating available information and thereby governs uncertainty
among agents.
The model highlights a novel mechanism that explains the characteristic
persistence of financial crises. In contrast to other types of crises, financially
constrained firms cannot step up their investments when they become more
confident in their business outlooks. As a result, in states of financial distress,
real business activity does not reflect actual business conditions, leaving market
observers uncertain about the state of the economy. With high uncertainty
feeding back into the financial market, this perpetuates financial distress and
creates a persistent cycle of uncertainty and financial constraints. As this chapter
shows, this feedback loop has important implications for the behavior of financial
markets and the behavior of the production sector in response to financial shocks.
Preview of the model The analysis is based on a stylized two-sector econ-
omy. In a production sector, entrepreneurs produce a single consumption good,
using labor provided by workers as the only input factor; and in a financial sector,
both workers and entrepreneurs trade an asset whose returns correlate with the
economy’s average productivity (the exogenous fundamental of the economy).
The model is built on two assumptions. First, fluctuations in the financial
market affect the real sector via financial frictions. Specifically, we assume that
1 This quote is taken from a guest article written by Olivier Blanchard for The Economist,
January 31, 2009.
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entrepreneurs must borrow in order to pay their workers and that, as in Kiyotaki
andMoore (1997), all debt must be secured with collateral. Having entrepreneurs
use the financial asset as collateral, this creates a cap on hiring which tightens as
asset prices tumble. Second, we assume that agents cannot observe the economy’s
average productivity directly. Instead they endogenously learn about productivity
by observing the market-clearing prices in both sectors, which aggregate further
exogenously available information that is dispersed across the economy.
Results The results in this chapter of my dissertation are driven by the inter-
action of informational and financial frictions. This combination leads adverse
financial shocks to systematically destroy the real economy’s “informational ca-
pacities” (i.e., less can be learned from observing the production sector). The
reason is that when entrepreneurs become financially constrained, they cease
to respond to available information. Wages—or, any other production-based
source of information2—therefore become less efficient in aggregating informa-
tion that is dispersed across the production sector. This reduces overall learning
and increases uncertainty among agents in times of financial distress.
The endogenous nature of the real economy’s informational capacities gives
rise to two information-basedmechanisms that amplify adverse financial shocks.3
To see this, note that when less can be learned from today’s production sector,
agents place more weight on other sources of information. In particular, agents’
opinions are more affected by information contained in asset prices as they
tumble. This amplifies pessimism among agents, tightens financial constraints
even more, and creates a harmful feedback loop. At the same time, with little to
learn from today’s economy, agents are also affected more by prior information in
forming their opinions. This causes pessimism in the financial market to become
inherently persistent, thereby increases future financial distress, and in turn
inhibits future learning. Metaphorically speaking, the financially constrained
economy gets stuck in a “pessimism trap”.
Importantly, both of thesemechanisms are inextricably tied to the endogenous
2 In our model, the only statistic that is (directly) affected by entrepreneurs’ production
choices are wages. In a richer model, however, the efficiency in aggregating information
would not only be reduced for wages, but for all observable prices (or quantities) that vary
with the economy’s production.
3 To sharpen our results, we abstract from any risk-related mechanisms or any other mech-
anisms that directly translate increases in uncertainty into real effects. However, including
any such mechanism only amplifies our findings, which we illustrate in Section 7.3 where we
extend the model to study the effects of risk-aversion.
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nature of uncertainty—were one to remove uncertainty during a financial crisis
(using the “magic wand” imagined by Olivier Blanchard), the crisis would indeed
largely go away. Moreover, while the bulk of the literature on financial frictions
discusses amplification mechanisms that are symmetric,4 the information-based
amplification mechanisms just described are inherently asymmetric. That is,
whereas adverse financial shocks inhibit learning and have an amplified and
persistent impact on the economy, positive financial shocks improve learning
and have a de-amplified and non-persistent impact.
More generally, we find that the more negative a financial shock, the greater
are both the amplification and the persistence of the shock. In particular, while
the amplification and persistence of small shocks is negligible, rare adverse (“tail”)
shocks virtually destroy the real economy’s informational capacities and entail
highly amplified andpersistent crashes. This non-linearity (or convexity) provides
a novel theoretical explanation for why during normal times the day-to-day
fluctuations in the financial market appear to have only a small impact on the
real economy, whereas unusually adverse financial shocks propagate persistently
throughout the whole economy.
Taken together, the aforementioned results imply that financial crises are
characterized by (i) amplified and (ii) persistent losses in output, employment,
and asset prices; (iii) as well as high uncertainty. In addition, the collapse in the
informational capacities explains three further key characteristics of financial
crises, namely: (iv) highly diverse views on the state and fate of the economy;
(v) volatile asset prices; and (vi) large risk premia. Highly diverse views result
from agents placing more weight on private sources of information—which are
inherently diverse—when less can be learned from today’s production sector. At
the same time, as discussed above, agents also pay more attention to asset prices.
As in any rational expectations equilibrium, this implies that asset prices become
more exposed to noisy demand shocks within the financial market, increasing
volatility. Lastly, when agents are risk-averse, risk premia on asset prices naturally
rise as uncertainty increases.
4 This is, for instance, true for the seminal contributions by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
Bernanke et al. (1999), and most of the literature thereafter. An important exception are
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), who consider an economy with a financial sector, in
which shocks have similar nonlinear effects. See the literature review for details.
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Methodological contribution The information loss in our model is
inextricably tied to endogenous learning governed by nonlinear laws of motion.5
That is, agents learn about the fundamental not only through linear signals but
also through nonlinear ones. More specifically, we show that, in virtue of financial
frictions, real sector prices (in the presence of noisy demand) are informationally
equivalent to observing a perturbed, concave function of the fundamental. The
slope of the function is decreasing in the “constrainedness” of the economy. In a
general theorem, we then prove that “well-behaved” concave signals generally
result in higher uncertainty when the signal realizes in flatter regions. This
theorem applies to a large class of information structures and holds independent
of the specifics of our model.
One technical challenge in analyzing the dynamic properties of our model
is that nonlinear Gaussian signal structures generally do not pair with conju-
gate prior distributions. To address this problem, we develop a quasi-Gaussian
framework, departing from the assumption that the small additive noise terms
included in the nonlinear signals are normally distributed. In particular, we
construct the noise terms in such a way that the nonlinear signals behave as if
they were linear normal signals with a state-dependent signal precision. Within
this framework, our general theorem then maps every state of the economy to a
unique signal precision, which is decreasing in the economy’s constrainedness.
Because, in the limit of signals becoming linear, the state-dependent signal pre-
cision becomes state-independent, quasi-Gaussian signals can be understood
as a natural extension of the standard linear Gaussian framework to the case of
nonlinear signals.
Related literature At a methodological level, the two building blocks of
our model relate this study to two strands of modern macroeconomics. First,
there is a large literature on financial frictions that demonstrates how small shocks
can get amplified through the financial system. In particular, our formalization
of credit constraints is based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).6We contribute to
5 Mertens (2011) and Hassan and Mertens (2011) also analyze a model with heterogeneous
information and nonlinear laws ofmotion. However, in their paper, the information structure
is such that nonlinearities are transformed away and agents actually update according to
linear prices, avoiding endogenous uncertainty.
6 More recent studies based on credit constraints include, e.g., Krishnamurthy (2003);
Iacoviello (2005); Kiyotaki and Moore (2008); Gertler and Karadi (2011); and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2011). Important contributions that are based on other financial frictions include,
e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); and Bernanke et al. (1996,
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this literature by identifying a new informational role of financial frictions that
complements the constraining role known from previous works. Throughout this
chapter, we highlight the consequences of this new informational mechanism by
comparing our model to the counterfactual case where the constraining role of
credit constraints remains intact, but all informational effects of frictions are shut
down. As with the majority of the financial frictions literature, we find that in this
counterfactual case, shocks symmetrically and linearly affect the economy. That
is, both adverse and positive shocks are amplified through financial frictions in
exactly the same way. In contrast, our findings that amplification is asymmetric
and nonlinear is a novel feature of the information-based mechanism introduced
in this chapter.7
Second, this study closely connects to an emerging literature on heterogeneous
information in macroeconomics and finance (see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 2002
and Woodford, 2003).8 From a methodological perspective, we contribute to
this literature by showing how learning from nonlinear signals gives rise to
endogenous uncertainty and by embedding nonlinear signals in a conjugate prior
framework. From an applied perspective, our study is similar to Angeletos et al.
(2010) who also study how learning from the real sector affects the financial
market, but do not consider how in the presence of financial constraints the
financial market feeds back to the information aggregation and how that causes
learning to collapse during financial crises. Perhaps closest to our model is a
framework by La’O (2010), which also combines informational with financial
frictions. However, because La’O resolves all dispersion of information at the
time agents learn from financially constrained markets, posterior uncertainty in
her model is completely determined by the exogenous amount of information
available to the economy, ruling out the informational mechanism that drives
1999), which are based on Townsend’s (1979) costly state verification approach; and Kurlat
(2010); Bigio (2011, 2012); and Boissay et al. (2012), which consider frictions originating in
adverse selection. See Appendix B.2 for a discussion how the ideas developed in this chapter
can be applied to the costly-state-verification and adverse selection approaches.
7 An important exception are Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), who consider an economy
with a financial sector, in which shocks have similar nonlinear effects. While the findings
of Brunnermeier and Sannikov are similar in spirit, their mechanism is, however, not. In
particular, information in their model is perfect and uncertainty is constant over time.
8 More recent contributions to the dispersed information literature with a macroeconmic
focus include Adam (2007); Angeletos and Pavan (2004, 2007, 2009); Amato and Shin (2006);
Morris and Shin (2006); Amador and Weill (2008); Lorenzoni (2009, 2010); Hellwig and
Veldkamp (2009); Hassan and Mertens (2011); Goldstein et al. (2011); and Angeletos and
La’O (2012a,b).
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our results.9
At a more applied level, this chapter also relates to a recent literature following
Bloom (2009) that puts forth the idea of uncertainty-driven business cycles re-
sulting from exogenous uncertainty shocks.10Our approach relates to these works
in two ways. First, we provide a microfoundation for why uncertainty increases
specifically during times of financial distress, which is also when empirical mea-
sures of uncertainty are highest. An important insight from our microfoundation
is that the endogenous nature of uncertainty unleashes a powerful feedback loop,
which is absent in business cycles that are driven by exogenous uncertainty shocks.
Therefore, in contrast to Bloom, who finds that uncertainty shocks give rise to
rapid drops and rebounds in economic activity, we find that high uncertainty
goes along with amplified and persistent crises. Second, the literature on exoge-
nous uncertainty shocks complements our findings in that it discusses a number
of additional channels, absent in our model, by which increases in uncertainty
may propagate through the economy. In particular, Christiano et al. (2009) and
Gilchrist et al. (2010) illustrate how fluctuations in uncertainty are amplified
through a combination of risk-aversion and financial frictions and have strong
effects on the real sector.11
Finally, our finding that financial frictions destroy information relates to a
small and closely related literature that studies endogenous fluctuations in uncer-
tainty. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) explore the idea that learning
about total factor productivity is slow in recessions when total business activity
is low. The reason is that if output is perturbed by an additive noise term, then
this noise term contributes relatively more to output when output is low, leading
to higher uncertainty during recessions (see also, Veldkamp, 2005 and Ordoñez,
2010). The mechanism studied in this chapter differs from the mechanisms in
these papers in that the efficiency of learning is governed by the degree to which
the economy is constrained rather than the level of output. As outlined above,
this difference leads to a number of important implications for the transmission
of financial shocks. Apart from this, our study also differs in that it considers
9 We also differ from La’O (2010) in that we focus on business cycle dynamics, whereas
La’O studies the (static) composition of output and price volatility in fundamental and noise
shocks in a single period model.
10 See also Sim (2008); Bachmann and Bayer (2009); and Bloom et al. (2012).
11 While we abstract from risk-related transmission mechanism of uncertainty in our model
to sharpen our results, these mechanisms are clearly important and strongly amplify the role
of the key mechanism identified in this study. For a illustration, see Section 7.3 where we
consider an extension of our model to the case where agents are risk averse.
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learning from price signals and provides an explicit foundation for why prices
vary in their informational content in times of financial distress. This approach
is shared with two related contributions by Yuan (2005) and Albagli (2011). How-
ever, both papers focus on one-shot financial market settings and do not include a
real sector, preventing them from analyzing the transmission of financial shocks
through the economy, which is at the core of our contribution.12
Outline The plan for the rest of this chapter is as follows. The next section
introduces the model economy. Section 3 examines how financial frictions affect
the ability of agents to learn from market prices. Section 4 characterizes the full
equilibrium. Section 5 then explores how shocks are transmitted through the
economy. Section 6 illustrates our theoretical results with a numerical example.
Section 7 points out some further empirical predictions, and Section 8 concludes.
All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2. The model
Our model is based on two ingredients: financial frictions and endogenous
learning. In the interest of analytical tractability, wemake a number of simplifying
assumptions. In particular, we focus on labor as a single input good, so that
learning from the real sector takes the form of extracting information from the
market clearing wage. Nonetheless, our analysis can be applied to any other
price that varies with entrepreneurs’ optimal production choices, and is meant to
more generally capture the idea that agents learn about business conditions by
observing the real sector. Also, we focus on a single, stylized financial friction to
model spillovers from the financial market. However, while the model heavily
rests on the constraining role of asset prices, it is irrelevant by which financial
friction this is explained (see Appendix B.2).
12 Another paper sharing the broad theme is Bachmann and Moscarini (2011), which looks
at a mechanism that increases the cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs during crises, but in
which posterior uncertainty remains constant. Also, there is a growing literature on rational
inattention, which is based on the idea that learning is costly, effectively leading agents to
endogenously pick their desired level of uncertainty (see, e.g., Sims, 2003, 2006; Maćkowiak
and Wiederholt, 2009, 2010; and Woodford, 2009).
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Preferences and technologies Consider a discrete time, infinite hori-
zon economy with a continuum 1 of risk-neutral, one-period lived agents.13 A
proportion m of each generation’s agents are farmers, while the remaining 1 −m
are gatherers. With a slight abuse of notation, we use F and G to denote the set
of farmers and gatherers at a given date, respectively. Both farmers and gatherers
consume a single consumption good, a perishable fruit, which is produced using
two distinct technologies. First, there is an entirely exogenous production unit.
In reference to Lucas (1978) it is helpful to think about this unit as a “tree” (or
asset), which bears a random number A˜t of fruits and comes in a total supply
of 1, equally distributed across each generation. Second, farmers have access to a
“field” which transforms labor input nit into additional fruits. The production
function for field work is given by
F(A˜it , nit) = A˜it log(nit),
where A˜it is an idiosyncratic random productivity parameter of farmer i ∈ F at
date t.
For simplicity, farmers are excluded from doing fieldwork themselves, but may
employ gatherers for the purpose of cultivating their fields. Gatherer i’s disutility
of working is given by v ∶ R+ → R+, a twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly
convex function, with v′(0) = 0 and limn→∞ v′(n) =∞. Gatherer i thus wishes
to maximize the quantity
E{c˜it − v(nit)∣Iit} , (1)
and farmer i wishes to maximize
E{c˜it ∣Iit} , (2)
where c˜it represents consumption of fruits, and E{⋅∣Iit} is an expectations oper-
ator given information set Iit .14
Field productivities {A˜it ∶ i ∈ F} are taken to be lognormally distributed, so
that log(A˜it) ≡ θ˜ it has a normal distribution with mean θ˜ t and variance 1/τξ,
13 Agents in our model are one-period lived to induce a common prior among agents at
all times. This ensures that heterogeneously informed agents in our model do not run into
Townsend’s (1983) infinite regress problem, allowing us to derive all our results in an analytic
fashion.
14 Throughout, we differentiate between stochastic variables and their realizations by accen-
tuating the stochastic version with a tilde (“∼”).
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and where the average log productivity θ˜ t follows a first-order autoregressive
process:
θ˜ t = ρθ˜ t−1 + є˜t ,
where є˜t is Gaussian noise with variance 1/τє. The dividend from fruit trees is
assumed to be positively correlated with the average productivity and is given by
log(A˜t) = γ0 + γ1θ˜ t + u˜t ,
where (γ0, γ1) ∈ R × R+ and u˜t is an independent (of θ˜ t) random variable that
possibly introduces additional noise to dividend payments.
Markets and credit constraints There are two types of markets operat-
ing at date t. First, a competitive labor market matches demand and supply for
field work and determines the market clearing wage wt . Second, a competitive
stock market determines ownership of fruit trees and pins down an asset price qt .
Shares on trees are assumed to be perfectly divisible and entitle its owners to
claim all A˜t fruits falling from the corresponding tree. In both markets, current
period consumption serves as the unit of account. Furthermore, we simplify
the analysis by ruling out margin trading and short selling of trees, effectively
restricting asset holdings of agent i to 0 ≤ xit ≤ 1.15
We now describe the financial friction in our economy. Following Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), we assume that farmers lack the means to commit to paying
their wage debt after production is sunk. As a consequence, gatherers refuse
to do field work unless they are provided a security by farmers in exchange for
their labor.16We assume that fruits harvested from fields are nontradeable, so
15 This specification is adopted from Albagli et al. (2011) and in combination with our
assumptions on noisy asset demand (see below), it keeps the law of motion of asset prices
tractable within a conjugate prior framework. Further note, that these no-borrowing con-
straints are consistent with the lack of commitment power that we impose as a key friction
on the labor market.
16 Our assumption that farmers cannot commit to paying their wage bill is based on the-
oretical arguments developed by Hart and Moore (1994, 1998). In their 1994 paper, such
commitment problem arises from the possibility to renegotiate wages at any point during the
production process. Accordingly, if farmers are indispensable for reaping the benefits of field
work (e.g., because fruits harvested on fields are nontransferable, as we assume in our setting),
then the outside option of gatherers is reduced to the value of collateral, and farmers could
renegotiate a smaller wage whenever the wage bill exceeds the value of collateral. Alternatively,
if, as in their 1998 paper, farmers can “run away” after production is harvested, gatherers are
likewise left with only the value of collateralized assets. In both cases, in anticipation of the
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that fields itself cannot be used as an security.17 Instead, farmers may use trees as
collateral to pay gatherers. Also, we simplify the problem of how to account the
value of collateral by assuming that the asset market operates at least twice: A first
time parallel to the labor market, ensuring that all information that is possibly
aggregated by trading trees is already available when the value of collateral is
determined; and a second time after production is realized and wages are paid, so
that the value of collateral is based on the current market price qt for trees. These
assumptions jointly imply that the wage debt of a farmer i at date t is bounded
from above by the market value of his asset holdings xitqt , constraining labor
demand to satisfy
nit ≤ (qt/wt) xit . (3)
Information The average productivity takes the role of the “fundamental” in
our economy. More generally, θ˜ t is meant to reflect the “profitability” of invest-
ments, comprising, e.g., technology shocks and aggregated business conditions.
Agents base their expectations about θ˜ t on the information
Iit = {sit} ∪ {ws , qs}ts=1,
which, in addition to the publicly observable history of prices {ws , qs}ts=1, contains
a private signal s˜it , which reveals the true average productivity θ˜ t perturbed by
some independent Gaussian noise ξ˜it with variance 1/τξ:
s˜it = θ˜ t + ξ˜it .
For simplicity, {s˜it}i∈F is assumed to be perfectly correlated with farmers’ pro-
ductivities {θ˜ it}i∈F , so that by learning the realization of s˜it a farmer also learns
the productivity of his field.
Furthermore, to prevent θ˜ t from being perfectly revealed by the market,
prices wt and qt are perturbed by noise traders with stochastic asset demand
Φ(√τξ (η˜t − µ)) and labor demand Ψθ t ,qt(ω˜t). Here η˜t and ω˜t are independent
Gaussian noise with variances 1/τη and 1/τω, Φ is the cumulative standard normal
distribution, µ is a constant which we conveniently set to offset the risk related
moral hazard, gatherers will not accept an outstanding wage debt that exceeds the value of
collateral.
17 This assumption is again based on Hart and Moore’s (1994) rationale for why farmers can-
not commit to paying their wages in the first place: If farmers are indispensable for operating
field production, then fields are naturally worthless to gatherers (see also, Footnote 16).
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components contained in q˜t ,18 and Ψθ t ,qt ∶ R→ R is a function that transforms ω˜t
into a random variable Ψ˜t which may depend on the realizations of θ˜ t and q˜t .
Noisy asset demand Φ (√τξ (η˜t − µ)) is divided between the two occurrences
of the asset market in a fixed ratio of 1 −m to m.
Note that to illustrate the precise conditions for which our main theorem
holds, we deliberately keep Ψθ t ,qt as general as possible for now, restricted only by
the assumptions below. In addition, this generality, later grants us the freedom
that is necessary to generalize the standard conjugate Gaussian framework and
to extend it to the case of nonlinear learning.
Distributional assumptions As it will be seen, one key feature of this
model is that the amount of information that is aggregated from the real sector
through the labor market varies with the state of the economy. To define the
conditions for which our characterization of learning holds, it is convenient to
first introduce normalized versions of labor demand and supply, χds and χst , which
describe them relative to the upper bound on labor as given by equation (3),19
χdt = log(m ∫F nit d iqt/wt ) and χst = log((1 −m) ∫G nit d iqt/wt ) ;
and define
χmt = log(exp(θ t)/wtqt/wt ) = θ t − log(qt),
which corresponds to the unconstrained relative demand of the median-
productivity farmer. Intuitively, χdt measures the fraction of farmers operating at
their collateral constraint and provides a useful proxy for the constrainedness
18 Although agents are risk-neutral in the model economy, the lognormal distribution of
dividends implies that the asset price q˜t behaves as if agents were risk-seeking with respect to
the fundamental θ˜ t . By setting µ to γ1/2 times the cross-sectional information dispersion (i.e.,
µ = γ1/(2τξ)), the risk-discount is exactly offset by the bias in noise traders’ demand, yielding
an asset price that behaves as if agents were risk-neutral with respect to θ˜ t and noise traders
were unbiased. Also note that by transforming η˜t into Φ(√τξ (η˜t − µ)) ∈ [0, 1], noise traders’
demandmatches the support of endogenous asset demand, ensuring the existence of a market
clearing price. The unbiased version of this specification (with µ = 0) is adopted from Albagli
et al. (2011) and keeps the law of motion of asset prices tractable within a conjugate prior
framework (see also, Footnote 15).
19 Here we anticipate that in equilibrium all farmers will hold x i t = 1 assets at the time the
labor market operates, so that the collateral constraint is given by n i t ≤ qt/wt .
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of the economy. Note that, even after observing wt and qt , χ˜dt ∣(wt , qt) is a non-
degenerate random number that, via optimal labor demand, depends on θ˜ t . In
the next section, it will be seen that forming the posterior χ˜dt ∣χst conveniently
summarizes the information that can be extracted from the labor market.
To develop an intuition for the conditions under which our main results hold,
it is helpful to define them in terms of the posterior χ˜dt ∣χst . Would there be no
market noise, then labor demand would equal labor supply and we would have
that χ˜dt ∣χst = χst . Accordingly, the properties of the random variable χ˜dt ∣χst reflect
how themarket noise Ψ˜t correlates with the state of the economy. In the following,
we impose two restrictions on these properties. Importantly, even though χ˜dt ∣χst
arises endogenously, it is possible to map these restrictions on χ˜dt ∣χst back into
assumptions about the exogenous noise term Ψ˜t (for details, see Appendix B.3).20
With this in mind, we impose the following key restriction:21
Property 1: Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst} is constant for all χst ∈ R.
Property 1 ensures that the amount of information about the normalized labor
demand χ˜dt that is contained in themarket clearingwage w˜t is constant throughout
all states of the economy. In Proposition 1, we show that this specification is
equivalent to requiring that, in the absence of credit constraints, uncertainty
about θ˜ t behaves exactly like in a standard economy where it is constant over
time. This ensures that there is no time dependency of uncertainty inherent to
the stochastic process Ψ˜t , so that any variation of uncertainty will be the result of
credit constraints.
Additionally, we shall also require the following regularity condition:
Property 2: It holds that
(i) χ˜dt ∣χst satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) with respect
to χst , or
(ii) χ˜mt ∣χst belongs to a location-scale family of distributions; i.e., χ˜mt ∣χst = α1(χst)+
α2(χst)X˜ where X˜ is a non-degenerate, square-integrable random variable
with mean zero and α1 ∶ supp( χ˜st)→ R increasing.
20 The bottom line is that there exists a monotone transformation of Ψ˜t that directly enters
the updating problem of agents which gives rise to χ˜dt ∣χst . By “backward-engineering” Bayes’
law, any assumption on the posterior distribution, can therefore also be traced back to an
assumption in terms of the signal structure defined by Ψ˜t .
21 Note that in Properties 1 and 2, the conditional distributions χ˜dt ∣χst and χ˜mt ∣χst are meant
to denote posterior distributions that result from a flat prior.
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This property states that observing a higher labor supply allows for the statis-
tical inference that also the corresponding fundamental labor demand (net of
market noise Ψ˜t) is higher in the sense of stochastic ordering. This is the natural
analogue to the case without market noise, where fundamental demand exactly
equals supply. More specifically, Property 2 specifies two alternative ordering
criterion. In case (i), we adopt the commonly used monotone likelihood ratio
property.22 In case (ii), we state an alternative distributional assumption which
gives rise to a specific class of “location-scale” posteriors. Here, α1(χst) is the
mean of the posterior and (α2(χst))2 is proportional to the posterior variance,
where the ordering takes the form of assuming that α1 is increasing. While it
will be seen that tighter financial constraints imply an higher uncertainty in both
cases, introducing the more specific location-scale setting allows us later to focus
on a conjugate Gaussian framework for analyzing the dynamics of this economy.
Timing The timing of events within one period can be summarized as follows:
1. The random variables {є˜t , {ξ˜it ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}} are realized and agents learn
the realizations of s˜it .
2. Noise traders’ demand and supply {η˜t , ω˜t} realize, the labor and asset
market operate.
3. Field production takes place, farmers choose whether or not to pay their
wage bill, and gatherers seize collaterals if farmers default on their wage
debt.
4. The asset market operates again.
5. Fruits from trees are gathered and consumption takes place.
6. A new generation replaces the old one and period t + 1 begins.
Equilibrium definition Because of the assumption that agents cannot
trade on margin, farmers are prevented from sidestepping collateral constraints
by buying additional trees. Accordingly, the only benefit of holding trees that is
reflected in themarket clearing price qt is the expected dividend payoff. Moreover,
a simple arbitrage argument then implies that trees are traded at the same price
in both openings of the asset market at any date t. In appendix B.1, we show
22 Formally, MLRP states that χst < χˆst implies that Prob( χ˜dt ∣χst)/Prob( χ˜dt ∣ χˆst) is decreasing
in χ˜dt .
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that without loss of generality we can treat the two asset markets as if all assets
were traded in a single pooled market that operates parallel to the labor market,
and where labor demand of all farmers is constrained to satisfy nit ≤ qt/wt .
Accordingly, the information {Iit ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}defined in the preceding paragraphs
is the basis for all labor supply {nit ∶ i ∈ G}, labor demand {nit ∶ i ∈ F}, and
asset demand choices {xit ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} at date t. Given these considerations, a
competitive rational expectations equilibrium is then defined in the usualmanner.
Definition: Given a stochastic process of shocks {є˜t , η˜t , ω˜t , {ξ˜it ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}},
an equilibrium in this economy is a stochastic process of choices {x˜it , n˜it ∶ i ∈[0, 1]} and prices {w˜t , q˜t}, such that:
1. {x˜it , n˜it ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}maximize expected utility (1) and (2) given {w˜t , q˜t}
and {s˜it ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]};
2. markets clear, i.e.,
(1 −m) ∫G n˜it d i = m ∫F n˜it d i + Ψθ˜ t ,q˜t(ω˜t) (4)
and
∫ 10 x˜it d i +Φ(√τξ (η˜t − µ)) = 1; (5)
3. expectations in (1) and (2) are formed optimally given {w˜t , q˜t} and {s˜it} ={θ˜ t + ξ˜it}.
3. Learning with financial frictions
In this section, we explore the key mechanism of this study. It will be seen how
learning from the real sector breaks down when financial constraints are tight.
Agents learn from the real sector via the endogenous history of market prices{w˜t , q˜t}. Hereby, asset prices play a dual role. On the one hand, changes in
q˜t tighten financial constraints and thereby affect the problem of extracting
information from w˜t . On the other hand, q˜t is also a source of information on
its own. In the next section, it will be seen that this latter problem of extracting
information from q˜t is standard. For now, we therefore focus on the novel
problem of extracting information from w˜t , by studying how an exogenously
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given asset price q¯—without any informational content on its own—constrains
farmers’ choices and how this affects the information aggregation.
From the market clearing condition (4), we have that w˜t solves
(1 −m)v′−1(w˜t) = n(w˜t , q¯, θ˜ t) + Ψ˜t ,
where v′−1(w˜t) is the optimal labor supply of a single gatherer, min{Ait , q¯}/wt
is the optimal labor demand of a single farmer with productivity Ait , and
n(w˜t , q¯, θ˜ t) = mw˜t ∫ ∞−∞min{exp(z), q¯}dΦ(√τξ (z − θ˜ t)), (6)
is the aggregated labor demand. Transforming noisy labor demand from an
additive perturbation Ψ˜t to a multiplicative perturbation ψ˜t of farmers’ labor
demand,23 the market clearing condition can be rewritten as
χ˜st = χ˜dt + ψ˜t , (7)
where χ˜st and χ˜dt are normalized labor supply and demand as defined in the
previous section.
Conditional on any realization of (w˜t , q˜t), χ˜st is a publicly known number.
Learning from the real sector is therefore equivalent to observing a signal χ˜st
which communicates the true value of χ˜dt perturbed by ψ˜t . This amounts to a
nonlinear signal structure. To see this, note that
χ˜dt = H(θ˜ t − log(q¯)),
where H ∶ R → R− is defined by H(x) = log(n(1, 1, x)). The key observation
is that H is increasing and concave. Intuitively, aggregated labor demand is
obviously increasing in the average productivity. However, as an increasing
number of farmers is operating at their collateral constraint (i.e., as (θ t − log(q¯))
increases), fewer farmers respond to changes in their productivities. Aggregating
thus implies that aggregated labor demand χ˜dt = H(θ˜ t − log(q¯)) is also less
responsive to changes in the fundamental θ˜ t . Hence the concavity of H.
23 Formally, ψ˜t = log(Ψ˜t/nt + 1); e.g., ψt = 0.01 refers to approximately an one percent
amplification of fundamental labor demand nt = n(wt , qt , θ t).
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3.1. Signal extraction without credit constraints
Before proceeding to our main theorem, it is insightful to first consider the limit
case where all farmers are unconstrained. Formally, let q¯ →∞. Then H′ → 1 for
all θ t ∈ R, so that Var{θ˜ t ∣χst} = Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst}. Property 1 therefore exactly ensures
that learning in the absence of credit constraints yields a posterior uncertainty
that is constant over time.
Proposition 1: Absent credit constraints, Var{θ˜ t ∣χst} = Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst}; i.e.,
Var{θ˜ t ∣χst} is constant if and only if Property 1 holds.
By Proposition 1, uncertainty is constant in any unconstrained version of
our economy. Any variations in uncertainty are therefore the exclusive result of
learning in the presence of credit constraints.
3.2. Signal extraction with credit constraints
We now address how credit constraints affect learning from the real sector. We
have already discussed that financial constraints give rise to a concave signal
structure. The following theorem states that independently from the specific
properties of our model, such a signal structure always leads to signals with a
precision that decreases as the signal realizes in flatter regions.24
Theorem 1: Let s˜, θ˜ and є˜ be three non-degenerate random variables, and let
f be an increasing function defined on the convex hull of the support of θ˜, such
that s˜ = f (θ˜) + є˜ and θ˜ , f (θ˜) square-integrable. Furthermore suppose that either
f (θ˜)∣s satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property with respect to s; or θ˜∣s =
α1(s) + α2(s)X˜ for some non-degenerate, square-integrable random variable X˜
and some functions α1, α2 defined on the support of s˜ and α1 increasing. Then
1. Var{θ˜∣s} is increasing in s if f is concave and Var{ f (θ˜)∣s} is nondecreasing
in s,
2. Var{θ˜∣s} is decreasing in s if f is convex and Var{ f (θ˜)∣s} is nonincreasing
in s.
24 For readability, we state the theorem for increasing functions f only, but it is straightfor-
ward to generalize it to all monotonic f , leading to the opposite predictions for Var{θ˜∣s} if f
is decreasing.
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In both cases, the monotonicity of Var{θ˜∣s} is strict whenever f is strictly concave
or convex.
The intuition behind this theorem is quiet straightforward. When a signal s˜
realizes in flatter regions, then a “well-behaved” signal structure allows for the
posterior belief that also the fundamental θ˜ takes values for which f is flat.25
But then, a Bayesian must also believe that the realization of s˜ is largely driven
by noise є˜ rather than by the fundamental θ˜. Hence the increase in posterior
uncertainty.
Framed in terms of our model, this reasoning translates into wage signals
that are largely driven by noisy demand fluctuations rather than fundamentals
whenever the economy is in a constrained state. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2: Var{θ˜ t ∣χst} is strictly increasing in χst .
The role of Proposition 2 for this study cannot be overstated. It precisely tells
us how andwhen uncertainty about θ˜ t is fluctuating in the economy. In particular,
it establishes that uncertainty rises after negative shocks to q˜t , which is at the
core of all our results.
3.3. Quasi-Gaussian signal structure
Proposition 2 is inextricably tied to learning through the nonlinear function H.
Unfortunately, learning from nonlinear Gaussian signals generally leads to poste-
rior distributions that do not conjugate with the corresponding priors, making
the dynamic analysis highly intractable. To address this problem, we henceforth
restrict ourselves to information structures that satisfy case (ii) of Property 2
with X˜ being a standard normal random variable. Under this assumption, beliefs
of agents evolve as if agents observed a Gaussian signal with an exogenously
given state-dependent signal precision τυ. Using this approach of information-
ally equivalent Gaussian signals, we are able to embed the idea of time-varying
uncertainty in a convenient framework with conjugate Gaussian priors.
25 By “well-behaved”, we refer to the assumption that either f (θ˜∣s) are ordered according to
the MLRP property—which then in Milgrom’s (1981) language implies that “good news” for s˜
is also “good news” for f (θ˜) and, hence, for θ˜—or, alternatively, that the first moment of the
posterior distribution of θ˜ is increasing in s—similarly implying that good news for s˜ is good
news for θ˜ .
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Lemma 1: Suppose Property 2(ii) holds with X˜ being standardnormally distributed.
Then, given a normal prior over θ˜ t , observing χ˜st = χst is equivalent to observing
a signal θ˜ t + υ˜t with realization α1(χst) + log(q¯), where υ˜t is Gaussian noise
with variance 1/τυ(θ t + υt − log(q¯)) and τυ ∶ R → R+ is strictly decreasing,
limz→−∞ τυ(z) = 1/Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst}, and limz→∞ τυ(z) = 0.
The “quasi-Gaussian” signal structure that follows from Lemma 1 effectively
decomposes the inference problem of agents into a straightforward interpre-
tation of a Gaussian signal and a computationally intensive calculation of the
relevant signal precision. The benefit of this decomposition is that agents’ beliefs
can be computed straightforwardly within a conjugate prior framework. The
computationally intensive part, on the other hand, only has to be solved by the
model analyst. However, applying the results from Proposition 2, we already
know that τυ is decreasing as the economy gets more constrained, enabling us to
derive all of our results analytically without the need to solve the exact inference
problem. (For providing a numerical example, we simulate the exact mapping in
Section 6.)
Figure 1 illustrates the properties of τυ that follow from Lemma 1: (i) τυ is
decreasing as the economy gets more constrained (i.e., as α1(χst) = θ t+υt−log(q¯)
increases, reflecting either tighter credit conditions, or an increased labor demand
relative to existing credit conditions); (ii) τυ converges to 1/Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst} = const
as the economy gets completely unconstrained (i.e, no information is lost when
all farmers are unconstrained); and (iii) τυ converges towards zero, so that the
signal gets completely uninformative, as the economy becomes fully constrained.
4. Equilibrium characterization
Equipped with the quasi-Gaussian representation, we are now ready to charac-
terize the equilibrium. We proceed in two steps. First, we fix the information
structure (by fixing τυ) and analyze the resulting signal extraction problem taking
into account all signals. Because parts of agents’ information is extracted from
endogenous asset prices, this step involves finding the “usual” fixed point between
a perceived law of motion of q˜t and its actual behavior. Second, allowing the
information structure to vary with the state of the economy, we then establish the
full informational equilibrium where information is simultaneously aggregated
from labor and asset markets and where prices in both markets are consistent
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Figure 1. Endogenous signal precision.
with the resulting beliefs.26
4.1. Signal extraction from the financial market
From Lemma 1 it follows that we can focus on Normal posteriors. Accordingly,
let bt ≡ E{θ˜ t ∣Iit∖ sit} and 1/πt ≡ Var{θ˜ t ∣Iit∖ sit} denote the posterior mean and
variance that result from observing the public history ofmarket prices up to date t.
Further let bit ≡ E{θ˜ t ∣Iit} and 1/π¯t ≡ Var{θ˜ t ∣Iit} denote the first two posterior
moments given information set Iit (i.e., including the private signal s˜it), where
in anticipation of the results below, we drop the subscript i from the posterior
precision π¯t . Then optimal asset demand is given by
xit = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if E{A˜t ∣bit , π¯t} > qt ,[0, 1] if E{A˜t ∣bit , π¯t} = qt ,
0 if E{A˜t ∣bit , π¯t} < qt ,
26 Formally, agents post labor and asset demand schedules that are fully contingent on
both prices. Agents therefore learn from observing prices in the labor and asset market
simultaneously and the resulting beliefs have to be consistent with the market clearing prices
on both markets.
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where E{A˜t ∣bit , π¯t} = exp(γ0 + γ1bit + γ21 /(2π¯t)).27 Aggregating, adding noise
traders’ demand, and rearranging yields the market clearing condition
Φ(σ−1t (bmt(qt) − b¯t)) = Φ(√τξ (η˜t − µ)),
where bmt(qt) is the belief of the marginal trader with E{A˜t ∣bmt , π¯t} = qt , b¯t is
the average belief ∫ bit d i, and σ2t = Var{bit} is the cross-sectional dispersion of
beliefs. This pins down the marginal traders’ belief bmt = σt√τξ (η˜t − µ) + b¯t
and the equilibrium price. Given any conjectured law of motion for the market
clearing price, this price also serves as an endogenous signal. In equilibrium
the beliefs resulting from interpreting this signal have to give rise to optimal
asset demands that yield an actual law of motion equal to the conjectured one.
This fixed-point problem has a log-linear solution, which is established in the
following lemma (for a detailed derivation, see, e.g., Hellwig (1980)).
Lemma 2: Fix any τυ. Then there exists a unique log-linear asset price
qt = exp{γ1(b¯t + π¯−1t τξηt) + γ0} (8)
which clears the asset market, where
b¯t = π¯−1t × [τξ τη τυ πˆt−1] ×
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
θ t
θ t + ηt
θ t + υt
ρbt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
π¯t = τξ + τη + τυ + πˆt−1,
πˆt−1 = πt−1τєπt−1 + ρ2τє ,
and where (bt , πt) are given by (b¯t , π¯t) after setting τξ = 0.
Given a public history summarized by bt−1 and πt−1, and given a signal preci-
sion τυ, this lemma characterizes the unique log-linear relationship between the
asset price at date t and the stochastic variables θ˜ t , η˜t , and υ˜t . The equilibrium
27 Herewe assumewithout loss of generality that u˜t is constant zero. Suppose it is not. Then by
the independence of u˜t we have that E{A˜t ∣b i t , π¯t} = E{exp(u˜t)} exp(γ0+γ1b i t+γ21 /(2π¯t)) =
exp(γ′0+γ1b i t+γ21 /(2π¯t)), where γ′0 = γ0+log(E{exp(u˜t)}) and, hence, any nonzero random
noise u˜t can be absorbed by the constant γ0.
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price increases in all three variables, not just in the fundamental. The reason
is that positive noisy demand realizations on the asset and labor market falsely
suggest that the fundamental increased. The exact weight that is put on these
sources of information, however, depends on the signal precision τυ. Intuitively,
as the real sector aggregates less information, less weight is placed on real sector
prices, and vice versa. We also see that posterior uncertainty 1/π¯t is increasing as
the signal precision τυ of the labor market decreases.
4.2. General informational equilibrium
To characterize the full informational equilibrium that takes into account the
mutual dependence of signal precision and asset price, define дq ∶ R2+ × R4 → R,
such that log(qt) = дq(τυ , Ωt) as given by (8), and define дτ ∶ R+ × R5 → R+,
such that τυ(θ t + υt − log(qt)) = дτ(log(qt), Ωt) is the signal precision defined
in Lemma 1. Here, Ωt ≡ (πt−1, bt−1, θ t , ηt , υt) is the vector of state variables in
period t. Then the informational equilibrium can be computed pointwise for any
state of the economy Ωt , by solving the fixed-point problem28
дτ(⋅, Ωt) − д−1q (⋅, Ωt) = 0. (9)
The following proposition establishes the existence of a solution to this problem
for all possible states Ωt and, hence, the existence of an informational equilibrium.
Proposition 3: For all Ωt ∈ R+ × R4, there exists a solution to the fixed-point
problem (9). The solution is unique for allΩt inside a set Ξ ⊂ R+×R4. In particular,
it is unique for all Ωt that satisfy(γ1 − 1)(θ t + υt) < M1
or
θ t + υt < M2 + γ−11 log(qt ∣τυ→0)
where M1,M2 ∈ R are parameters defined by the primitives of the model. In contrast,
if Ωt ∉ Ξ, the economy is in a “sunspot” state where (9) has multiple solutions.
Proposition 3 implies that for any initial state Ω0 the equilibrium dynamics of
the model economy can be computed recursively by computing a solution to (9)
28 For expositional reasons, we abstract from the non-generic case where дq is flat throughout
the main body of this chapter. The case where д−1q does not exist is carefully treated in all
formal proofs.
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given Ωt and then using Lemma 2 to determine Ωt+1. As long as {Ωs}ts=1 ∈ Ξt , this
pins down a unique equilibrium path. This is the case as long as the information
aggregated in the labor and asset market is not too conflicting. In states where the
labor market signals a realizations for θ˜ t that is sufficiently more optimistic than
what is suggested by the asset market, the equilibrium gives rise to self-fulfilling
sunspots: If agents coordinate on interpreting the conflicting information in
an optimistic way, asset prices will be little constraining, so that observing the
“good” labor market news will be sufficiently informative to justify an optimistic
interpretation. On the other hand, if agents interpret the evidence in a pessimistic
way, the resulting financial constraints will obscure the “good” news from the
labor market and the pessimistic interpretation is indeed justified.
Because the findings in this study generally carry over to sunspot regimes (but
require a more subtle distinction between cases), we focus throughout most of
this study on paths where {Ωs}ts=1 ∈ Ξt . A brief discussion of sunspot regimes
can be found in Appendix B.4.
5. Transmission of shocks
We now explore how random shocks to the economy are propagated through the
informational equilibrium. In the next two subsections, it will be seen how shocks
are statically amplified or de-amplified depending on their size and composition.
In Section 5.3, it will be seen that a similar distinction divides shocks in those
that are dynamically persistent, and others that are non-persistent.
5.1. Static asymmetries: Amplifying and de-amplifying shocks
Consider the solution to the fixed point problem (9). We say that a shock is
amplified through the endogenous information structure if and only if its absolute
impact on qt is larger than in the hypothetical benchmark in which τυ is fixed
at the level it would attain in the absence of shocks. By that definition, which
shocks are amplified and which shocks are de-amplified upon impact?
For answering this question, it is useful to define τ˚υ ≡ τυ(−γ0) to be the
precision of υt in the absence of shocks.29 In the benchmark case, the market-
clearing price then reads q˚t ≡ exp(дq(τ˚υ , Ωt)). Contrast this with the case,
where τυ adjusts endogenously to the asset price. Then the endogeneity of the
29 I.e., for θ t = ηt = υt = 0 and bt−1 = 0, implying log(qt) = γ0 and, hence, τ˚υ = τυ(−γ0).
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information structure unfolds a feedback loop. Intuitively, the benchmarkprice q˚t
can be seen as the “initial” impact of the shock. In response to this change in q˜t
and also in response to the shock itself (compare Lemma 1), τυ is now changing
to τ1υ ≡ дτ(log(q˚t), Ωt). However, unless τ1υ = τ˚υ, agents who optimally form
expectations respond to such changes in τυ by re-weighting the available sources
of information, leading to an asset price q1t , and so on.
To answer which shocks are amplified, we need to compare the equilibrium
of this feedback loop—i.e., the solution q∗t to (9)—with q˚t . Observe that the two
directions of the feedback loop can be summarized by (i) the sign of ∂дq/∂τυ
(how do changes in τυ feed back to qt), and (ii) the sign of {τ1υ − τ˚υ} (after a
single “cycle” through the feedback loop, how does τυ change in response to
q0t ).30 Combining, we have four cases to consider, summarized by Figure 2. If дq
is increasing in τυ and τ1υ < τ˚υ, then д−1q intersects with дτ to the left of log(q˚t)
and we have that q∗t < q˚t (see Panel a). Likewise, if дq is increasing in τυ and
τ1υ > τ˚υ, then q∗t > q˚t (see Panel b). A similar reasoning establishes the opposite
relationship if дq is decreasing in τυ (see Panels c and d).
So what determines the signs of ∂дq/∂τυ and {τ1υ − τ˚υ}? From Lemma 2, we
have that
sign{∂дq
∂τυ
} = sign ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂
∂τυ
⎛⎜⎝π¯−1t [τξ + τη τυ πˆt−1] ×
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
θ t + ηt
θ t + υt
ρbt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎞⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭= sign {−(θ t + ηt) + δ1(θ t + υt)} ,
where δ1 ∶ R→ R is defined by
δ1(x) = (τξ + τη)−1(−bˇt−1 + πˇt−1x)
with bˇt−1 = ρbt−1πˆt−1 and πˇt−1 = τξ + τη + πˆt−1. Here, δ−11 (θ t + ηt) is the residual
asset price, which would obtain if there were no labor market signal. It includes
all information that is inferred from other sources than wt—i.e., the prior bt−1,
the idiosyncratic signals {sit}, and news extracted from qt itself. Weighting these
sources against θ t + υt—the information extracted from wt—then pins down
the equilibrium price. Intuitively, if θ t + υt is larger than δ−11 (θ t + ηt), then if
agents increase the weight on wt , they become more optimistic. As a result, дq is
increasing in τυ exactly if θ t + ηt < δ1(θ t + υt).
30 Here we exploit that, as formally shown in the proof to Proposition 4, sign{τ1υ − τ˚υ} =
sign{τ∗υ − τ˚υ}, allowing us to use sign{τ1υ − τ˚υ} to determine the qualitative effects of the
feedback loop on q∗t .
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Figure 2. Location of equilibrium asset price relative to the counterfactual price.
To determine the sign of {τ1υ − τ˚υ}, we apply the transformation τ−1υ . Since τυ
is decreasing, the term is positive exactly if θ t + υt − log(q˚t) < −γ0, or if θ t + ηt >
δ2(θ t + υt), where δ2 ∶ R→ R is defined by
δ2(x) = (τξ + τη)−1(−bˇt−1 + γ−11 (πˇt−1 + (1 − γ1)τ˚υ)x).
Note that δ2 is decreasing, if and only if γ1 > π˘t−1/τ˚υ + 1. This reflects the case,
where asset prices have a strong enough impact on τυ to compensate for any
direct impact of θ t + υt . By contrast, if γ1 is sufficiently small, then any effect
that a positive realization of θ˜ t + υ˜t has on qt is dominated by additional labor
demand. Thus the economy is effectively more constrained and generates less
information as θ t + υt increases, which translates into a positively sloped δ2.
We are now ready to address the key question in this section. Based on the
affine functions δ1 and δ2, we can assign each state Ωt one of the four cases
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depicted in Figure 2. If we also take into account whether q˚t is increased or
decreased relative to the no-shock price γ0, we can therefore determine whether
endogenous information amplifies or de-amplifies the impact of shocks in pe-
riod t. More specifically, when q˚t is increased compared to γ0, then endogenous
uncertainty amplifies the impact of Ωt if q∗t > q˚t , and de-amplifies (or, possibly,
reverses) the impact if q∗t < q˚t . The converse holds true if q˚t is decreased com-
pared to the no-shock case. Comparing log(q˚t)with γ0, we find that log(q˚t) > γ0
exactly if θ t + ηt > δ3(θ t + υt), where δ3 ∶ R→ R is defined by
δ3(x) = (τξ + τη)−1(−bˇt−1 − τ˚υx).
The state space Ωt is thus divided into amplification and de-amplification regimes
by lines δ1, δ2, and δ3. The following proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 4: (a) Suppose that γ1 > 1 and θ t + ηt > δ3(θ t + υt), that is,
log(q˚t) > γ0. Then q∗t > q˚t , so that the impact of Ωt is amplified if and only if
δ1(θ t + υt) < θ t + ηt < δ2(θ t + υt),
where the inequalities are reversed for γ1 < 1.
(b) Suppose that γ1 > 1 and θ t + ηt < δ3(θ t + υt), so that log(q˚t) < γ0. Then
q∗t < q˚t , so that the impact of Ωt is de-amplified, if and only if
δ1(θ t + υt) > θ t + ηt > δ2(θ t + υt),
where the inequalities are reversed for γ1 < 1.
Figure 3 illustrates the proposition. For all realizations of θ˜ t , η˜t , and υ˜t that fall
north-east of δ3, the combined impact on q˚t is positive, so that log(q˚t) > γ0. For
these shocks, the impact ofΩt compared to the exogenous uncertainty benchmark
is de-amplified in region A and amplified in region B. Note that region A is split
into two separate areas. The one to the north-west of B corresponds to the case
depicted in Panel (d) of Figure 2, and the one to the south-east corresponds to
Panel (a). Region B corresponds to either Panel (b) or (c), depending on the
value of γ1. If γ1 > 1, δ2 is steeper than δ1, and all Ωt in the area bounded by these
two lines are amplified by a decreasing дq as depicted in Panel (c). If γ1 < 1, then
δ2 has a smaller slope than δ1, and Ωt is amplified as depicted in Panel (b).
For realizations of θ˜ t , η˜t , and υ˜t that fall south-west of δ3, the combined impact
has a negative effect on q˚t , implying log(q˚t) < γ0. In that case, realizations within
region C are amplified—corresponding to the cases in Panel (a) in the south-east
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Figure 3. Impact asymmetries. Note: Shocks in regions A and B have an overall positive
impact on q˚t , shocks in regions C and D have an overall negative impact. Shocks in regions B
and C are endogenously amplified, shocks in regions A and D are endogenously de-amplified.
of region D, and Panel (d) in the north-west of region D. Realizations within
region D are de-amplified—corresponding to Panel (b) if γ1 > 1, and Panel (c) if
γ1 < 1.
Macroeconomists are often interested in the special case where the economy
is hit by a single shock, shutting down all other stochastic channels through
which the economy is impacted. Since δ1 and δ2 both have a finite slope, any
state in which ∣ηt ∣ is sufficiently large compared to ∣θ t ∣ and ∣υt ∣ is unambiguously
amplified for ηt < 0 and de-amplified for ηt > 0. In particular, this adverse
feedback loop applies to any financial “impulse” shocks; i.e., shocks along the
vertical dashed axis through the origin of Figure 3. (See Figure 4 for a schematic
illustration of the feedback loop induced by financial shocks.)
Corollary 1: In the limit as θ t → 0, υt → 0, and bt−1 → 0, financial shocks are
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Figure 4. A schematic illustration of the feedback loop in the special case of an isolated
financial shock.
amplified if ηt < 0 and de-amplified if ηt > 0.
Similarly, because bt−1 vertically shifts the origin of δ1, δ2, and δ3, any prior
pessimism is amplified and any prior optimism is de-amplified along an impulse
response path.
Corollary 2: In the limit as θ t → 0, ηt → 0, and υt → 0, prior beliefs are
amplified if bt−1 < 0 and de-amplified if bt−1 > 0.
The case where the economy is perturbed by a single shock on the labormarket
(i.e., shocks along the horizontal dashed axis through the origin of Figure 3) is
less clear. This is because for large γ1 the slope of δ2 becomes negative (but never
steeper than the slope of δ3). Formally, this leads to the following result.
Corollary 3: In the limit as θ t → 0, ηt → 0, and bt−1 → 0, labor shocks
are amplified if υt < 0 and de-amplified if υt > 0 if and only if γ1 < πˇt−1/τ˚υ + 1.
Otherwise, the converse holds true.
5.2. Static asymmetries: Non-proportionality in scale
Proposition 4 divides the state space into amplifying and de-amplifying regimes.
It is silent, however, on how the degree of amplification or de-amplification
changes within these regimes. We now address this question. In particular, we
are interested in how the degree of amplification and de-amplification changes as
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shocks realize “further away” from the origin,Ot ≡ (0,−b˘t−1/(τξ + τη)), of Fig-
ure 3. The following proposition establishes that both the degree of amplification
in amplification regimes and the degree of de-amplification in de-amplification
regimes monotonically increases as shocks are scaled up relative toOt .
Proposition 5: Consider any combination of shocks (θ t + υt , θ t + ηt) ≡ St +Ot . Then scaling up these shocks to aSt + Ot , a > 1, increases amplification in
amplification regimes and decreases amplification in de-amplification regimes.
Formally, that is, log(q∗t ) − log(q˚t) decreases in a if and only if sign{θ t + ηt −
δ1(θ t + υt)} = sign{θ t + ηt − δ2(θ t + υt)}.
Proposition 5 states that “scaling up” the combination of shocks that hit the
economy at time t, implies that amplification or de-amplification of these shocks
is both more pronounced. The reason is that absolute larger shocks lead to larger
changes in uncertainty and hence to more pronounced amplification and de-
amplification loops, respectively. Figure 5 illustrates these nonlinearities by plot-
ting contours of the degree of amplification {log(q∗t )− log(q˚t)}× sign(log(q˚t)).
Negative contours (dashed lines) thus correspond to de-amplification regimes,
positive contours (solid lines) correspond to amplification regimes. By Propo-
sition 5, these contours are increasing towards the origin in de-amplification
regimes, and are decreasing towards the origin in amplification regimes.
5.3. Dynamic asymmetries: Persistence and non-persistence of beliefs
We now consider the effect of changes in τυ on the persistence of shocks. Because
our model abstracts from all intertemporal links other than the fundamental
process of θ˜ t , the only channel through which Ωt may affect future periods other
than through the autocorrelation of θ˜ t , is through the persistence of public beliefs.
For all s > 0, we define the persistence of belief bt onto bt+s as
Λt,t+s = ∂bt+s∂bt .
In the following, we focus on the specific signal structure underlying our model,
but it is worth noting that the arguments generalize to arbitrary quasi-Gaussian
signal structures (see the formal proof of Proposition 6). From Lemma 2, we
have that
bt = π−1t × [τη τυ,t πˆt−1] × ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
θ t + ηt
θ t + υt
ρbt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (10)
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Figure 5. Amplification contours. Note: Positive contours (amplification regimes) are plot-
ted solid, negative contours (de-amplification regimes) are dashed. Arrows point into the
direction of increasing (more amplifying) contours.
Recursively substituting and differentiating thus yields
Λt,t+s = t+s∏
q=t+1 λq ,
where λt ≡ ρπˆt−1/πt . We are interested in the effect of an increase in uncertainty
in period t on the persistence Λt−r,t+s for r, s ≥ 0. Suppose τυ,t changes by a
differential dτυ,t . Consider the special case where r = 0. Then
dΛt,t+s
dτυ,t
= Λt,t+s × t+s∑
q=t+1
⎛⎝ 1λq ∂λq∂πq−1 q−1∏p=t+1 ∂πp∂πp−1⎞⎠ .
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Here, the only term with a nontrivial sign is ∂λq/∂πq−1. However, because
∂πq/∂πq−1 = ∂πˆq−1/∂πq−1, we have
∂λq
∂πq−1 = ∂πˆq−1∂πq−1 τη + τυ,qπ2t > 0,
establishing that dΛt,t+s/dτυ,t > 0. This reflects that more precise information
in period t is unambiguously more relevant for forming future beliefs. Contrast
this with the case where s = 0. Then
dΛt−r,t
dτυ,t
= Λt−r,t
λt
× ∂λt
∂πt
< 0.
Now, an increase in period t’s information unambiguously decreases the weight
on prior information. So how do these two opposing effects add up in the general
case where r, s > 0? The following proposition establishes that the decrease in
weight on prior information always dominates all increases in future weights.
Proposition 6: Λt−r,t+s is decreasing in τυ,t for all r, s > 0.
Because τυ is decreased in financial crises, Proposition 6 implies that financial
crises are inherently persistent. Intuitively, as the economy receives less news
about the current state of the economy, more weight is put on prior information—
which during a financial crisis is generally pessimistic. In turn, the asset market
continues to constrain the real economy in future periods and, hence, continues
to impede learning about θ˜ t , throwing the economy into a “pessimism trap”.
In contrast, τυ increases during financial booms, making them inherently non-
persistent. Moreover, as larger shocks have stronger effects on τυ, persistence and
non-persistence are increasing when shocks are “scaled up” as in Proposition 5.
More precisely, from Lemma 2, we have that for θ t = υt = 0,
bt+s = π−1t × [τη πˆt−1] × [ ηtρbt−1] × Λt,t+s
= (ρπˆt−1)−1 × [τη πˆt−1] × [ ηtρbt−1] × Λt−1,t+s .
Applying Proposition 6 then yields the formal result.
Corollary 4: For θ t = υt = 0, a financial shock ηt is persistent (compared to
the fixed-τυ benchmark) if and only if ηt < −b˘t−1/(τξ + τη). Otherwise, ηt is non-
persistent. Moreover, “scaling up” ηt as in Proposition 5 increases the persistence
and non-persistence, respectively.
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5.4. Summary
The information-based feedback mechanism underlying our equilibrium cre-
ates two types of asymmetries. On the one hand, shocks are either amplified
or de-amplified. On the other hand, shocks are also either persistent or non-
persistent. In particular, our findings imply that adverse financial shocks are
amplified and persistent, while positive financial shocks are de-amplified and
non-persistent. Moreover, the underlying mechanisms are highly nonlinear, im-
plying that “scaling up” a shock gives rise to more pronounced (de-)amplification
and (non-)persistence, respectively. In consequence, the impact of small shocks
is only little amplified and barely persistent, whereas rare adverse shocks virtually
destroy the informational capacities of the real sector and thereby induce highly
amplified and persistent crashes.
6. Illustration: Impulse responses to financial shocks
In this section, we illustrate our theoretical results using simulated impulse
response paths to financial shocks. To highlight the informational role of credit
constraints, we contrast the impulse responses with counterfactual paths where
τυ is fixed at its steady state level, but credit constraints continue to constrain
the economy. The only difference between our model and the counterfactual
responses is that uncertainty is removed—just as if we were to use the “magic
wand” imagined by Blanchard.31
6.1. Impulse responses to financial shocks
Consider the economy’s response to a nonzero realization of noisy asset demand
η˜t and, for simplicity, suppose that the economy is in its steady state prior to the
arrival of the shock.32 From (10),
31 See the quote in the beginning of the introduction.
32 As usual, we define the steady state as the situation where true productivity θ t equals
its unconditional expectation and there are no noisy perturbations (θ t = ηt = υt = 0). Yet,
agents are unaware of these realizations and beliefs are formed rationally. Prior expectations
are undistorted (bt−1 = 0) and prior uncertainty is fixed at its stochastic steady state value
given the corresponding steady state signal precision (for details see Hamilton, 1994, Ch. 13.5).
To streamline the illustration in this section, we also focus on financial noise shocks. For
noise that originates in the real sector (i.e., nonzero realizations of υ˜t), similar results hold
for γ1 < π˘steady state/τ˚υ + 1 (see Corollary 3 for details).
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bt+s = (τη/πt)Λt,t+s × ηt , (11)
where {πt+s} are recursively defined by {τυ,t+s} and {qt+s} solving (9), pinning
down all other model variables. In particular, by Lemma 2:
Corollary 5: If ηt < 0 (>), then for all s ≥ 0, bt+s and qt+s are strictly smaller
(larger) than their steady state levels in, both, the model and the counterfactual.
Moreover, by Lemma 1:
Corollary 6: If ηt < 0 (>), then for all s ≥ 0, τυ,t+s and πt+s are strictly
smaller (larger) than their steady state level in the model, but are constant in the
counterfactual.
Because the information-based amplification mechanisms crucially depend
on the variability of τυ, it will be seen that this difference drives a wedge between
the model and the counterfactual.
Spillovers to real sector To provide a simple closed form solution for
the “real” variables of the model, consider the special case where v(nit) = n2it/2
and α1(χst) = H−1(χst). This specification of α1 ensures that wages will be un-
perturbed along the impulse response path; i.e., if υt = 0, then ψt = 0, so that
gatherers’ labor supply equals farmers’ labor demand nt .33 From (7), we then
have that
wt = nt1 −m = [qt exp(χdt )1 −m ]
1/2
,
along the impulse response path. Because χdt = H(θ t − log(qt)) is increasing in
θ t−log(qt)with a slope smaller than unity, it follows thatwt and nt are increasing
in qt . Moreover, field output is given by
yt = m ∫ ∞−∞ exp(z) (min{z, log(qt)} − log(wt))dΦ(√τξ z),
along the impulse response path. Substituting wt , output yt can be shown to be
increasing in qt , too. That is, tighter financial constraints spill over to the real
sector, so that the “real” variables are decreased along the impulse response path,
too:
33 To see this, recall that by Lemma 1, θ˜ t + υ˜t = α1(χst) + log(qt). For υt = 0, α1 = H−1 thus
implies that χst = H(θ t − log(qt)) = χdt . Hence, ψt = 0 by (7).
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Corollary 7: If ηt < 0 (>), then for all s ≥ 0, wt+s, nt+s and yt+s are strictly
smaller (larger) than their steady state levels in, both, the model and the counterfac-
tual.
Parametrization We set m = 12 , implying an equal mass of gatherers and
farmers, and set ρ = 0.98, τ−0.5є = 13 , and, τ−0.5ξ = 2, corresponding to a persis-
tent and predictable process for the average log-productivity θ˜ t , with a strong
cross-sectional dispersion of {θ˜ it}. The standard deviations of market noise,
τ−0.5ω and τ−0.5η , are set so that perturbations are high in the financial sector,
τ−0.5η = 4, and low in the real sector (i.e., the real sector is the predominant
source of information to infer about business conditions). Because τ−0.5ω only
matters through Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst}, we directly set Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst} = 4, avoiding the need
to specify Ψθ˜ t ,q˜t . Finally, we use γ0 and γ1 to specify the fraction of firms that is
constrained in the steady state and the relative amplitude of asset price fluctua-
tions compared to productivity. We set γ0, so that approximately 2.5 percent of
firms are constrained in the steady state (γ0 = 4). To emphasize the theoretical
results, we pronounce the importance of financial fluctuations by setting γ1 to
125, implying a relative amplitude that is about two to three times as high as its
empirical counterpart.34
6.2. Amplification and persistence of financial crises
We first illustrate our results on the persistence of financial shocks. From Corol-
laries 1, 2, 4, and Proposition 5 it follows that:
Corollary 8: For all ηt ≠ 0 and s ≥ 0, b¯t+s, qt+s, wt+s, nt+s, and yt+s are strictly
smaller in the model economy than in the counterfactual. I.e., financial crises
are more persistent than in the counterfactual, whereas financial booms are less
persistent than in the counterfactual.
In Figure 6, we plot the responses of the asset price (normalized to
log(qt+s/qsteady state)), employment nt+s, output yt+s, the fraction of constrained
farmers in the economy (i.e., farmers with nit+s = qt+s/wt+s), and the endogenous
signal precision τυ,t+s to an adverse (left column) and positive (right column)
realization of η˜t . In both columns, we consider a rare tail shock with a magnitude
34 With more conservative parameters choices for γ1, we need unrealistically large financial
shocks in order to see a notable amplification. In Section 7.3, we illustrate how small levels
of risk aversion provide further amplification that substitutes for high values of γ1, yielding
similar responses for realistic values of γ1.
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Figure 6. Impulse responses to financial shocks. Notes: Solid lines are model responses to
shocks. Dashed lines are counterfactual responses in the exogenous uncertainty benchmark.
Circles indicate that to retain readability the responses are truncated at the boundary of the
graph.
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of 2.5 standard errors. With a quarterly interpretation of time, these shocks each
correspond to events that occur roughly once every 40 years. As we emphasize in
Section 6.4, because of the nonlinearity of our model, the large shock size consid-
ered here is crucial for the effects established in Corollary 8 to be economically
significant. In all plots, the solid lines correspond to the responses in the model
economy and the dashed lines correspond to the fixed-τυ counterfactual.35
Consider first the case of financial crisis in the left column. Qualitatively,
asset prices (row 1), employment (row 2), and output (row 3) all decline after
a negative financial shock. The causal link between these responses are the fi-
nancial constraints, implying that an increased fraction of farmers is financially
constrained (row 4) after an initial decrease in the asset price, leading to the
decline in employment and output. Note that—as known from the financial fric-
tions literature—the contagion of the real sector is present in the counterfactual
economy as well. We call this the constraining effect of credit constraints.
In addition to this constraining effect, our theoretical results suggest a novel
informational effect of credit constraints. This effect results from the variations
in the signal precision as seen in row 5. By fixing the precision in the counterfac-
tual economy, the difference between our model and the counterfactual exactly
amounts to this novel informational effect. As can be seen, this informational
effect of credit constraints virtually shuts down the informational capacities of
the real sector. This throws the economy in a “pessimism trap” that induces an
amplified and highly persistent response to the considered shock. In contrast,
removing uncertainty in the counterfactual, agents quickly learn about the noisy
character of the crisis, and the crisis largely goes away as has been suggested by
Olivier Blanchard.
35 Note that asset prices and output in the first and third row are truncated at ±20 and 30,
respectively, omitting the initial impact of the shock. The initial impact on log(qt) amounts
to -98 (49) in the model and -63 (63) in the counterfactual in the bust (boom) case. Note that
the impact for the endogenous uncertainty model is higher than in the exogenous uncertainty
benchmark, reflecting the initial amplification established in Corollary 1. Underlying the
strong initial impact in, both, the model and the counterfactual is a dual role of financial
shocks. First, a negative realization of noise traders’ demand has a direct impact on the asset
price in period t and, hence, also a direct impact on economic constraints of the real sector.
Second, the perturbation of asset prices also plays an informational role, effecting the beliefs
of agents in the economy. Because, the second effect persists over time, while the first effect
only applies to period t, this leads to a “discontinuity” between initial impact and the response
of the economy starting in period t + 1. Here, we choose to omit the initial impact to make
the graphs more readable.
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6.3. De-amplification and non-persistence of financial booms
In contrast, after a positive financial shock (depicted in the right column of
Figure 6), the model’s response is less persistent than the counterfactual. This is
because in financial booms, the real sector aggregates more information, so that
agents learn faster about the bullish character of a non-fundamental boom (recall
Proposition 6). Importantly, this implies that financial booms have necessarily
smaller spillover effects on the real sector than financial crises.36 (Note the small
scale of the y-axis in the right column of Figure 6, when comparing the spillover
effects to the left column).
6.4. Convexity of crises
In fact, by Proposition 5 and Corollary 4, the asymmetry between booms and
busts generalizes to a non-linearity which, in particular, implies a general convex-
ity of financial crises. The more negative a financial shock, the more information
is destroyed and, hence, the more amplified and persistent is the resulting crisis.
To illustrate this convexity, consider the half-life of average beliefs in our econ-
omy; i.e., the time s it takes until agents in the economy are half as pessimistic as
they were at the time the shock hit the economy. In the counterfactual—as in any
standard model—shocks are scale-independent, so that the half-life measure is
independent of the shock size. That is, scaling up an initial shock leads to a pro-
portional response along the whole response path, so that the relative realizations
of beliefs across time remain unchanged. In contrast to this, the non-linearity
of our model implies that larger shocks have an disproportionately severe effect,
resulting in a convexity of financial crises.
Corollary 9: Suppose the economy is in its steady state and let T1/2(ηt) denote
the half-life of average beliefs in the economy along an impulse response path to a
financial shock ηt ; i.e., the time s it takes, such that b¯t+r ≤ b¯t/2 for all r ≥ s. Then
it holds that T1/2 is (weakly) decreasing in ηt .
36 Nonlinearities in output and employment are responsible for parts of the asymmetry
between the real variables during a financial boom compared to a financial bust. However,
the responses for asset prices are necessarily perfectly symmetric in the counterfactual. This
implies that the model’s responses during a financial boom are bounded above by the re-
sponses of the counterfactual that are symmetric to the responses of the counterfactual during
a crises. This then further implies that additionally to nonlinearities in output and employ-
ment, spillovers caused by the financial market are also necessarily less pronounced during a
financial boom than during a bust.
40 Essays in Informational Economics
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Size of shock in ση (log scale)
H
a
lf
-l
if
e
o
f
cr
is
is
Counterfactual
Endogenous uncertainty
2.5 sd (every 40 years)
Figure 7. Half-life of adverse financial shocks.
Note that because of the discrete nature of the half-life, it is necessarily locally
constant almost everywhere, so that T1/2 is only weakly decreasing. (Still, from
our more general earlier results we know that crises are strictly more persistent
as shocks get larger.)
In Figure 7, we plot the half-life in our model economy for negative financial
shocks of different sizes. For our baseline simulations with a 2.5 standard error
shock, the half-life is 9 quarters, while, in the conterfactual economy, any financial
shock leads to a half-life of only 2 quarters.
From Proposition 5 it follows that small financial shocks, which are more
frequent, have half-life periods that are similar to the exogenous uncertainty
counterfactual, so that for small shocks our model behaves similar to models that
only reflect the constraining role of credit constraints. However, in the event of a
rare negative shock, the feedback loop and pessimism trap studied in Section 5
drive a significant wedge between the predictions of our model and those of the
counterfactual.
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7. Further empirical predictions
In this section, we point out some further implications of the endogeneity of the
information structure. In particular, we show that common proxies of uncertainty,
such as the dispersion of beliefs (as can be, for instance, measured by the survey
of professional forecasters), risk premia and volatility of financial markets all
increase in crisis times.
7.1. Dispersion of beliefs
One “measure of uncertainty” that is commonly used in the empirical literature
is the diversity of beliefs in the economy. From Lemma 2 we know that the
cross-section of beliefs is normally distributed around b¯t with standard deviation
σt =√τξ/π¯t . Here, an individual agent’s uncertainty 1/π¯t = 1/(πt + τξ) co-moves
with the economy’s (public) uncertainty 1/πt . In particular, when the economy is
caught in a pessimism trap, agents increasingly refer to their own, private signals,
creating a large dispersion in beliefs. On the other hand, during financial booms,
public information becomes more valuable compared to private information,
which reduces the dispersion of beliefs. In sum, opinions are aligned in booms
and dispersed in crises.
Corollary 10: If ηt < 0 (>), then for all s ≥ 0, the cross-sectional dispersion of
beliefs σt+s =√τξ/(πt+s + τξ) is strictly larger (smaller) than its steady state level
in the model, but is constant in the counterfactual.
7.2. Stochastic volatility
Another commonly used measure for uncertainty is the volatility of asset prices.
During credit crises, high uncertainty induces volatile asset market behavior, as
seen from the perspective of an outside observer. The reason is that, as the real
sector becomes less informative, agents place more weight on signals from the
financial market. This means that the asset price is more exposed to financial
market noise and thus subject to larger conditional volatility.37
37 For technical reasons, we here focus on the conditional volatility of asset prices; i.e., the
volatility of asset prices that is inducedbynoise originating in the financialmarket. Computing
the unconditional volatility would require us to integrate out the distribution of noise in the
labor market. While our quasi-Gaussian transformation is aimed at making the updating
problem of agents tractable, there is no analytical solution available for computing the actual
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Corollary 11: Var{log(q˜t)∣Ωt ∖ ηt} is decreasing in πt . Hence, if ηt < 0 (>),
then for all s ≥ 0, the volatility Var{log(q˜t)∣Ωt ∖ ηt} is strictly larger (smaller)
than its steady state level in the model, but is constant in the counterfactual.
7.3. Risk premium
Yet another natural consequence of high uncertainty in financial crises are large
risk premia.
Although agents in our model are risk-neutral with respect to exp(θ˜ t), we
can simulate any risk-attitude towards θ˜ t by shifting the realization of noisy asset
demand shocks η˜t by a constant µ. In the baseline model, we use this feature
to clear the model from any risk effects on the asset price, so that the price only
reflects the first moment of agents’ expectations (see also Footnote 18). Here, we
apply this feature to obtain an equilibrium asset price which behaves as if agents
exhibited risk preferences.
More specifically, suppose that we set µ to µ′ + r/τξ, where µ′ denotes our
baseline choice of µ that induces risk-neutral behavior, and r > 0. Then, the
equilibrium asset price qt reflects a risk-averse attitude towards θ˜ t . In particular,
one can show that in this case, all previous results hold exactly, except that qt as
defined by (8) is replaced by qrt , which relates to qt as follows:
R−1t ≡ qrtqt = exp{−rγ1π−1t },
where Rt is the risk premium associated with each unit of the Lucas tree that is
traded in t. Given this specification, Corollary 6 immediately implies that the
risk premium is increased along the impulse response path.
Corollary 12: Suppose r > 0 and ηt < 0 (>). Then for all s ≥ 0, the risk
premium Rt is strictly larger (smaller) than its steady state level in the model, but is
constant in the counterfactual.
Figure 8 re-plots the economy’s response to an adverse financial shock of
2.5 standard errors for r = 12 . In row 1, we plot asset prices (again, normalized
as log returns) and the corresponding risk premium (in logs). The response
of the risk premium is hump-shaped. This is because the loss of information
that results from tighter constraints on the real sector (see third row) slowly
increases the posterior uncertainty. Accordingly, log assets returns in the first
distribution of labor market noise (see also the discussion around Lemma 1).
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Figure 8. Volatility and risk premium response to an adverse financial shock.
periods after impactmainly reflect the pessimism that is induced through learning.
However, while in the case without risk aversion, prices monotonically increase
as pessimism ebbs away, prices now further reflect the general uncertainty that
characterizes a credit crisis in our model. Accordingly, as uncertainty increases
along the crisis path, asset prices are more and more repressed by this increased
uncertainty.
This additional downward pressure of prices tends to tighten financial con-
straints on the real sector even further and, therefore, introduces additional
amplification. Note that in our numerical simulation this additional amplifica-
tion is somewhat obscured by a change in the model parameters.38
38 Because of the additional amplification due to risk-aversion, responses in the baseline
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8. Concluding remarks
This chapter of my dissertation proposes a novel mechanism that restricts the
ability of agents to learn from the real sector during financial crises. Incorpo-
rating this idea into a dynamic macroeconomic model with a financial sector,
we show that the transmission of financial shocks is inherently asymmetric and
nonlinear. While fluctuations on the financial market have only little impact
on the economy during “normal times”, unusually adverse shocks destroy the
informational capacities of the economy and therefore lead to disproportionately
severe and persistent crises.
At a methodological level, we show that a combination of informational and
financial frictions gives rise to a nonlinear signal structure, which explains why
learning is less efficient in crisis times. Specifically, we establish that learning
from “concave” signals leads to higher posterior uncertainty whenever the signal
realizes in “flatter” regions. In a general theorem, this is shown to hold for a
large class of information structures and to hold independently of the specific
properties of ourmodel. Equippedwith these results, we then furtherdemonstrate
how learning from nonlinear signals can be incorporated within an analytically
tractable conjugate Gaussian framework.
Going beyond our main results, our model also provides a number of further
predictions that are accessible to an empirical verification. In particular, we show
that both uncertainty and also common empirical proxies of uncertainty (such as
the dispersion of beliefs, the volatility of asset prices, and risk premia) increase
during financial crises.
While these predictions are in line with conventional wisdom and stylized
facts, a systematic empirical analysis on the causal links is an important direction
for future research. Another promising road is to directly examine how the
informational capacity of the economy changes across different states of the world.
In particular, applying the empirical methods recently developed by Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2012), a natural investigation suggested by our model is to
examine the impact of credit conditions on the persistence of beliefs.
parametrization lead to a crisis that spans more than a century. Here, we therefore reduce
the value of γ1 to 30, implying a relative amplitude of asset price fluctuations compared to
productivity that is roughly in line with its empirical counterpart. We also set γ0 = 7 in order
to target again a fraction of 2.5 percent of farmers who are constrained in the steady state.
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A. Mathematical appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
As q¯ → ∞, xit = exp(θ it)/wt and hence χ˜dt = log{∫∞−∞ exp(z)dΦ(√τξ (z −
θ˜ t))} − log(q¯) = θ˜ t + 1/(2τξ) − log(q¯). Therefore, Var{θ˜ t ∣wt} = Var{ χ˜dt ∣wt} =
Var{ χ˜dt ∣χst}, where the last equality follows since χ˜st is a monotone transformation
of w˜t .
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
We separate the proof into two steps. Lemma 3 establishes that Var{θ˜∣s} =
α2(s)2Var{X˜} is increasing in s if we are in the case where θ˜∣s = α1(s)+ α2(s)X˜
and where f is concave (the case where f is convex follows analogue). Lemma 5
establishes the corresponding results for the case where f (θ˜)∣s is ordered by the
MLRP.
A.2.1. Location-scale distributions under concave transformations
Lemma 3: Let д ∶ R → R be a differentiable, (strictly) increasing, and (strictly)
concave function and X˜ a square-integrable, non-degenerate random variable with
mean zero over R. Then, for any positive number v > 0, there exists a unique,
differentiable function α21 ∶ R→ R++ such that
Var{д(α1 +√α21(α1)X˜)} = v ∀α1 ∈ R.
Moreover, α21 is (strictly) increasing. When д = H, α21 has limits
limα1→−∞ α21(α1) = (Var{X˜})−1v and limα1→∞ α21(α1) =∞.
Proof. We only show the “strict” version of the lemma. Define G(α1, α2) =
Var{д(α1 +√α2X˜} − v. G is clearly differentiable in both arguments. We start
by establishing that Gα1 < 0 and Gα2 > 0.
Suppose αˇ1 < αˆ1 ∈ R. Define дˇ(x) = д(αˇ1+ x√α2) and дˆ(x) analogously. The
function дˇ induces the density Fдˇ(X)(y) = FX(дˇ−1(y)) of дˇ(X˜). Similarly we
find Fдˆ(X)(y). This means, Fдˇ(X)(y) = Fдˆ(X)(k(y)), where it is straightforward
to check that k(y) ≡ дˆ(дˇ−1(y)) is a differentiable contraction mapping with
k(y0) = E{дˆ(X)} for some y0. In particular, k satisfies the condition in Lemma 4
and thus G(αˇ1, α2) > G(αˆ1, α2). This proves Gα1 < 0.
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For Gα2 > 0, take αˇ2 < αˆ2 ∈ R and define дˇ(x) = д(α1 + x√αˇ2) and дˆ(x)
analogously. Proceeding as before, we find that Fдˆ(X)(y) = Fдˇ(X)(k(y)) with
k(y) = д(αд−1(y)), α =√αˇ2/αˆ2 < 1. Here, k need not be a contractionmapping
in general. Still, for y ≤ y∗ with k(y∗) = y∗, k′(y) ≤ α < 1 and k(y) ≤ y for y >
y∗. Also, there exists a (unique) y0 such that k(y0) = E{дˇ(X)} < д(0) = k(y∗).
Using these two properties, the following inequalities hold,
∣k(y)− k(y0)∣ = ∣k(y)− k(y∗)∣+ ∣k(y∗)− k(y0)∣ ≤ ∣y− y∗∣+α∣y∗− y0∣ < ∣y− y0∣
if y > y∗, and ∣k(y) − k(y0)∣ ≤ α∣y − y0∣ ≤ ∣y − y0∣
if y ≤ y∗, ensuring that Lemma 4 is applicable. Consequently, G(α1, αˆ2) >
G(α1, αˇ2) and Gα2 > 0.
Now turn to the existence of α21. For large α2, G(α1,α2) goes to infinity as can
be seen by the inequality
Var{д(α1 +√α2X˜} ≥ Var{д′(α1)√α2min{X˜ , 0}} = α2 ⋅ const.
Also, G(α1, 0) = −v < 0, that is, by continuity of G and its monotonicity in α2, a
unique α2 ≡ α21(α1) ∈ R++ must exist, with G(α1, α21(α1)) = 0. By the implicit
function theorem, α21 is continuous and differentiable with α′21(α1) = −Gα1/Gα2 >
0. When д = H, it becomes almost linear for large negative values of α1, i.e.
v = lim
α1→−∞Var{H(α1 −√α21(α1)X˜)} = limα1→−∞Var{α1 −H(α1 −√α21(α1)X˜)}= Var{√ lim
α1→−∞ α21(α1)X˜}= lim
α1→−∞ α21(α1)VarX˜
and thus limα1→−∞ α21(α1) = (VarX˜)−1v. Similarly, since limα1→∞G(α1, α2) =−v for any level of α2, limα1→∞ α21(α1) =∞. ◇
The main rationale behind the previous proof was to compare the variances
of a random variable X˜ (in our case, this was дˇ(X˜) or дˆ(X˜)) and its transform
k(X˜) with k satisfying some regularity conditions. When these conditions are
merely that k be a contraction mapping, the result is obvious and most textbooks
(see for example, ) mention it. In our case, however, a (much) more general result
is needed since the second set of regularity conditions we derive in Lemma 3
clearly allow for functions with slopes larger than one.
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Lemma 4: Let X˜ , Y˜ be two random variables over an interval I ⊆ R with cumula-
tive distributions functions FX , FY , and k ∶ I → R be an increasing function such
that FY(x) = FX(k(x)) and ∣k(x) − E{X˜})∣ ≤ ∣x − x0∣ for all x ∈ I and a given
x0 ∈ I. Then, Var{X˜} ≤ Var{Y˜}. If ∣k(x) − E{X˜}∣ < ∣x − x0∣ somewhere in the
support of X˜ the inequality is strict.
Proof. We only show the “strict” version of the lemma. Without loss of generality
we may assume E{X˜} = 0, I = R (proof is analogous for any other interval) and
x0 = 0 (Var{Y˜} is invariant under shifts x ↦ x + x0). First note, that we can
restrict our attention to functions k = k+ with k+(x) = x for all x ≤ 0. This is
the case since any k with k(0) = 0 can be split up into two functions, k−and
k+, which are just the identity on the positive (negative) side of zero and k on
the other. We recover the result for general k by constructing an intermediate
random variable Y˜+with cdf FY+(x) = FX(k+(x)). The intermediate random
variable Y˜ has then mean E{Y˜} ≥ 0 = E{X˜} and variance Var{Y˜} ≥ Var{X˜}.
Now, FY(x) = FX(k(x)) = FX(k+(k−(x))) = FY+(k−(x)), and thus F−Y(x) =
F−Y+(−k−(−x)). The function −k−(−⋅) is the identity on the negative side of
zero and the mean of −Y˜ is also negative. We can use the “reduced” result shown
below and get Var{Y˜} = Var{−Y˜} ≥ Var{−Y˜+} = Var{Y˜+} ≥ Var{X˜}.
Second, it is sufficient to prove the result for functions k+ which are not only
the identity for negative values of x but also above a certain (possibly large) level
M > 0. This is without loss of generality by a standard limit argument.
Third, even simpler functions may be used to accomplish the proof, namely
functions kz,c of the form
kz,c(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x x > z + c
z z < x ≤ z + c
x x ≤ z z > 0, c > 0.
These functions only slightly differ from the identity but still they are very effective
in that they are the building blocks of more general functions k+. More precisely,
any k+with an upper bound of M > 0 can be decomposed as follows,
k+ = limn→∞ kk+(Nh),Nh−k+(Nh) ○ . . . ○ kk+(2h),2h−k+(2h) ○ kk+(h),h−k+(h), (12)
where h ≡ M/N , N = 2n, and where the limit holds under the sup-norm. Hence
fix z > 0 and consider the random variable Y˜c given by cdf FYc(x) = FX(kz,c(x)).
We would like to show that д(c) ≡ Var{Y˜c} −Var{X˜} is strictly larger than zero
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for c > 0. Clearly д(0) = 0. Straightforward computation shows that
д′(c) = 2(z + c)(∆ − ∆2) + 2∆ ∫ z+cz x dFX(x) ≥ 0, (13)
where ∆ = FX(z + c) − FX(z) ≥ 0. Given our assumption that ∣k(x) − E{X˜}∣ <∣x − x0∣ somewhere in the support of X˜, the approximation in (12) will always
involve functions kz,c such that ∆ > 0 and (13) is strict.39 Therefore, Var{X˜} <
Var{Y˜}. ◇
This concludes the proof of the theorem for the case where θ˜∣s belongs to a
location-scale family of distributions.
A.2.2. MLRP distributions under concave transformations
Lemma 5: Let I ⊆ R be a nonempty (and possibly unbounded) real interval, let
X1, X2 be two random variables over I which exhibit the monotone likelihood ratio
property, i.e. f2/ f1 is increasing with fi being the (possibly degenerate) density of
Xi , and let д be an increasing continuous function defined on I.
1. Var{д(X1)} ≤ Var{д(X2)} if д is convex and Var{X2} ≤ Var{X1} <∞.
2. Var{д(X1)} ≥ Var{д(X2)} if д is concave and Var{X1} ≤ Var{X2} <∞.
In both cases, the inequality is strict whenever f2/ f1 is strictly increasing and д is
strictly convex or concave somewhere in the support of f2.
Proof. We restrict ourselves to I = [a, b] and distributions of X1, X2 with finite
support. It is straightforward to generalize the result first to continuous dis-
tributions and then to arbitrary, possibly unbounded intervals. Moreover, it is
sufficient to prove the result solely for increasing convex functions д since all other
cases can be reduced to this case by flipping д either vertically or horizontally.
We will prove the result for functions д of the form
дz,c(x) = x + (c − 1)(x − z) 1{x≥z} ∀z ∈ R, c ≥ 1.
39 Because Var{Y˜} is monotonic in k—the closer k is to the identity, the closer Var{Y˜} is to
Var{X˜}—the “strictness” does not vanish in the limit of (12). It rather becomes larger with
every increase in n.
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The general case follows by iteration,
д(x) = lim
N→∞ (дд(zN),д′(zN)/д′(zN−1) ○ . . . ○ дд(z1),д′(z1)/д′(z0))×× (д′(z0)(x − z0) + д(z0)) ,
where zi = a + i(b − a)/N . To have MLRP well-defined for pairs of discrete
distributions, assume X1 and X2 share a common support {x1 < x2 < . . . < xN},
N ∈ N, and assign probability weights (pi) and (qi) to the respective nodes.
MLRP then translates to
0 ≤ q1
p1
≤ q2
p2
≤ . . . ≤ qN
pN
≤∞.
Now define H ∶ RN → R by
H(y1, . . . , yN) =∑(qi − pi)y2i − (∑ qi yi)2 + (∑ pi yi)2 .
Note that H((xi)) = Var{X2} −Var{X1} ≥ 0. By regarding the first two deriva-
tives with respect to c we will now show that
h(c) ≡ H((дz,(c+1)(xi))i) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ R, c ≥ 0.
Assume z ∈ [x j−1, x j). Then, h(c) is a quadratic polynomial in c ≥ 0 with the
following two derivatives at c = 0,
h′(0) = 2 N∑
i= j qi(xi − z)(xi − µ2) − 2
N∑
i= j pi(xi − z)(xi − µ1)≡ 2Bz − 2Az (14)
and
h′′(0) = 2⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
N∑
i= j qi(xi − z)2 − ⎛⎝
N∑
i= j qi(xi − z)⎞⎠
2⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
− 2⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
N∑
i= j pi(xi − z)2 − ⎛⎝
N∑
i= j pi(xi − z)⎞⎠
2⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦≡ 2Dz − 2Cz . (15)
If we can show that both expressions are nonnegative, we are done since h(0) =
Var{X2} −Var{X1} ≥ 0 by assumption.
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1st derivative. First note that Bz and Az are continuous and piecewise linear
in z ∈ [x1, xN] with Bx1 −Ax1 ≥ 0 and BxN −AxN = 0. We will show that Bz −Az is
single-peaked or quasi-concave on [x1, xN], meaning it is impossible for Bz − Az
to first drop below 0 and then rise again to 0 at the right boundary xN . More
precisely, we claim that if the derivative B′z − A′z is nonpositive at some point z, it
stays nonpositive thereafter, preventing u-shaped behavior.
Suppose z ∈ [x j−1, x j) and B′z ≤ A′z, i.e.−B′z =∑
i≥ j qi(xi − µ2) ≥∑i≥ j pi(xi − µ1) = −A′z . (16)
It is sufficient to show that B′z ≤ A′z also in the next interval [x j , x j+1). The
rest follows by iteration. We distinguish between three cases. First, assume
q j(x j − µ2) ≤ p j(x j − µ1). Then, by omitting the terms with i = j on both
sides of (16) we only increase the inequality and trivially get that −B′z ≥ −A′z
for all z ∈ [x j , x j+1). Note that we are automatically in the first case whenever
µ2 ≥ x j ≥ µ1. Second, assume q j(x j − µ2) > p j(x j − µ1) and x j > µ2 ≥ µ1. Thus,
using MLRP, we have for all i > j,
qi
pi
≥ q j
p j
≥ x j − µ1
x j − µ2 > xi − µ1xi − µ2 ,
where the last inequality follows since x ↦ (x − µ1)/(x − µ2) is decreasing when
µ2 > µ1 (which follows fromMLRP). By xi > x j > µ2 this is easily rearranged to
qi(xi − µ2) > pi(xi − µ1) for all i > j. After summing over all i > j we obtain for
z ∈ [x j , x j+1), −B′z =∑
i> j qi(xi − µ2) >∑i> j pi(xi − µ1) = −A′z .
Third, assume q j(x j − µ2) > p j(x j − µ1) and µ2 ≥ µ1 > x j. In a fashion similar to
before we find that for all i < j
qi
pi
≤ q j
p j
≤ µ1 − x j
µ2 − x j < µ1 − xiµ2 − xi ,
and so qi(µ2 − xi) < pi(µ1 − xi) for all i < j. Using∑Ni=1 qi(xi − µ2) = 0 we see
that for z ∈ [x j−1, x j),−B′z =∑
i≥ j qi(xi − µ2) =∑i< j qi(µ2 − xi) <∑i< j pi(µ1 − xi) = −A′z ,
contradicting our assumption. The third case is therefore not possible given the
assumption. This concludes the proof that h′(0) ≥ 0 for all possible z.
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2nd derivative. Again, note that Cz and Dz are both continuous in z ∈[x1, xN]. However, other than before, these two functions are no longer piecewise
linear but piecewise quadratic and therefore require a more subtle treatment.
First, note that Dz − Cz is quasi-concave on each sub-interval [x j−1, x j]. Suppose
this did not hold. This means, the constant second derivative D′′z − C′′z must be
positive,
D′′z /2 = F2(x j−1)(1 − F2(x j−1)) > F1(x j−1)(1 − F1(x j−1)) = C′′z /2, (17)
where Fi denotes the cumulative distribution function of Xi . At the same time,
the first derivatives D′z −C′z at the left and right boundaries must be negative and
positive, respectively. Let us regard the right boundary. A positive first derivative
implies,
lim
z↗x j D′z/2 = −F2(x j−1)∑i≥ j qi(xi − x j) > −F1(x j−1)∑i≥ j pi(xi − x j) = limz↗x j C′z/2.
(18)
It is a well-known feature of MLRP that the corresponding conditional distribu-
tions (Xi − x j)∣(Xi ≥ x j) satisfy MLRP again. Necessarily, the conditional means
must be ordered again,40
(1 − F2(x j−1))−1∑
i≥ j qi(xi − x j) ≥ (1 − F1(x j−1))−1∑i≥ j pi(xi − x j).
Now, we multiply this nonnegative inequality with (17) to obtain,
F2(x j−1)∑
i≥ j qi(xi − x j) ≥ F1(x j−1)∑i≥ j pi(xi − x j),
contradicting (18) and establishing quasi-concavity of Dz − Cz on each interval[x j−1, x j).
The quasi-concavity on the intervals allows us to restrict our attention to z’s
that lie on the interval boundaries, i.e. it is sufficient to prove D j ≥ C j where, with
slight abuse of notation, we write D j for Dx j and similarly for C j. Still, D1 ≥ C1
and DN = CN .
We will now show the claim D j ≥ C j by induction over N . It is trivial for
N = 2. In the following, suppose it holds for N − 1 points in the support of X1
and X2. To show it for N points, assume the contrary is true, namely there exists
a j such that C j > D j while at the same time Var{X2} ≥ Var{X1}. We will try to
40 Note that 1 − F2(x j−1) is precisely∑i≥ j q i and the same holds for F1.
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increase Var{X1} relative to Var{X2} as much as possible but eventually see that
it is not possible that the former exceeds the latter.
Define δ = x2 − x1 and rewrite
C1 = Var{X1} = δ2(p1 − p21) + 2δp1s1 + C01 ,
where s1 = ∑i>3 pi(xi − x2). C01 is the variance of X1 when we collapse x1 and x2
by reducing their distance δ to zero. Similar results emerge for D1 = Var{X2}, s2
and D01 . By the induction hypothesis we must have C01 > D01 , otherwise D j would
have to be larger than C j. Note that s1 and s2 are independent of the actual levels
of p1 and p2. From Lemma 6 we can infer that p1(1 − p1) ≥ q1(1 − q1) (otherwise
we already have our contradiction D j ≥ C j), thus for C1 to be possibly larger than
D1, we would certainly need s2 > s1.
Now, let us study how these expressions change if we shift mass from x2 to x1.
Since p2 does not enter C1 directly,41 a mass increase towards x1 by one percent
yields
p1
∂C1
∂p1
= C1 − C01 − δ2p21 ≥ 0 (19)
q1
∂D1
∂q1
= D1 − D01 − δ2q21 . (20)
Here, the positivity of the bottom derivative relies on the fact that q1 ≤ 1/2 (which
is true if p1 − p21 ≥ q1 − q21 and p1 ≥ q1) and therefore δ2q1(1 − 2q1) ≥ 0. In virtue
of the positivity, we increase q1 to make D1 as large as possible without violating
MLRP, i.e. we set
q1 = p1χ ≡ p1 1 −∑i>2 qi1 −∑i>2 pi .
The ratio χ here guarantees that p1/q1 = p2/q2. In other words, we used the
positivity of (19) to reduce the two degrees of freedom of the two mass shifts to
one. Precisely by percentage shifts up or down, we can now control how much
weight both distributions lay on x1, thereby keeping our equatedMLRP condition
p1/q1 = p2/q2 intact. The overall effect of these remaining percentage shifts on
D1 − C1 is a comparison of (19) and (20).
First, assume p1∂C1/∂p1 ≥ q1∂D1/∂q1. Then, adding the two inequalities
C01 > D01 and δ2p21 ≥ δ2q21 to this yieldsC1 > D1, a contradiction to our assumption
41 Notice that C01 only the depends on the sum p1 + p2 and is invariant under mass shifts
from one to the other.
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Var{X2} ≥ Var{X1}. Now, suppose p1∂C1/∂p1 < q1∂D1/∂q1. This means, we
increase D1 − C1 by moving more weight from x2 to x1 until there is nothing left
at x2, i.e. p2 = q1 = 0. This is equivalent to omitting x2, so, again, we know by
the induction hypothesis that D1 ≥ C1, another contradiction. In sum, we have
shown that D j ≥ C j for all j whenever Var{X2} ≥ Var{X1}, completing the proof.◇
Lemma 6: Let (pi)1≤i≤N , (qi)1≤i≤N , (C j)2≤ j≤N , and (D j)2≤ j≤N be specified as
above.
If p1 − p21 ≤ q1 − q21 then D j ≥ C j for all j ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2.
Proof. Note that, since p1 ≥ q1 by MLRP, p1 must be larger than 1/2. In particular,
for any ℓ ≥ 1,
F1(xℓ)(1 − F1(xℓ)) ≤ F2(xℓ)(1 − F2(xℓ)). (21)
If F2(xℓ) ≥ 1/2, this immediately holds since F1(xℓ) ≥ F2(xℓ) by MLRP so both
F2(xℓ) and F2(xℓ) are in the decreasing region of x ↦ x(1 − x). Now suppose
F2(xℓ) < 1/2. We know that 1/2 ≥ F2(xℓ) ≥ q1 ≥ 1 − p1 and all three are in the
increasing region, i.e. F2(xℓ)(1−F2(xℓ)) ≥ p1(1−p1) ≥ F1(xℓ)(1−F1(xℓ)), where
the last inequality follows from the fact that F1(xℓ) ≥ p1 ≥ 1/2, so both are in the
decreasing region. This establishes (21).
The proof itself works by induction over N . The result is immediate if N = 2.
Assume it holds for distributions with a support of N − 1 points. We define
δ = xN − xN−1 and rewrite
C j = δ2pN(1 − pN) + 2δpN r1 + C0j ,
where r1 = (∑ j<i<N pi(xN−1 − xi) + (xN−1 − x j)F1(x j)) ≥ 0. C0j denotes the N −1
points analog of C j where we collapse points xN and xN−1 by reducing their
distance δ to zero. Similar results emerge for D j, r2 and D0j . By the induction
hypothesis we must have D0j ≥ C0j . Note that r1 and r2 are independent of the
actual levels of pN and pN−1. From (21) we can infer that pN(1−pN) ≤ qN(1−qN),
thus if C j was bigger than D j, we would certainly need r1 > r2.
Now, let us study how these expressions change if we shift mass from xN−1 to
xN . Since pN−1 does not enter C j directly,42 a mass increase towards xN by one
42 Notice that C0j only the depends on the sum pN−1 + pN and is invariant under mass shifts
from one to the other.
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percent yields
pN
∂C j
∂pN
= C j − C0j − δ2p2N ≥ 0 (22)
qN
∂D j
∂qN
= D j − D0j − δ2q2N . (23)
Here, the positivity of the upper derivative relies on the fact that pN ≤ 1− p1 ≤ 1/2
and therefore δ2pN(1 − 2pN) ≥ 0. In virtue of the positivity, we increase pN to
make C j as large as possible without violating MLRP, i.e. we set
pN = qN χ ≡ qN 1 −∑i<N−1 pi1 −∑i<N−1 qi .
The ratio χ here guarantees that pN/qN = pN−1/qN−1. In other words, we used
the positivity of (22) to reduce the two degrees of freedom of the two mass shifts
to one. Precisely by percentage shifts up or down, we can now control how much
weight both distributions lay on xN , thereby keeping our equatedMLRP condition
pN/qN = pN−1/qN−1 intact. The overall effect of these remaining percentage shifts
on D j − C j is a comparison of (22) and (23).
First, assume pN∂C j/∂pN ≤ qN∂D j/∂qN . Then, adding the two inequalities
C0j ≤ D0j and δ2p2N ≤ δ2q2N yields C j ≤ D j and we are done. Now, suppose
pN∂C j/∂pN > qN∂D j/∂qN . This means, we increase C j − D j by moving more
weight from xN−1 to xN until there is nothing left at xN−1, i.e. pN−1 = qN−1 = 0.
This is equivalent to omitting xN−1, so, again, we knowby the induction hypothesis
that D j ≥ C j. In sum, we have shown that there is no way in which C j could
exceed D j, for any j ≥ 2 and any N ≥ 2. ◇
This concludes the proof of the theorem for the general MLRP case.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
It is straightforward to show that H is increasing concave. Hence, given Prop-
erties 1 and 2, we can apply Theorem 1. In case (i) of Property 2, the claim then
follows directly from the theorem. In case (ii), the theorem yields thatVar{ χ˜mt ∣χst}
is increasing in χst , implying that Var{θ˜ t ∣χst} = Var{θ˜ t−log(q¯)∣χst} = Var{ χ˜mt ∣χst}
is also increasing in χst .
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A.4. Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that χ˜mt = θ˜ t − log(qt), so that given a flat prior43 over θ˜ t , the posterior
belief θ˜ t ∣χst is normally distributed around α1(χst)+ log(q¯) with variance α2(χst)2
by Property 2 (ii). This is exactly the same posterior belief a Bayesian updater
would hold after observing a Gaussian signal θ˜ t + υ˜t with realization α1(χst) +
log(q¯) and variance τ−1υ = α2(χst)2 ≡ α21(α1(χst)) = α21(θ t + υt − log(q¯)). Note
that τυ is increasing and has the desired limiting properties by Lemma 3. Thus,
an observer with a flat prior updates his information given χst as if the signal he
receives is Gaussian with a constant variance that happens to be τ−1υ . The crucial
step is now to show that given this informational equivalence holds for a flat prior
distribution of θ˜ t , it continues to hold for any normal prior over θ˜ t .
Suppose an observer holds a normal prior over θ˜ t as given by a pdf p(θ) =
ϕθ0 ,τ−10 (θ) and receives some signal s with pdf q(s∣θ) such that he would have
updated to an s-dependent normal posterior p0(θ∣s) = ϕµ(s),τ(s)−1(θ) had he
held a flat prior p0(θ) = 1 over θ˜ t . This means,
p0(θ∣s) = q(s∣θ)∫ q(s∣z)dz .
Therefore, the updated posterior pdf p(θ∣s) given a normal prior can be written
as
p(θ∣s) = q(s∣θ)p(θ)
∫ q(s∣z)p(z)dz = p0(θ∣s)p(θ)∫ p0(z∣s)p(z)dz ,
which is just a normal pdf withmean (τ0+τ(s))−1(τ0θ0+τ(s)µ(s)) and variance(τ0 + τ(s))−1. This is exactly the posterior distribution a Bayesian updater infers
from observing the realization µ(s) of a Gaussian signal θ˜ t + υ˜t where τυ =
τ(s).
A.5. Proof of Lemma 2
To verify the fixed point note that given the law ofmotion (8), q˜t is informationally
equivalent to a signal
θ˜ t + δη η˜t + δυ υ˜t ,
43 We use the flat prior merely for simplicity. The argument goes through for any normal
prior with a variance larger than some (constant) upper bound.
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where δη = τξ+τητξ+τη+τυ and δυ = τυτξ+τη+τυ . Straightforward application of Bayes rule
yields
bit = π¯−1t × [τξ τη τυ πˆt−1] ×
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
θ t + ξit
θ t + ηt
θ t + υt
ρbt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(24)
when solving the inference problem including the private signal s˜it , and yields bt
as stated in the lemma when considering only the publicly observable history
of prices. Aggregating over i, substituting into the equilibrium price as pinned
down by the marginal trader
qt = E{A˜t ∣bit , π¯t} = exp{γ0 + γ1(σt√τξ (η˜t − µ) + b¯t + γ1/(2π¯t))},
noting that (24) implies a cross-sectional variation σ2t = Var{bit} = τξ/π¯2t , and
using µ = γ1/(2τξ) verifies that the mapping (8) is indeed a fixed point.
Uniqueness follows from following the same steps above, but leaving δη and δυ
unspecified. Solving the resulting system of equations yields two solutions. The
first one being the one stated in the lemma and the second one being δη = δυ = 0.
Note that the second solution implies that rational beliefs and, hence, market
prices are invariant to the realization of noisy asset demand η˜t . Therefore, δη =
δυ = 0 clearly violates market clearing for almost all realizations of η˜t , implying
uniqueness of the first solution.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3
Please note that the notation in this proof is inconsistent with the notation in the
remainder of this chapter. We are sorry for any confusion arising from that.
A.6.1. Existence
To show the existence of a solution to the fixed point problem (9), we first derive
the inverse of дq. We used дq to describe the functional form of the log-linear
equilibrium asset price qt , defined in equation (8). It can be rewritten in terms
of τυ, r ≡ log(qt)∣τυ→0, and s ≡ γ1(θ t + υt) + γ0,
log(qt) = дq(τυ , Ωt) = (1 − τυπ¯t )r + τυπ¯t s.
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Dropping the second argument Ωt for simplicity from now on, the inverse reads
д−1q (log(qt)) = (π¯t ∣τυ→0) log(qt) − rs − log(qt) . (25)
Evidently, д−1q is only defined for log(qt) between r and s whenever r /= s . Then,
its range is found to be [0,∞), i.e. дτ(log(qt)) − д−1q (log(qt)) attains дτ(r) > 0
for log(qt) = r and converges to −∞ for log(qt)→ s. By the intermediate value
theorem, there exists a value for log(qt) such that дτ(log(qt))− д−1q (log(qt)) = 0.
For r = s, д−1q is not well-defined, so we cannot study the problem in terms of (9).
Instead, we consider the usual formof the fixedpoint equation, дq(дτ(log(qt))) =
log(qt). Obviously, since дq = r, log(qt) = r is the unique fixed point if r = s.
A.6.2. Uniqueness
Let δ = s− r. For δ < 0, д−1q is strictly decreasing and дτ − д−1q is strictly increasing.
Thus, a unique fixed point exists if δ < 0. The case δ = 0 is discussed above. Given
these considerations, we see that there must be a non-empty set Ξ ⊂ R+ × R4
characterizing all parameter constellations Ωt that lead to unique equilibria. Bear
in mind that r and s are just combinations of different components of Ωt that we
use to describe the influence of Ωt on дq(log(qt)). Since the set {Ωt ∣ δ ≤ 0}
entirely lies in Ξ, we now derive bounds for the case δ > 0.
Bound 1 In virtue of (25), the fixed-point equation (9) is equivalent to
(s − s˚ − z)(1 + τυ(−z)
π¯t ∣τυ→0 ) − s = −r, (26)
where s˚ ≡ (s−γ0)/γ1 and z ≡ log(qt)− s˚ ∈ (r− s˚, s− s˚). This has a unique solution
for any value of r if the left hand side is strictly decreasing for all z ∈ (r, s), i.e.
s − s˚ < f (s − s˚) ≡ inf
z∈(−∞,s−s˚) π¯t ∣τυ→0 + τυ(−z)−τ′υ(−z) + z. (27)
It is evident that the function f is increasing. Apart from that, we show in Lemma
7 below that there exists a unique bound s∗ such that below s∗, f (s) > s while
f (s∗) = s∗. Note that this also implies that f (s) > −∞ for any s. Using s∗ the
condition for uniqueness independent of r becomes s − s˚ < s∗, or, split according
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to the signs of γ1 − 1,
γ1(θ t + υt) + γ0 = s < M , for γ1 > 1
γ1(θ t + υt) + γ0 = s > M , for γ1 < 1
M0 > 0, for γ1 = 1,
whereM = (γ1s∗−γ0)/ ∣ γ1− 1 ∣ andM0 = γ1s∗−γ0. Interestingly, the uniqueness
condition for γ1 = 1 is independent of s, i.e. whenever M0 > 0, any equilibrium is
unique. On the other hand, forM0 < 0, we always find some values for r such that
the equilibrium is not unique, irrespective of s. Linearly redefiningM establishes
the desired bounds on θ t + υt .
Bound 2 Similar to (26), the fixed-point equation (9) can be rewritten to
δ π¯t ∣τυ→0
τυ(−z) + π¯t ∣τυ→0 + z = s − s˚, (28)
with δ, z, s, s˚ as above. Now suppose γ1 /= 1. To find an upper bound δ∗ for s − r
that establishes uniqueness independent of s, we set δ∗ to the largest level need
to have that the left hand side of (28) is increasing, i.e.
δ∗ ≡ inf
z∈R (τυ(−z) + π¯t ∣τυ→0)2−τ′υ(−z) π¯t ∣τυ→0 > 0.
It now holds that, whenever δ = γ1(θ t +υt)+γ0− log(qt)∣τυ→0 < δ∗, the left hand
side of (28) is strictly increasing and hence has a unique solution. The bound
δ∗ is by construction the largest with this property. The inequality stated in the
proposition can be derived by a linear transformation.
Let us regard the special case γ1 = 1. Here, we can do better than δ∗. Since
s − s˚ is constant at γ0/γ1, to ensure uniqueness δ must only be small enough for
(28) to have a unique solution if the right hand side equals γ0/γ1, i.e.
δ < δ∗∗ ≡ sup{δ ∣ (28) has a unique solution for s − s˚ = γ0/γ1}.
Clearly, δ∗∗ ≥ δ∗ > 0.
Lemma 7: The following two statements hold:
1. As x →∞, x τ′υ(x)→ 0.
2. Let f be as defined in (27). Then, lims→−∞ f (s)− s > 0 while lims→∞ f (s)−
s < 0.
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Proof. We first show part 1. Recall that τυ(x) = 1/συ(x)2 is defined by the follow-
ing implicit equation,
Var{H(συ(x)X˜ + x)} = σ2c , (29)
where X˜ is standard normally distributed and we denote Var{ χ˜d ∣ χs} by σ2c .
Note that H is similar to a standard kink function H˚ = min{⋅, 0} in that they are
almost equal outside the area around the kink where H is smooth while H˚ is not.
Now, for x large enough, the probability mass of the distribution of συ(x)X˜ + x
that is assigned to the area around the kink becomes arbitrarily small. Therefore,
for large x, the solution συ of (29) behaves exactly like the solution σ˚υ to the
implicit equation
Var{H˚(σ˚υ(x)X˜ + x)} = σ2c . (30)
In contrast to (29), we can analytically compute the variance on the left hand
side of (30),
Var{H˚(σ˚υ(x)X˜ + x)} = σ˚υ(x)2F(x/σ˚ υ(x)),
where F(β) = 1 − Φ(β) − ϕ(β)2 + β2(Φ(β) − Φ(β)2) − βϕ(β)(2Φ(β) − 1).
Substituting this in (30), the implicit definition for τυ(x) reads,
F (√τυ(x) x2) = σ2c τυ(x).
Differentiating this with respect to x yields,
F′
2
(τυ(x))−1/2(x τ′υ(x) + 2τυ(x)) = σ2c τ′υ(x). (31)
Regard the signs on both sides of (31): F′(β) = −2(ϕ(β)−β(1−Φ(β)))Φ(β) < 0
due to the standard bound on the tails of Φ, 1−Φ(β) < ∣β∣−1ϕ(β), and τ′υ(x) < 0
as we saw in Proposition 2. This immediately implies that x τ′υ(x)+ 2τυ(x)must
be positive, or in other words,
0 > x τ′υ(x) > −2τυ(x),
which establishes part 1 of the lemma for we know τυ(x) converges to 0 as x
tends to infinity (see Lemma 1).
In (27), we defined the function f such that
f (−s) = inf
z>−s π¯t ∣τυ→0 + τυ(z)−τ′υ(z) − z.
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The first claimed property lims→−∞ f (s) − s = lims→∞ f (−s) + s > 0 means that
there exists an s¯ > 0 such that for any s > s¯, z ≥ s,
s > π¯t ∣τυ→0 + τυ(z)
τ′υ(z) + z ⇐⇒ −(z − s)τ′υ(z) < π¯t ∣τυ→0 + τυ(−z).
But the left hand side of the second equation is smaller than −z τ′υ(z)—which
we know tends to 0 from part 1—and therefore has to be smaller than π¯t ∣τυ→0 for
large values of z.
The second property lims→∞ f (s) − s < 0 is equivalent to finding a s¯ > 0 such
that for any s > s¯ there exists a z ≤ s for which
π¯t ∣τυ→0 + τυ(−z)−τ′υ(−z) + z < s ⇐⇒ π¯t ∣τυ→0 + τυ(−z) − z τ′υ(−z) < −s τ′υ(−z).
Trivially, for z = 0 the right hand side of the second equation diverges to∞ for
large values of s while the rest remains constant. Thus we can just pick a s¯ > 0
that is large enough. This establishes the second property of part 2. ◇
This concludes the proof of the proposition.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4
For the most part, the proof follows from the discussion in the main body of
the chapter. It remains to be shown that sign{τ1υ − τ˚υ} = sign{τ∗υ − τ˚υ}. Given
the definition of τ˚υ, τ1υ, and τ∗υ , and given that дτ is increasing (see Lemma 1),
proving the claim is equivalent to showing that
log(q˚t) > −γ0 ⇐⇒ log(q∗t ) > −γ0. (32)
We distinguish two cases. First, consider the case where дq is decreasing. Then
we have that
log(q˚t) = дq(дτ(−γ0)) > −γ0 ⇐⇒ дτ(−γ0) < д−1q (−γ0).
But given that д′q < 0 and д′τ > 0, it follows that д−1q and дτ intersect to the right
of −γ0 if and only if д−1q (−γ0) > дτ(−γ0). Hence, (32) holds at the unique fixed
point q∗t .
Now consider the case where дq is increasing. Then
log(q˚t) = дq(дτ(−γ0)) > −γ0 ⇐⇒ дτ(−γ0) > д−1q (−γ0).
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From Lemma 2, it follows that limx→γ0+γ1(θ t+υt) д−1q (x) =∞, while by Lemma 1
we have that дτ(x) is finite for all x. Hence, whenever дτ(−γ0) > д−1q (−γ0), there
necessarily exists an intersection between д−1q and дτ to the right of −γ0. Further,
since by Lemma 2 limx→−∞ дτ(x) = 0, while limx→−∞ д−1q (x) < 0 (since дq(0)
is finite by Lemma 2), we also have that there necessarily exists an intersection
between д−1q and дτ to the left of−γ0 whenever дτ(−γ0) > д−1q (−γ0). Hence, there
always exists at least one fixedpoint q∗t such that (32) holds. In the case considered
in the main body of the text where there always exists a unique equilibrium, this
concludes the proof. Moreover, when there are multiple equilibria, in a given
state Ωt , our analysis continues to apply to each equilibrium that satisfies (32)
(for further details, see Appendix B.4).
A.8. Proof of Proposition 5
Let (θ t+υt , θ t+ηt) = aSt+Ot ≡ a ⋅(x , y)+(0, z), with z ≡ −b˘t−1/(τξ+τη). Then,
differentiating ∆ ≡ log(q∗t )− log(q˚t) = дq(τ∗υ , Ωt)− дq(τ˚υ , Ωt)with respect to a
yields
d∆
da
= ∂∆
∂a
+ ∂дq(τ∗υ , Ωt)
∂τ∗υ
dτ∗υ
da
. (33)
Consider the first term first. From Lemma 2, we have that
дq(τ∗υ , Ωt) = aγ1(y(τξ + τη) + xτ∗υ)/π¯∗,
and analogous for τ˚υ. Substituting in ∆, differentiating, and rearranging, we get
∂∆
∂a
= γ1
π¯∗ ˚¯π(τξ + τη) × 1τ˚υ − τ∗υ × [y + z − δ1(x)] .
From the definitions of x, y, and z, y+ z− δ1(x) is positive if and only if θ t + ηt >
δ1(θ t + υt). Moreover, τ˚υ − τ∗υ is positive if and only if θ t + ηt < δ2(θ t + υt). Thus
∂∆/∂a < 0 if and only if sign{θ t+ηt-δ1(θ t+υt)}=sign{θ t+ηt-δ2(θ t+υt)}.
Consider now the second term of (33). Substituting log(q∗t ) = дq(τ∗υ , Ωt)
into (9) and implicit differentiating yields
dτ∗υ
da
= x − ∂дq∂a∂дq
∂τυ − ∂д−1τ∂τυ . (34)
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As illustrated in Figure 2, ∂дq∂τυ < ∂д−1τ∂τυ at the fixed point, so that the denominator
is necessarily negative. Again, substituting for ∂дq(τ∗υ , Ωt)/∂a, the numerator
simplifies to
x − ∂дq
∂a
= −γ1(τξ + τη)
π¯∗ × [y + z − δ∗2 (x)],
where
δ∗2 (x) = (τξ + τη)−1(−b˘t−1 + γ−11 (π˘t−1 + (1 − γ1)τ∗υ)x)
is defined such that θ t + ηt < δ∗2 (θ t + υt) if and only if τ˚υ − τ∗υ > 0. Hence,
since it also holds that τ˚υ − τ∗υ > 0 if and only if τ˚υ − τ1υ > 0, we have that from
the definitions of x, y, and z, −[y + z − δ∗2 (x)]—and, hence, the numerator
of (34)—is positive if and only if θ t + ηt < δ2(θ t + υt). Taken together, we
thus have that dτ∗υ/da is negative if and only if θ t + ηt < δ2(θ t + υt). Moreover,
in Section 5.1, we show that ∂дq/∂τυ > 0 if and only if θ t + ηt < δ1(θ t + υt).
Hence, like the first term, the second term of (33) is negative if and only if
sign{θ t+ηt-δ1(θ t+υt)}=sign{θ t+ηt-δ2(θ t+υt)}, completing the proof.
A.9. Proof of Proposition 6
We consider a generic information structure given by
st = H′θ t + ψt , ψt ∼ N(0, Ψt),
where H′ is a m × 1-vector and Ψt is a positive-semidefinite, symmetric m ×m
matrix. Note that st is informationally equivalent to s¯t = BtH′θ t + ψ¯t with
ψ¯t ∼ N(0, BtΨtB′t) for all invertible Bt which match the number of rows in H′.
In particular, we can choose Bt , such that BtH′ = (1, . . . , 1)′ and Ψ¯t ≡ BtΨtB′t is
diagonal.44
Accordingly, suppose without loss of generality that
st = (1, . . . , 1)′θ t + ψt , ψt ∼ N(0, diag(τt)−1),
where τt is a m × 1-vector of strictly positive signal precisions. Then posterior
beliefs at time t are given by
bt = 1πt m∑i=0 τt,ist,i and πt = m∑i=0 τt,i ,
44 To see this, let Lt be the lower Cholesky factor of Ψt . Then for all diagonal At , we have
that AtL−1t ΨtL′−1t A′t is diagonal. Hence, setting At = diag(L−1t H′)−1 and defining Bt ≡ AtL−1t
yields the desired result.
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where the subscript i denotes the i-th element of vectors τt and st with the
convention that τt,0 = πˆt−1 ≡ (ρ2τє + πt−1)−1τєπt−1 and st,0 = ρbt−1. Accordingly,
λt = ρπˆt−1/πt , matching exactly the definition in the special case discussed in the
main body of the text.
Without loss of generality, consider a generic change of τt,1 by a differen-
tial dτt,1. Then for r, s > 0,
dΛt−r,t+s
dτt,1
= Λt−r,t+s × ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ 1λt ∂λt∂πt +
t+s∑
q=t+1
⎛⎝ 1λq ∂λq∂πq−1 q−1∏p=t+1 ∂πp∂πp−1⎞⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ,
or, after computing the individual terms and dividing by Λt−r,t+s > 0,
− 1
πt
+ t+s∑
q=t+1
⎛⎝ πˆq−1π2q−1πq (ρ2
m∑
i=1 τq,i)
q−1∏
p=t+1(ρπˆp−1πp−1 )
2⎞⎠ . (35)
To show that (35) is negative, we proceed in two steps.
Step 1 We claim that (35) is maximized by setting τo,1 →∞ for all o > t. We
prove this claim by proceeding recursively. For o = s, the term is obviously
increasing in τs,1 since
∂
∂τs,1
{∑mi=1 τs,i
πs
} = ∂
∂τs,1
{∑mi=1 τs,i∑mi=0 τs,i } > 0.
Hence, suppose that τo,1 → ∞ for all o > n. Then, πˆo → τє and πo → ∞. Thus,
differentiating (35) with respect to τn,1, n > t, simplifies to
∂
∂τn,1
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
n+1∑
q=n
⎛⎝ πˆq−1π2q−1πq (ρ2
m∑
i=1 τq,i)
q−1∏
p=t+1(ρπˆp−1πp−1 )
2⎞⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
= ∂
∂πn
{πn − πˆn−1
πˆn−1πn + ρ2πˆnπ2n } × n∏p=t+1(ρπˆp−1πp−1 )
2
= (πn − ρ2πˆn
π2n
)2 × n∏
p=t+1(ρπˆp−1πp−1 )
2 > 0,
verifying the claim.
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Step 2 By step 1, it is sufficient to show that (35) is negative if τo,1 →∞ for all
o > t. Accordingly, (35) simplifies to
−πt − ρ2πˆt
π2t
= − πˆt
τєπt
< 0,
completing the proof.
B. Supplementary material
B.1. Pooled asset market
First, we prove that in any equilibrium the market clearing price must be the
same in both occurrences of the asset market. Suppose the contrary holds and
the market clearing price in the first asset market is larger than the price in the
second market.45 Then, given that no informational gains are possible between
the two market instances, all gatherers find it optimal to sell their asset (tree)
in the first market. Yet, total asset demand is always smaller than 1 −m in the
first market, a contradiction. Suppose now the price in the first market is smaller
than the price in the second market. Consequently, all agents find it optimal not
to sell assets in the first market. Again, this is incompatible with market clearing
since total asset demand is always strictly positive. Thus, in any equilibrium, the
two occurrences of the asset market share the same market price.
To show the equivalence of the two separatedmarkets to one pooledmarket we
need to show that any equilibrium in the separatedmarkets is also an equilibrium
in the pooled market and vice versa. Consider an equilibrium in the separate
markets. From above we know that there is a singlemarket clearing price equating
supply and demand in bothmarkets. This price must also be an equilibrium price
in the pooled market for it obviously equates total supply and total demand. Vice
versa, suppose a price is an equilibrium price in the pooled market. We construct
an equilibrium candidate for the separate markets by letting all gatherers who
trade in the pooled equilibrium trade in the first market and all farmers who
trade in the pooled equilibrium trade in the second market. Indeed, this is an
equilibrium with the pooled price since the fraction of trading agents must be
45 Note that the price in the second market can be forecasted by the time the first market
operates because (i) no exogenous information realizes between the two markets, and (ii) all
information aggregated by the second market price is already aggregated by the first.
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the same across farmers and gatherers and nobody has an incentive to change
his marketplace.
The last argument also implies that there is an equilibrium where the relevant
collateral constraint for all farmers is given by nit ≤ qt/wt . Since selling assets on
the first market and ending up constrained is dominated for all farmers by waiting
and selling assets on the second market, we conclude that every separate asset
market equilibrium can be represented by a pooled asset market that operates
parallel to the labor market in which nit ≤ qt/wt is exogenously imposed on all
farmers.
B.2. Endogenous learning with alternative financial frictions
For demonstrating how endogenous learning interacts with other financial fric-
tions, we consider four toy models. To be consistent with the structure of the
model, all frictions are sited at the firm-level. However, one could also shift
constraints to a separate financial sector, which then constrains the real sector
depending on the state of the economy. In the following, our strategy is to set up
simple versions of these alternative frictions and solve these model fragments up
to a point where Theorem 1 is applicable.
Cash-in-advance constraints Consider a continuum of entrepreneurs
with an investment opportunity that for an initial investment of ki pays
F(A˜i , ki) = A˜i log(ki) + A˜iγ,
where log(A˜i) ∼ N (θ , 1/τξ). Let p denote the price per unit of investment and
assume that investments have to be paid in advance using cash. For the purpose
of raising cash, entrepreneurs may sell claims on the investment return on a
financial market. For simplicity, assume that each entrepreneur is exogenously
endowed with γ units and that claims can only be written on the return A˜iγ of
these units (e.g., because ki is unobservable or noncontractable). The timing is
as follows:
1. Entrepreneurs choose to sell claims on any fraction xi ∈ [0, 1] of γ on the
financial market.
2. The financial market operates and yields an equilibrium price q per claim.
(Each share entitles its owner to claim the return of γ units).
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3. Entrepreneurs learn the realization of A˜i and decide how much to invest,
subject to the cash-in-advance constraint ki ≤ (q/p) xi .
For any reasonable specification of the financial market, it should be clear that
whenever agents on the financial market and entrepreneurs start out with a
common prior, then entrepreneurs optimally set xi = 1. Then given p, each
entrepreneur optimally sets ki = min{Ai , q}/p, so that aggregated demand kd
resembles (6). Without specifying the details of the capital supply side, assume
that there exists a noisy pricing function p˜ = f (k˜d , ψ˜) that clears the market and
which is increasing in both arguments (ψ˜ being some random variable). Given
these assumption, there trivially exists a transform of ψ˜ which gives rise to a
concave signal structure that, given the appropriate assumptions on the random
variable ψ˜, is isomorphic to the one resulting from our baseline model.
Skin-in-the-game constraints A common generalization of the above
cash-in-advance approach is to allow entrepreneurs to give out claims on profits,
but assume that in order to provide the right incentives, entrepreneurs must
have some “skin-in-the-game” that exogenously restricts the maximal number
of shares that can be issued to xi ≤ x¯ < 1. Keeping the timing identical to our
cash-in-advance setup, the difference is now that claims on the financial market
are defined on expected entrepreneurs profits:
E{Π(A˜i , xi , p˜, q)∣I j} ≡ E{F(A˜i , k∗i (A˜i , p˜)) − k∗i (A˜i , p˜)p˜ + xiq∣I j}.
Assuming risk-neutrality on the financial market (and some bounds on traders’
asset demands that, as in our baseline setup, ensure the existence of a market
clearing price), the equilibrium price will be given by the marginal trader m’s
expectation
q = E{Π(A˜i , xi , p˜, q)∣Im}= (1 − xi)−1E{F(A˜i , k∗i (A˜i , p˜)) − k∗i (A˜i , p˜)p˜∣Im}.
Suppose again that prior information ensures that entrepreneurs optimally set
xi = x¯. For any x¯ < 1, we thus have that q amounts to a finite number that for
well-behaved F, A˜i and p˜,46 is increasing in E(A˜i ∣Im). Based on the previous
cash-in-advance setting, our results can therefore also be extended to such more
general skin-in-the-game settings.
46 Here, we implicitly assume that as long as the “skin-in-the-game” constraint is fulfilled,
entrepreneurs choose k∗i (θ i) = argmax{F(θ , k i)− k i p}. Then, we in particular require that
F is increasing in θ i and that F − kp is concavely increasing in k and has an interior solution.
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Costly state verification We argue on an intuitive level. As firms’ inter-
nal funding decreases, standard auditing models imply that the markup over the
risk-free rate increases, implying that firms invest less and are less responsive to
the price of output (see, e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). It is straightforward
to extent such frameworks to the case where the return to investments also de-
pends on an unobserved (to the financial market) state. To fix ideas, consider the
case where F(ki ,Ai) = Aiki with log(Ai) ∼ N (θ , σ2). With such log-normal
specification, the production function transforms to the “standard” setting where
F(ki , θ ,ωi) = pωiki with p = exp(θ + σ2/2) and ωi ∼ N (−σ2/2, σ2). That is,
one can absorb θ into the output price. Assuming that firms are matched to
lenders with zero bargaining power, and further assuming that lenders learn θ
upon matching and that lenders finance themselves through an exogenous finan-
cial market, this is equivalent to the setting at the core of Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997). In particular, higher effective interest rates imply that firms’ investment
choices respond less to θ as firms have less internal funds ni for the purpose
of financing ki ; i.e., as (ki − ni) increases. Aggregating over ki gives rise to a
concave relation between k and θ. Accordingly, based on this study’s analysis the
ability of any outside observer (like the financial market), who observes a noisy
signal of (aggregate) k, is impeded during financial crises.
Adverse selection We argue on an intuitive level. Suppose there are two
types of firms that differ in their probability of defaulting. Then for standard
adverse selection setups, good firms are crowded out of the market in crisis
times. But if good firms are more likely to succeed, then they will also be more
respondent to any change in fundamentals that affect profits in the non-default
state. This reduces overall responsiveness to the fundamental among market-
financed firms during financial crises, so that based on this study’s analysis the
information aggregation becomes less efficient.
B.3. Distributional assumptions
To clarify the conditions under which Theorem 1 is applicable to our model, we
state them in terms of properties of the posterior distribution χ˜dt ∣χst . Here we
illustrate how these properties of χ˜dt ∣χst can be mapped into assumptions on the
distribution of Ψ˜t .
From χ˜st ∣χst to Ψ˜t Consider an arbitrary posterior density function P(χdt ∣χst)
given a flat prior over χ˜dt . Trivially, we can choose P(χdt ∣χst) to satisfy Properties 1
68 Essays in Informational Economics
and 2 (an example is the quasi-Gaussian posterior we use throughout most of the
chapter). By Bayes’ law, reverse engineering gives the corresponding conditions
on P(χst ∣χdt ):
P(χdt ∣χst) = P(χst ∣χdt )∫ P(χst ∣ χˆd)d χˆd .
Rearranging yields
P(χst ∣χdt ) = д(χst)P(χdt ∣χst), (36)
where д is indeterminate (i.e., arbitrary).
That is, any P(χst ∣χdt ) that is consistent with (36) implements the chosen pos-
terior P(χdt ∣χst). In particular note that because of the indeterminacy of д, there
are infinite many improper conditional distributions P(χst ∣χdt ) that are consistent
with our assumptions on P(χdt ∣χst). Lets for now not worry whether there exists
any д which guarantees the existence of a proper signal structure (but see below).
Then in order to transform P(χst ∣χdt ) into a distribution of ψ˜t , recall that
χ˜st = χ˜dt + ψ˜t .
Then, from (36),
P(ψt ∣χdt ) = P(χst − χdt ∣χdt ),
yielding the following CDF for ψ˜t ∣χdt
P(ψt ≤ z∣χdt ) = ∫ z+χdt−∞ P(χs∣χdt )dχs= ∫ z+χdt−∞ д(χs)P(χdt ∣χs))dχs . (37)
Condition (37) defines the distributional assumptions on ψ˜t that lead to the
posterior distribution P(χdt ∣χst). It can be seen that any consistent distribution
of ψ˜t necessarily varies with the state of the world χdt . But since ψ˜t is explicitly
allowed to be dependent on θ˜ t and q˜t (and thus on χ˜dt = H(θ˜ t − log(q˜t))), the
above distribution is well in line with our model specifications.47Moreover, by
setting z →∞, we see that the distribution of ψ˜t is also properwhenever P(χst ∣χdt )
is proper.
47 Because w˜t and n˜dt can both be written as functions of θ˜ t and q˜t and Ψ˜t , we can also
transform ψ˜t back to Ψ˜t = (exp(ψ˜t) − 1)n˜st .
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Existence of a proper signal structure For a class of conditional
distributions to be proper, we need that there exists some function д, such that:
∫ P(χs∣χdt )dχs = 1,
or
∫ д(χs)P(χdt ∣χs)dχs = 1 (38)
for all χdt ∈ supp(χdt ). This problem turns out to be quite challenging (it is
equivalent to solving a Fredholm integral equation of kind 1). For the special case
where Property 2b holds with X˜ ∼ N (0, 1) (the baseline setup in this chapter),
we can verify the existence numerically. More specifically, we use an algorithm
that ensures that with a probability arbitrary close to 1, the economy realizes in a
state such that P(χst ∣χdt ) integrates arbitrary close to 1.48 Based on our algorithm,
we conjecture that—even if there does not exist an exact solution—there always
exists a signal structure which is in this sense “almost” proper.
In summary, we conclude that there always exists an improper signal structure
in line with Properties 1 and 2. The question whether there also exists a proper
signal structure is analytically unclear. However, even if there does not exist a
proper signal structure, then for the quasi-Gaussian case covered in most of this
chapter, our numerical algorithm suggests that there always exists an “almost
proper” one. This would then suggest that there also exists an almost identical
proper signal structure, which does not satisfy our assumptions, but for which
the results in this chapter nevertheless describe an arbitrary accurate solution. Or,
alternatively, that there exists an almost identical proper signal structure, which
does not satisfy our assumptions, but for which the results in this chapter describe
the exact solution given that agents make arbitrary small errors by erroneously
holding Gaussian beliefs.
48 For any є, δ > 0, we first define a set A ⊂ supp( χ˜dt ), such that Pr(χdt ∈ A) > 1 − є. Given
this set, we then ensure that
∣ ∫ д(χs)P(χdt ∣χs)dχs − 1∣ < δ
for all χdt ∈ A. Given that this condition does not need to hold for χdt ∈ supp(χdt ) ∖ A, we
have infinite many degrees of freedom in the tails of P(χst ∣χdt ), which allow us to design д
such that (38) holds for all χdt ∈ Awith arbitrary precision.
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Figure 9. Sunspot regimes. Note: Shocks in regions A and B have an overall positive impact
on q˚t , shocks in regions C and D have an overall negative impact. Shocks in regions B
and C are endogenously amplified, shocks in regions A and D are endogenously de-amplified.
Region E defines the set Ξ¯ of sunspot regimes.
B.4. Sunspot regimes
By Proposition 3, a necessary condition for sunspot regimes is that θ t + υt is
sufficiently large (small) if γ1 > 1 (γ1 < 1) in absolute terms and also relative to
θ t + ηt (specifically, sunspots require that θ t + ηt < δ1(θ t + υt)). If both of these
conditions hold, then the economy could potentially (but not necessarily) be
in a sunspot state (Ωt ∈ Ξ¯). Figure 9 plots the set Ξ¯ of sunspot regimes for the
parameter set underlying Figure 3. In the figure, region E defines the set Ξ¯. There
are three equilibria in the interior of this set and two equilibria at the boundary. It
can be shown that at any boundary of Ξ¯, one of these equilibria is the continuation
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of the unique equilibrium outside Ξ. Moreover, by the proof of Proposition 4,
there always exists at least one equilibrium within Ξ¯ for which our analysis in
Section 5.1 applies; i.e., Propositions 4 and 5 continue to hold for this equilibrium.
For instance, in Figure 9, there always exists on equilibrium in the intersection of
regions A and E in which q˚t > q∗t . Similarly, there always exists one equilibrium
in the intersection of regions B and E in which q∗t > q˚t .49 For these equilibria, all
results in this study apply without any adjustment. Among the other equilibria,
our results also continue to hold, but require an adjustment of the conditions that
define the respective cases. For instance, for some equilibria in the intersection of
regions A and E it holds that q∗t > q˚t . Accordingly, these equilibria are described
by our characterization of region B rather than the one for region A. Accounting
for that, all further results continue to hold.
References
Adam, K. (2007), “Optimalmonetary policy with imperfect common knowledge,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 54:267–301.
Albagli, E. (2011), “Amplification of Uncertainty in Illiquid Markets,” mimeo.
Albagli, E., C. Hellwig, and A. Tsyvinski (2011), “A Theory of Asset Pricing Based
on Heterogeneous Information,” mimeo.
Amador, M. and P.-O. Weill (2008), “Learning from prices: Public communica-
tion and welfare,” mimeo.
Amato, J. D. and H. S. Shin (2006), “Imperfect common knowledge and the
information value of prices,” Economic Theory, 27:213–241.
Angeletos, G.-M. and J. La’O (2012a), “Optimal Monetary Policy with Informa-
tional Frictions,” mimeo.
——— (2012b), “Sentiments,” mimeo.
Angeletos, G.-M., G. Lorenzoni, and A. Pavan (2010), “Beauty Contests and
Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach,” mimeo.
Angeletos, G.-M. and A. Pavan (2004), “Transparency of information and coor-
dination in economies with investment complementarities,” The American
Economic Review, 94:91–98.
——— (2007), “Efficient use of information and social value of information,”
Econometrica, 75:1103–1142.
——— (2009), “Policy with dispersed information,” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 7:11–60.
49 Since q˚t is uniquely pinned down by Ωt , q˚t > −γ0 holds for all equilibria in E.
72 Essays in Informational Economics
Bachmann, R. and C. Bayer (2009), “Firm-Specific Productivity Risk over the
Business Cycle: Facts and Aggregate Implications,” mimeo.
Bachmann, R. and G. Moscarini (2011), “Business Cycles and Endogenous Un-
certainty,” mimeo.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1989), “Agency Costs , Net Worth , and Business
Fluctuations,” The American Economic Review, 79:14–31.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1996), “The Financial Accelerator and
the Flight to Quality,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78:1–15.
——— (1999), “The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle frame-
work,” in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. B. Taylor andM.Woodford,
Amsterdam, New York and Oxford: North-Holland, vol. 1, 1341–1393.
Bigio, S. (2011), “Endogenous Liquidity and the Business Cycle,” mimeo.
——— (2012), “Financial Risk Capacity,” mimeo.
Bloom, N. (2009), “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks,” Econometrica, 77:623–
685.
Bloom, N., M. Floetotto, N. Jaimovich, I. Saporta-Eksten, and S. Terry (2012),
“Really Uncertain Business Cycles,” mimeo.
Boissay, F., F. Collard, and F. Smets (2012), “Booms and Systemic Banking Crises,”
mimeo.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Y. Sannikov (2012), “A macroeconomic model with a
financial sector,” mimeo.
Carlstrom, C. T. and T. S. Fuerst (1997), “Agency costs, net worth, and busi-
ness fluctuations: A computable general equilibrium analysis,” The American
Economic Review, 87:893–910.
Christiano, L., R.Motto, andM. Rostagno (2009), “Financial Factors in Economic
Fluctuations,” mimeo.
Coibion, O. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012), “Information Rigidity and the Expec-
tations Formation Process : A Simple Framework and New Facts,” mimeo.
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2011), “A model of unconventional monetary policy,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 58:17–34.
Gertler, M. and N. Kiyotaki (2011), “Financial intermediation and credit policy
in business cycle analysis,” in Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol. 3A, ed.
by B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford, Amsterdam, New York and Oxford:
North-Holland.
Gilchrist, S., J. W. Sim, and E. Zakrajšek (2010), “Uncertainty, Financial Frictions,
and Investment Dynamics,” mimeo.
Goldstein, I., E. Ozdenoren, and K. Yuan (2011), “Trading Frenzies and Their
Impact on Real Investment,” mimeo.
Ch. 1: Credit Crunches, Information Failures, and the Persistence of Pessimism 73
Hamilton, J. D. (1994), Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1994), “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of
Human Capital,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109:841–879.
——— (1998), “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:1–41.
Hassan, T. A. and T. M. Mertens (2011), “The social cost of near-rational invest-
ment,” mimeo.
Hellwig, C. and L. L. Veldkamp (2009), “Knowing What Others Know: Coordi-
nation Motives in Information Acquisition,” The Review of Economic Studies,
76:223–251.
Hellwig, M. F. (1980), “On the aggregation of information in competitivemarkets,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 22:477–498.
Iacoviello, M. (2005), “House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary policy
in the business cycle,” The American Economic Review, 95:739–764.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997), “Credit cycles,” Journal of Political Economy,
105:211–248.
——— (2008), “Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy,” mimeo.
Krishnamurthy, A. (2003), “Collateral constraints and the amplification mecha-
nism,” Journal of Economic Theory, 111:277–292.
Kurlat, P. (2010), “Lemons, Market Shutdowns and Learning,” mimeo.
La’O, J. (2010), “Collateral Constraints and Noisy Fluctuations,” mimeo.
Lorenzoni, G. (2009), “A Theory of Demand Shocks,” The American Economic
Review, 99:2050–2084.
——— (2010), “Optimal Monetary Policy with Uncertain Fundamentals and
Dispersed Information,” The Review of Economic Studies, 77:305–338.
Lucas, R. E. (1978), “Asset prices in an exchange economy,” Econometrica, 46:1429–
1445.
Maćkowiak, B. andM.Wiederholt (2009), “Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational
Inattention,” The American Economic Review, 99:769–803.
——— (2010), “Business cycle dynamics under rational inattention,” mimeo.
Mertens, T. M. (2011), “Volatile Stock Markets: Equilibrium Computation and
Policy Analysis,” mimeo.
Milgrom, P. R. (1981), “Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and
applications,” The Bell Journal of Economics, 12:380–391.
Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2002), “Social value of public information,” The
American Economic Review, 92:1521–1534.
——— (2006), “Inertia of forward-looking expectations,” The American eco-
nomic review, 96:152–157.
74 Essays in Informational Economics
Ordoñez, G. L. (2010), “Larger crises, slower recoveries: the asymmetric effects
of financial frictions,” mimeo.
Sim, J. W. (2008), “Uncertainty driven business cycle,” mimeo.
Sims, C. A. (2003), “Implications of rational inattention,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50:665–690.
——— (2006), “Rational inattention: Beyond the linear-quadratic case,” The
American economic review, 96:158–163.
Townsend, R. M. (1979), “Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly
state verification,” Journal of Economic Theory, 21:265–293.
——— (1983), “Forecasting the forecasts of others,” The Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 91:546–588.
Van Nieuwerburgh, S. and L. L. Veldkamp (2006), “Learning asymmetries in
real business cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 53:753–772.
Veldkamp, L. L. (2005), “Slow boom, sudden crash,” Journal of Economic Theory,
124:230–257.
Woodford,M. (2003), “Imperfect common knowledge and the effects ofmonetary
policy,” in Knowledge, Information and Expectations in Modern Macroeco-
nomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps, ed. by P. Aghion, R. Frydman,
J. Stiglitz, and M. Woodford, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 25–58.
——— (2009), “Information-constrained state-dependent pricing,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 56:100–124.
Yuan, K. (2005), “Asymmetric Price Movements and Borrowing Constraints: A
Rational Expectations EquilibriumModel of Crises, Contagion, and Confu-
sion,” The Journal of Finance, 60:379–412.
Chapter 2
EMERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE OF EXTREME
POLITICAL SYSTEMS— TRANSITION DYNAMICS IN
AN UNRESTRICTED POLITY SPACE∗
Contents
Abstract 76
Keywords 76
1. Introduction 77
2. The model 81
3. Political equilibrium 86
3.1. Stage 2: Coordination among outsiders 86
3.2. Stage 1: Policy choices of insiders 88
3.3. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 90
4. Transition dynamics 91
4.1. Political systems after transition 91
4.2. Probabilities of transition 93
4.3. A parametric example 93
5. A look at the data 98
5.1. Data construction 99
5.2. Empirical properties of political systems and transitions 100
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Lukas Buchheim. We would like to thank Toke
Aidt, Matthias Doepke, Larry Christiano, Georgy Egorov, Florian Englmaier, Matthias Fahn,
Florian Herold, Monika Piazzesi, Klaus M. Schmidt, Martin Schneider, Daniel Sturm, Uwe
Sunde, MirkoWiederholt, and Fabrizio Zilibotti for many helpful comments and discussions.
We are also grateful for comments by seminar participants at Munich and Northwestern
Universities, and the 2012 Silvaplana Workshop in Political Economy. A significant amount
of the work leading to this chapter was done while I was visiting Northwestern in 2010. I
thank the Economics and the Management and Strategy departments for their hospitality.
75
76 Essays in Informational Economics
6. Concluding remarks 104
A. Mathematical appendix 105
A.1. Insiders never subvert, outsiders always join the regime 105
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1 105
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2 108
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3 111
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4 114
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5 115
References 116
Abstract
This chapter of my dissertation introduces a dynamic model of political transi-
tions, in which the outcomes of reforms and revolts are determined endogenously
from a set of potential political systems that ranges continuously from single-
man dictatorships to full-scale democracies. We find that while revolts result in
autocracies, political reforms always enfranchise the majority of the population.
Moreover, we show that democracies are intrinsically stable, leading to long
episodes without political change. In contrast, autocracies are subject to frequent
regime changes. Yet, our findings suggest that autocratic systems are persistent
over time as they are frequently overthrown by small groups of insurgents, result-
ing in political systems similar to their predecessors. Taken together, our results
imply that the long-run distribution of political systems is double hump-shaped
with mass concentrated on the extremes. The model’s predictions are consistent
with descriptive statistics from cross-country data.
Keywords
Emergence of extreme political systems, endogenous political transitions, stability
of political systems, unrestricted polity space.
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1. Introduction
There is a growing economics literature exploring causes and circumstances of
political transitions. This recent literature describes how political reforms and
revolts can be supported within a rational-agents framework and how political
systems are changed by these transition mechanisms. Even though many aspects
of political transitions are dynamic in nature, these studies have largely abstracted
from dynamic issues and focused on isolated transition events. This chapter ofmy
dissertation takes a step towards filling this gap, by placing the dynamic process
that describes the evolution of political systems at the core of the analysis. To this
end, we endogenize outcomes of political transitions to a continuum of a priori
attainable political systems and ensure the co-existence of reforms and revolts
along the equilibrium path, allowing us to focus on the endogenously arising
dynamic properties of political transitions.
More specifically, we introduce a dynamic framework where the space of
political systems ranges continuously from single-man dictatorships to full-scale
democracies. Actual political systems are determined endogenously and result
from political transitions that either can be initiated from within a regime (i.e.,
reforms) or can be enforced from outside (revolts); the likelihood of transitions
is thereby determined endogenously. Within this framework, we address the
following key questions. Which types of political systems arise from reforms,
and which arise from revolts? Similarly, through which of these transition mech-
anisms are particular systems such as democracies most likely to emerge? And
how frequently is either type of transition observed depending on the political
system in place?
Model overview Our modeling approach aims to resemble the key mecha-
nisms behind political transitions explored in the literature, but generalizes them
in order to ensure the co-existence of reforms and revolts along the equilibrium
path and to endogenize their outcomes.
To endogenize political systems that emerge after revolts, we dispense with the
simplifying approach of a representative “political outsider”. Instead we consider
an economy in which agents that are excluded from political power are heteroge-
neously adapted to the current regime. As is standard in the literature, political
outsiders can attempt to acquire political power by supporting a subversive at-
tempt against the regime. Prospects of subverting depend on, first, an unobserved
ability of the regime to withstand such an attempt and, second, the total mass of
outsiders supporting it. For deciding whether or not to support a revolt, agents
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weight these prospects against their individual adaptation utility to the current
regime. As a consequence, a coordination game similar to the literature on global
games endogenously determines the regime type after a successful revolt.1
Reforms are modeled as in the seminal paper by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000b) in that members of the current regime (“political insiders”) may conduct
preemptive reforms in order to alleviate the threat from a revolt. However, we
generalize their original approach by permitting political insiders to enfranchise
an arbitrary fraction of the population, allowing for a continuum of a priori
unspecified political systems to emerge from these reforms.
Finally, we assume that while insiders are perfectly informed about their ability
to withstand a revolt, outsiders are strictly less informed about the prospects
of subverting. As a consequence, conducting reforms will be endogenously
associated with being intrinsically weak, which in equilibrium helps outsiders
to coordinate their actions. This effectively increases the costs of reforming
and provides an incentive for weak regimes to take tough stance rather than to
negotiate on moderate reforms. Because, in equilibrium, excessive repression
translates into a substantial risk to be overthrown, asymmetric information,
crucially, ensures the co-existence of reforms and revolts along the equilibrium
path and allows us to jointly analyze these two transition mechanisms in our
model.
Results Our first set of findings characterizes the political systems that en-
dogenously arise in equilibrium. We show that while revolts result in autocracies
where a minority of the population forms the ruling class, political reforms
enfranchise the majority of the population and establish democratic political
systems. Intermediate types of political regimes, by contrast, do not arise along
the equilibrium path, so that political systems tend to be extreme.
Furthermore, this first set of results implies that democracies are only estab-
lished from within regimes, giving theoretical support to a long-standing view in
political science according to whichmembers of former autocracies are key actors
in the establishment of democracies (Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter,
1973; Huntington, 1991). Or, as Karl (1990, p. 8) puts it: “no stable political democ-
racy [in South America] has resulted from regime transitions in which mass
1 Although outsiders in our model share the same amount of information, we use heteroge-
neous opportunity costs to ensure that subverting and not subverting is always a dominant
strategy for some outsiders in our model. Iterated elimination of (interim) dominated strate-
gies then gives rise to a unique outcome of this coordination game. This is essentially the
same mechanism that determines equilibria in global games.
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actors have gained control, even momentarily, over traditional ruling classes”.
Our second set of results concerns the stability and persistence of political
systems. From our analysis it follows that democratic regimes are intrinsically
stable, characterized by long episodes without political change. In contrast, au-
tocracies are subject to frequent regime changes—either via revolts or reforms.
This is in line with the empirical literature on regime stability, which observes
that democratic political systems are significantly more stable than autocratic
ones (Przeworski, 2000; Gates et al., 2006; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010).2
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that despite their instability, autocratic
systems are persistent over time. This is because even though single autocratic
regimes are relatively short lived, political change is frequently initiated by a small
group of insurgents, resulting in autocracies very similar to their predecessors.
Interestingly, this reasoning further implies that revolts tend to be serially corre-
lated over time as they go along with a selection into politically instable regimes,
leading to periods of political instability.
In combination, our results imply that the long-run distribution of political
systems is double hump-shaped with mass concentrated on extreme political
systems. Our model thus provides a foundation to the empirically observed
distribution of political systems since World War I, plotted in Figure 1.3 Taking
a look at the underlying dataset (for details, see Section 5), we also find similar
support for the findings outlined above.
Related literature So far, the literature on political transitions has primar-
ily focused on developing arguments for why autocratic regimes may conduct
democratic reforms. Bourguignon andVerdier (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2004),
and Llavador and Oxoby (2005) argue that reforms are reflective of situations
where autocratic decision makers are better off in a democratized political system
than under the status quo. A number of other studies are based on the idea
of preemptive reforms introduced by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) (e.g.,
2 From these results it follows that the mode of transition—peaceful reforms or violent
revolts—is important for the characteristics of the resulting regimes. For transitions to
democracy, a similar point has been highlighted by Cervellati et al. (2007, 2011), who show
that consensual transitions foster civil liberties and property rights provision in contrast to
violent transitions.
3 The underlying data is taken from the Polity IV Project (for details, see Section 5). It has
been disputed whether intermediate scored regimes on this index should nevertheless be
classified as either democratic or autocratic due to nonlinearities in the index (Cheibub et al.,
2010). Note, however, that this is to say that different measurements would only lead to more
mass on the extremes, not altering the basic conclusion drawn for our purposes.
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Figure 1. Distribution of political systems since World War I. Political systems range from
extremely autocratic (0) to extremely democratic (1). Units of observation are country-days.
Conley and Temini, 2001; Boix, 2003). These papers share with ours the basic
logic behind reforms; i.e., autocratic regimes may use political reforms to credibly
commit to redistribution and to reduce revolutionary pressure.4
In contrast to these papers, the emphasis of this analysis is on the dynamics
of political transitions, including but not restricted to democratization. In this
respect, this chapter relates more closely to Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and
Acemoglu et al. (2010), who consider settings where preemptive reforms co-
exist with coups along the equilibrium path, and to Ellis and Fender (2011), who
consider preemptive reforms that co-exist with mass revolutions. In particular,
Ellis and Fender choose a similar approach in studying how autocracies may
strategically manipulate the degree of subversive coordination in the presence of
asymmetric information. In their model, outsiders sequentially choose whether
or not to support a subversive attempt, which succeeds only if it is unanimously
4 See Aidt and Jensen (2012) and Przeworski (2009) for empirical studies suggesting that
subversive threats are indeed the driving force behind democratization.
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supported. They find that asymmetric information provides an incentive to
refrain from stabilizing reforms despite the presence of revolutionary pressure
(see also Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000a; and for information manipulation in
global games, see Angeletos et al., 2006 and Edmond, 2011).
However, all of these papers have in common that they exogenously restrict the
set of political systems that result from transitions. In contrast, our approach of an
unrestricted space of political systems leaves the outcomes of reforms and revolts
unspecified. This is central to our analysis, allowing us to endogenously derive
the properties of these transition mechanisms and to analyze their implications
for the stability and persistence of political systems.
We also relate to Justman and Gradstein (1999), Jack and Lagunoff (2006),
and Gradstein (2007), who study the incentives of political regimes to conduct
democratic reforms in frameworks in which—as in our approach—continuous
extensions of the franchise are possible. Similar to the literature discussed above,
these authors provide conditions under which (possibly gradual) extensions of
the franchise are to be expected. In contrast to our work, however, they do not
allow for political change to be initiated from political outsiders (via revolts),
preventing them from analyzing transition dynamics in their generality that
follows from the interplay between reforms and revolts, which is at the core of
our contribution.
Outline The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the model economy. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium
and illustrate the strategic considerations determining political transitions. The
law of motion of the dynamic economy and our main predictions are derived
in Section 4. In Section 5, we present some empirical evidence, and Section 6
concludes.
2. The model
We consider an infinite horizon economy with a continuum of two-period lived
agents. Each generation has a mass equal to 1. At time t, fraction λt of the popula-
tion has the power to implement political decisions, whereas the remaining agents
are excluded from political power. We refer to these two groups as (political)
“insiders” and “outsiders”.
When born, the distribution of political power among the young is inherited
from their parent generation; that is, λt agents are born as insiders, while 1 − λt
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agents are born as outsiders. However, agents who are born as outsiders can
attempt to overthrow the current regime and thereby acquire political power.
To this end, outsiders choose individually and simultaneously whether or not
to participate in a revolt.5 Because we will assume that all political change takes
effect at the beginning of the next period, only young outsiders have an interest
in participating in a revolt. Accordingly, we denote young outsider i’s choice by
ϕit ∈ {0, 1} and use the aggregated mass of supporters, st = ∫ ϕit d i, to refer to
the size of the resulting revolt.
The probability that a revolt is successful is given by
p(θ t , st) = θ th(st), (1)
where θ t ∈ Θ is a random state of the world that reflects the vulnerability of the
current regime or their ability to put down a revolt, and h is an increasing and
twice differentiable function, h ∶ [0, 1]→ [0, 1], with h(0) = 0. That is, the threat
of a revolt to the current regime is increasing in the mass of its supporters and in
the vulnerability of the regime. When a revolt has no supporters (st = 0) or the
regime is not vulnerable (θ t = 0), it fails with certainty.
The purpose of θ t in our model is to introduce asymmetric information be-
tween insiders and outsiders that, as will become clear below, explains the preva-
lence of revolts along the equilibrium path. Formally we have that the state θ t is
uniformly distributed on Θ = [0, 1], is i.i.d. from one period to the next, and is
revealed to insiders at the beginning of each period. Outsiders only know the
prior distribution of θ t .
After they learn θ t , insiders may try to alleviate the threat of revolt by con-
ducting reforms. We follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) by modeling these
reforms as an extension of the franchise to outsiders, which is effective in cred-
ibly preventing them from supporting a revolt.6 However, since our model is
aimed at endogenizing the political system λt , we generalize this mechanism
by allowing insiders to continuously extend the regime by any fraction, xt − λt ,
of young outsiders, where xt ∈ [λt , 1] is the reformed political system.7 Because
5 For notational convenience, we abstract from the possibility of insiders participating in a
revolt. In Appendix A.1, however, we show that this is without loss of generality, since it is
never optimal for insiders to support a revolt against fellow members of the regime.
6 As argued in Footnote 5 and shown in Appendix A.1, it is indeed individually rational for
enfranchised outsiders to not support a revolt.
7 Note that by assuming xt ∈ [λt , 1], we are ruling out reforms that withdraw political power
once it has been granted. This is in line with the idea that granting someone the status of an
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preferences of insiders will be perfectly aligned, there is no need to specify the
decision making process leading to xt in detail.
Given the (aggregated) policy choices st and xt , and conditional on the out-
come of a revolt, the political system evolves as follows:
λt+1 = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩st if the regime is overthrown, andxt otherwise. (2)
When a revolt fails (indicated by ηt = 0), reforms take effect and the old regime
stays in power. The resulting political system in t + 1 is then given by xt . In the
complementary case, when a revolt succeeds (ηt = 1), those who have participated
will form the new regime. Accordingly, after a successful revolt, the fraction of
insiders at t + 1 is equal to st . Note that this specification prevents non-revolting
outsiders from reaping the benefits from overthrowing a regime; there are no
gains from free-riding in our model.8
To complete the description of our model, we still have to specify how payoffs
are distributed across the different groups of agents at t. As for outsiders, we
assume that they receive a constant per period payoff of γit which is privately
assigned to each agent at birth and is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
We interpret this heterogeneity of outsiders as different degrees of economical or
ideological adaptation to a regime, determining their propensity to revolt.
In contrast, insiders enjoy per period payoffs u(λt), where u is twice differ-
entiable, u′ < 0, and u(1) is normalized to unity. One should think of u(⋅) as
a reduced form function that captures the various benefits of having political
power (e.g., from extracting a common resource stock, implementing preferred
policies, etc.). One important feature of u is that it is decreasing in the current
regime size and, hence, extending the regime is costly for insiders (e.g., because
resources have to be shared, or preferences about policies become less aligned).
Another thing to note is that u(λt) ≥ γit for all λt and γit ; that is, being part of
the regime is always desirable. In the case of full democracy (λt = 1) all citizens
insider is a credible and irreversible commitment in the logic of Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000b).
8 The theoretical possibility for free-riding arises since we depart from the common as-
sumption of treating the opposition as a single player in order to endogenize the political
system resulting from a revolt. However, as long as there are some private benefits that
provide incentives for outsiders to support a revolt, the working of this model is unaffected
by (moderate) incentives to free-ride. Entirely abstracting from the collective action problem
is merely a model simplification.
84 Essays in Informational Economics
are insiders and enjoy utility normalized to the one of a best-adapted outsider
(i.e., u(1) = 1).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that members of an overthrown regime
and participants in a failed revolt are worst-adapted to the new regime. Formally,
γit = 0, resulting in zero payoff.
For the upcoming analysis it will be convenient to define the expected utility
of agents that are born at time t, which is given as follows:
V I(θ t , λt , st , xt) = u(λt) + [1 − p(θ t , st)] × u(xt), (3)
VO(θ t , γit , st , ϕit) = γit + ϕit p(θ t , st) × u(st) + (1 − ϕit) × γit , (4)
where superscript I and O denote agents that are born as insiders and outsiders,
respectively. In both equations, the first term corresponds to the first period
payoff (unaffected by the policy choices of the young agent’s generation), while
the other terms correspond to second period payoffs. (Since agents do not face
an intertemporal tradeoff, we do not need to define a discount rate here).
The timing of events within one period can be summarized as follows:
1. The state of the world θ t is revealed to insiders.
2. Insiders may extend political power to a fraction xt ∈ [λt , 1] of the popula-
tion.
3. Outsiders individually and simultaneously decide whether or not to partic-
ipate in a revolt.
4. Transitions according to (1) and (2) take place, period t + 1 starts with the
birth of a new generation, and payoffs determined by λt+1 are realized.
In what follows, we characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria that
satisfy the trembling-hand criterion (due to Selten, 1975); that is, perfect Bayesian
equilibria that are the limit of some sequence of perturbed games inwhich strategy
profiles are constrained to embody “small” mistakes.9 To increase the predictive
9 Here, the concept of trembling-hand perfection rules out “instable” equilibria, in which
st = 0, but iteratively best-responding to a (perceived) second-order perturbation of st would
lead to a different equilibrium with a first-order change in st . For details see the proof of
Proposition 1. Except for these instabilities, the set of trembling-hand perfect equilibria
coincides with the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in our model. An alternative approach to
rule out these instabilities would be to restrict attention to equilibria which are the limit to a
sequence of economies with a finite number of outsiders, where each agent’s decision has
non-zero weight on st .
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power of our model, we thereby limit attention to equilibria that are consistent
with the D1 criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987), a standard refinement
for signaling games. The D1 criterion restricts outsiders to believe that whenever
they observe a reform x′ that is not conducted in equilibrium, the reform has
been implemented by a regime with vulnerability θ′, for which a deviation to x′
would be most attractive.10
Anticipating our results, we simplify our notation as follows. First, outsiders’
beliefs regarding the regime’s vulnerability will be uniquely determined in our
setup. We therefore denote the commonly held belief by θˆ t , dropping the index i.
Second, there are no nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria in our game. Ac-
cordingly, we restrict the notation in themain text to pure strategies and introduce
mixed strategies only to define the perturbations required by trembling-hand
perfection.
This leads to the following definition of equilibrium for our economy.
Definition: Given a history δ = {λ0} ∪ {{ϕiτ ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}, θτ , xτ , ητ}t−1τ=0, an
equilibrium in this economy consists of policy mappings xδ ∶ (θ t , λt)↦ xt and{(ϕiδ ∶ (θˆ t , xt) ↦ ϕit) ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}, and beliefs θˆδ(λt , xt) ↦ θˆ t , such that for all
possible histories δ:
a. Reforms xδ maximize insider’s utility (3), given states (θ t , λt), beliefs θˆδ ,
and perturbed policy mappings {ωkiδ ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} for all values of k;
b. Each outsider’s policy choice ϕiδ maximizes (4), given perturbed policy
mappings σ kδ , {ωkjδ ∶ j ∈ [0, 1] ∖ i}, and corresponding beliefs θˆkδ for all
values of k;
c. Beliefs θˆδ = limk→∞ θˆkδ(xt), where θˆkδ are obtained using Bayes rule given
σ kδ ; and θˆδ satisfies the D1 criterion;
d. States (λt , ηt) are consistent with (1) and (2);
10 Formally, let V¯ I(θ′ , λt) be the insiders’ payoff in a candidate equilibrium when the regime
has a vulnerability θ′. Then the D1 criterion restricts beliefs to the state θ′ that maximizes
Dθ′ ,x′ = {θˆ ∶ V I(θ′ , λt , s(θˆ , x′), x′) ≥ V¯ I(θ′ , λt)}, where s(θˆ , x′) is the mass of outsiders
supporting a revolt, given the beliefs θˆ and reform x′. Dθ′ ,x′ is maximal here, if there is no
θ′′, such that Dθ′ ,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′′ ,x′ . That is, beliefs are attributed to the state in
which a deviation to x′ is attractive for the largest set of possible inferences about the regime’s
vulnerability (implying that the regime gains most by deviating).
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e. The perturbed policy mappings {{ωkiδ ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}, σ kδ }∞k=0 are sequences
of completely mixed strategy profiles converging to profiles that place all
mass on {ϕiδ ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} and xδ , respectively.
3. Political equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the political equilibrium in the model economy.
Our analysis will be simplified considerably by the overlapping generations struc-
ture of our model, which gives rise to a sequence of “generation games” between
young insiders and young outsiders. Since the distribution of political power at
time t captures all payoff-relevant information of the history up to t, the only link
between generations is λt . We can therefore characterize the set of equilibria in
our model by characterizing the equilibria of the generation games as a function
of λt . All other elements of the history up to time t may affect the equilibrium at
t only by selecting between multiple equilibria of the generation game.
The generation game consists of two stages that determine the political system
at t+ 1. First, outsiders have to choose whether or not to support a revolt. Because
the likelihood that a revolt succeeds depends on the total mass of its supporters,
outsiders face a coordination problem in their decision to revolt. Second, prior
to this coordination problem, insiders decide on the degree to which political
power is extended to outsiders. On the one hand this will decrease revolutionary
pressure along the extensive margin by contracting the pool of potential insur-
gents. However, extending the regime may also contain information about the
regime’s vulnerability. As a result, reforms may increase revolutionary pressure
along the intensive margin by increasing coordination among outsiders who are
not subject to reforms. Insiders’ policy choices will therefore be governed by
signaling considerations.
We proceed by backward induction in solving for the equilibrium, beginning
with the outsiders’ coordination problem.
3.1. Stage 2: Coordination among outsiders
Consider the outsiders’ coordination problem at time t. For any given belief,(θˆ t , sˆt) ∈ Θ × [0, 1], individual rationality requires all outsiders to choose a ϕit
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that maximizes their expected utility Et{VO(⋅)}.11 At time t, outsider i with
adaptation utility γit will therefore participate in a revolt if and only if
γit ≤ p(θˆ t , sˆt)u(sˆt) ≡ γ¯(sˆt). (5)
Here γ¯(sˆt) is the expected benefit of participating in a revolt that is supported
by a mass of sˆt outsiders. Since γ¯(sˆt) is independent of γit , it follows that in any
equilibrium the set of outsiders who support a revolt at t is given by the agents
who are least adapted to the current regime. Suppose for the time being that
γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1. Then, γ¯(sˆt) defines the fraction of young outsiders that participates
in a revolt, and, therefore, the size of a revolt, st , that would follow from γ¯(sˆt) is
given by
f (sˆt) ≡ (1 − xt) γ¯(sˆt). (6)
Further note that in any equilibrium it must hold that st = sˆt . Therefore, as
long as γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1, the share of outsiders that support a revolt at t has to be a fixed
point to (6). To guarantee that this is always the case and to further ensure that a
well-behaved fixed point exists, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1: For ψ(s) ≡ h(s) ⋅ u(s),
a. ψ′ ≥ 0 and ψ′′ ≤ 0;
b. lims→0 ψ′(s) =∞.
Intuitively, Assumption 1 states that participating in a revolt becomes more
attractive if the total share of supporters grows. This requires that the positive ef-
fect of an additional supporter on the success probability outweighs the negative
effect of being in a slightly larger regime after a successful revolt. Put differ-
ently, Assumption 1 states that the participation choices of outsiders are strategic
complements. To ensure existence, we further require that the strategic comple-
mentarity is sufficiently strong when a revolt is smallest, and is decreasing as it
grows larger.
Using Assumption 1, the above discussion leads to the following proposition.
11 Note that by our specification of p, VO is linear in θ t , and thus Et{VO(θ t , ⋅)} = VO(θˆ t , ⋅),
where θˆ t ≡ Et{θ t}. That is, the expected value of θ t , given the posterior distribution of
θ t (outsiders’ beliefs), is a sufficient statistic for computing VO . Henceforth we define θˆ t
accordingly, disregarding any higher moments of outsiders’ beliefs.
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Proposition 1: In any equilibrium, the mass of outsiders supporting a revolt
at time t is uniquely characterized by a time-invariant function, s ∶ (θˆ t , xt)↦ st ,
which satisfies s(0, ⋅) = s(⋅, 1) = 0, increases in θˆ t , and decreases in xt .
All formal proofs are in the appendix. Proposition 1 establishes the already
discussed tradeoff of conducting reforms: On the one hand, reforms reduce
support for a revolt along the extensive margin. In the limit, as regimes reform
to a full-scaled democracy, any subversive threat is completely dissolved. On the
other hand, if reforms signal that the regime is vulnerable, they may backfire by
increasing support along the intensive margin.
3.2. Stage 1: Policy choices of insiders
We now turn to the insiders’ decision problem. Since more vulnerable regimes
have higher incentives to reform than less vulnerable ones, conducting reforms
will shift beliefs towards being vulnerable and, therefore, indeed stipulate co-
ordination among outsiders who are unaffected by reforms. This generates the
tradeoff established in Proposition 1, which is the main driving force behind the
following result.
Proposition 2: In any equilibrium, policy choices of insiders and beliefs of
outsiders are uniquely characterized by time-invariant functions x ∶ (θ t , λt)↦ xt
and θˆ ∶ (λt , xt)↦ θˆ t , such that
x(θ t , λt) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩λt if θ t < θ¯(λt)ξ(θ t) if θ t ≥ θ¯(λt),
and
θˆ(λt , xt) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ¯(λt)/2 if xt = λt
θ¯(λt) if λt < xt < ξ(θ¯(λt))
ξ−1(xt) if ξ(θ¯(λt)) ≤ xt ≤ ξ(1)
1 if xt > ξ(1),
where ξ is a unique increasing function with ξ(θ t) > λt + µ, and θ¯(λt) > 0 for all
λt and some µ > 0.
Proposition 2 defines insiders’ policy choices for generation t as a function of(θ t , λt). Because the logic behind these choices is the same for all values of λt ,
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Figure 2. Equilibrium reforms and implied probability to be overthrown.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium beliefs and implied mass of insurgents.
we can discuss the underlying intuition keeping λt fixed. Accordingly, in Figure 2
we plot reform choices (left panel) and the implied probability to be overthrown
(right panel), sliced along a given λt plane. It can be seen that whenever a regime
is less vulnerable than θ¯(λt), insiders prefer to not conduct any reforms (i.e.,
xt = λt), leading to a substantial threat for regimes with θ t close to θ¯(λt). Only
if θ t ≥ θ¯(λt), reforms will be conducted (xt = ξ(θ t)), which in equilibrium
effectively mitigate the threat to be overthrown, ruling out marginal reforms
where ξ(θ t)→ λt .
To see why marginal reforms are not effective in reducing revolutionary pres-
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sure consider Figure 3. Here we plot equilibrium beliefs (left panel) and the
corresponding mass of insurgents (right panel) as functions of xt . If the politi-
cal system is left unchanged by insiders, outsiders only learn the average state
θ¯(λt)/2 of all regimes that pool on xt = λt in equilibrium. On the other hand,
every extension of the regime—how small it may be—leads to a non-marginal
change in outsiders’ beliefs from θˆ t = θ¯(λt)/2 to θˆ t ≥ θ¯(λt) and, hence, results
in a non-marginal increase in revolutionary pressure along the intensive margin.
It follows that there exists some x˜(λt), such that for all xt < x˜(λt) the increase of
pressure along the intensive margin dominates the decrease along the extensive
margin. Thus, reforms smaller than x˜(λt) will backfire and increase the mass
of insurgents (as seen in the right panel of Figure 3), explaining why effective
reforms have to be non-marginal.
Furthermore, optimality of reforms requires that the benefit of reducing pres-
sure compensates for insiders’ disliking of sharing power. Because x˜(λt)− λt > 0,
it follows that u(x˜(λt))−u(λt) < 0. Moreover, any reformmarginally increasing
the regime beyond x˜(λt) leads only to amarginal increase in the likelihood to stay
in power. Hence, there exists a non-empty interval, given by [x˜(λt), ξ(θ¯(λt))],
in which reforms are effective, yet insiders prefer to gamble for their political
survival in order to hold on to the benefits of not sharing power in case they
survive. This explains the substantial threat for regimes with θ t close to θ¯(λt), as
seen in the right panel of Figure 2.12
3.3. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Propositions 1 and 2 uniquely pin down the policy choices in every state, which in
return determine the evolution of political systems. We conclude that there is no
scope formultiple equilibria in ourmodel economy; if there exists an equilibrium
it is unique. Verifying the existence then permits us to reach the following result.
Proposition 3: There exists an equilibrium, in which for all histories δ, policy
mappings xδ and {ϕiδ ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}, as well as beliefs θˆδ correspond to the time-
invariant mappings given by Propositions 1 and 2. Furthermore, for any given initial
political system λ0, this equilibrium is unique.
12 More precisely, gambling for survival increases the likelihood to be overthrown in two
ways. First, since on the margin it is more vulnerable regimes that join the pool at xt = λt ,
these regimes obviously face a high threat by not conducting reforms. Second, since these
regimes also shift the pooling belief towards more vulnerable, the threat further increases for
regimes of all vulnerabilities in the pool.
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4. Transition dynamics
In the preceding section, we have established that in the unique equilibrium,
policy mappings are time-invariant, implying that (λt , θ t) is a sufficient statistic
for characterizing the transition dynamics of the political system from time t to
t + 1. Integrating out θ t , political systems in our equilibrium follow a Markov
process where the probability that λt+1 ∈ Λ is given by
Q(λt , Λ) = ρS(λt) × QS(λt , Λ) + ρR(λt) × QR(λt , Λ)+ {1 − ρI(λt) − ρR(λt)} × 1λt∈Λ . (7)
Here ρS and ρR denote the probabilities that a transition occurs via subversive
attempts (i.e., revolts) and reforms, respectively; QS and QR are conditional
transition functions; and 1 is an indicator function equal to unity whenever
λt ∈ Λ.13 Accordingly, the first term in (7) defines the probability that state
λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges through a revolt, the second term defines the probability that
λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges from a reform, and the third term refers to the event of no
transition. Decomposing the law of motion into these conditional channels, we
are now ready to state our main predictions.
4.1. Political systems after transition
By (7), political systems that arise after transitions are summarized by QS and
QR. Our first result states that political systems that emerge after reforms differ
fundamentally from those that emerge from revolts. The following proposition
states the formal result.
Proposition 4: For all states λt ,
QR(λt , ( 12 , 1]) = 1 and QS(λt , (0, 12)) = 1;
13 Formally, we have that
ρS(λt) = ∫ 10 p`(θ)dθ
ρR(λt) = ∫ 1θ¯(λ t) {1 − p`(θ)}dθ
QS(λt , Λ) = {ρS(λt)}−1 ∫θ ∶s`(θ)∈Λ p`(θ)dθ
QR(λt , Λ) = {ρR(λt)}−1 ∫θ ∶x`(θ)∈Λ∖λ t {1 − p`(θ)}dθ ,
where x`(θ) ≡ x(λt , θ), s`(θ) ≡ s(θˆ(λt , x`(θ)), x`(θ)), and p`(θ) ≡ p(θ , s`(θ)).
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i.e., reforms lead to majority regimes with λt+1 > 12 and revolts lead to minority
regimes with λt+1 < 12 .
The first part of Proposition 4 states that any reform leads to a democratic
system, in which the majority of citizens holds political power. The intuition for
this result mirrors the one for Proposition 2. Because conducting reforms will
be associated with being intrinsically weak, coordination is increased along the
intensive margin. For the benefits along the extensive margin to justify these
costs, reforms therefore have to be far-reaching, leading to the enfranchising of
the majority of the population.
In contrast, the second part of Proposition 4 establishes that successful revolts
always lead to minority regimes, in which a small elite rules over a majority
of political outsiders. Underlying this result is that in equilibrium subversive
attempts are conducted by only a small group of insurgents. Mass revolutions
on the other hand are off-equilibrium. To see what drives the result, first note
that rationality of reforms implies that revolts are largest when regimes abstain
from reforms and choose to repress the population. However, because abstaining
from reforms is optimal, both, in times when regimes are strong and when they
hide their weakness through taking tough stance, uncertainty about a regime’s
weakness is largest from the perspective of outsiders exactly when a regime
abstains from reforms. Accordingly, prospects of revolting are only moderate
and only those with large gains from winning political power (i.e., outsiders who
are least adapted to the current regime) will find it rational to take the risk of
revolting.
An interesting implication of Proposition 4 is that democratic regimes arise if
and only if it is optimal for the regime to enfranchise former political outsiders.
The commonly made assumption in the previous literature that democracies are
established by means of reforms conducted by the elites is thus an endogenous
outcome of our model. The other channel through which democracies hypothet-
ically could be established are mass revolutions. Their severe threat, however, is
always mitigated by rational regimes, such that mass revolts are events off the
equilibrium path. This observation gives support to a long-standing view in polit-
ical science according to which members of former autocracies are key actors in
the establishment of democracies, which is based on, e.g., the observation of Karl
(1990, p. 8) that no stable South American democracy has been the result of mass
revolutions (see also Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1973; Huntington,
1991).
Finally, note that from Proposition 4 it follows that there is a (possibly quite
large) open interval Λ¯ around 1/2, such that Q(λt , Λ¯) = 0 for all λt . That is,
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there is a range of intermediate regimes that are completely off the equilibrium
path, suggesting a long-run distribution with mass only on the extremes. In a
parametric example below, we will see that this is indeed the case.
4.2. Probabilities of transition
The next proposition describes how the likelihood of either type of political
transition depends on the political system λt .
Proposition 5: For all λt > λ¯, ∂ρS/∂λt < 0 and ∂ρR/∂λt ≤ 0; and for all
λt < ¯λ, ∂ρS/∂λt < 0 and ∂ρR/∂λt > 0 if limλ→0 ∂u/∂λ < ¯u, and ∂ρS/∂λt > 0 and∂ρR/∂λt < 0 if limλ→0 ∂u/∂λ > u¯, and some (λ¯, ¯λ, u¯, ¯u) ∈ [0, 1)2 × R2−, whereasλ¯ ≥
¯
λ > 0 if θ¯(0) < 1.
From Proposition 5 it follows that as regimes become more democratic, they
eventually becomemore stable. This is generally true forpolitical systems inwhich
no reforms are conducted; and further holds for sufficiently democratic regimes
(λt > λ¯). For autocratic systems, in contrast, the properties of the likelihood
of political change depend on the exact specification of u. Still, Proposition 5
suggests that ρR and ρS are hump-shaped when marginal reforms for autocratic
regimes are very costly or rather cheap, respectively. Otherwise, the likelihood
for either type of transition tends to be decreasing as the political system becomes
more democratic.
4.3. A parametric example
To illustrate the dynamics implied by Propositions 4 and 5 and to further study
the implications of the model in the long-run, we now introduce a parametrized
version of our model economy. We choose the following functional forms,
h(st) = sαt
and
u(λt) = − exp(β1λt) + β0.
Here one may think of β0 as a common resource stock or some other type of
private benefits, which decline at an exponential rate β1 as power is shared with
more agents. To pin down the free parameters, we further assume that ψ′(1) = 0;
i.e., the strategic effect of an additional outsider supporting a revolt becomes
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negligible when revolts are supported by the full population. Together with
our assumptions on u and h, this pins down α and β0 in terms of β1, which is
restricted to approximately satisfy β1 ∈ (0, 0.56).14
Intuitively, β1 measures the costs of enfranchising political outsiders. In prac-
tice, these costs are expected to be high if members of the regime have access to
a large pool of resources, or if there is a large degree of economic and political
inequality.15 Thus, when β1 is close to its upper bound, extending the franchise
is costly and the incentives to gamble for survival are strong. Consequently, for
large β1, one should expect to observe revolts frequently in equilibrium. On
the other hand, if β1 is low, conducting reforms is cheap and one should expect
political insiders to quickly reform to a fully integrated society.
To give an overview of the transition dynamics, Figure 4 displays a simulated
time series of the model economy for different values of β1 and for 500 periods
each. For each time path, we plot the political system, λt , at time t and indicate
the dates where transitions occur via revolts (marked by ∆) and reforms (marked
by ×). It can be seen that low costs of reforms in Setting 1 (β1 = 0.35) result in
immediate democratic reforms and the absence of successful subversive attempts.
As the costs of reforms are increasing in Setting 2 (β1 = 0.40) and Setting 3
(β1 = 0.45), successful revolts become more frequent and are followed by periods
of frequent regime changes, where autocracies succeed each other. In contrast,
democratic reforms give rise to long periods of political stability.
Polarization Although Figure 4 is the result of a random simulation, it
captures many essential transition dynamics that arise in our model. First, in line
with Proposition 4, it can be seen that transitions lead to a polarization of regimes;
i.e., revolts lead to autocratic regimes, whereas reforms result in fairly inclusive
democracies. A more complete picture is provided by Figure 5, which displays
the distribution of political systems that emerge from each transition mechanism
for β1 = 0.4.16 From the left panel, it becomes apparent that approximately two
14 The implied values for the other two parameters are α = β1 exp(β1) and β0 = exp(β1) + 1,
restricting β1 ∈ (0, exp(−β1)) ≈ (0, 0.56).
15 In particular, note that u(λ) = exp(β1) − exp(β1λ) + 1 is increasing in β1 for all λ, so that
also the inequality between insiders and the average outsider, ∫ (u(λ) − γ)dγ, is increasing
in β1 for all λ.
16 For computing the distributions, originating political systems are weighted by their
long-run distribution Ψ; e.g., the distribution of political systems after reforms is given
by pdf(λt+1) = ∫ 10 QR(λt , λt+1)dΨ(λt). While the long-run distribution itself varies consid-
erably with β1 (see also Figure 8), the conditional distributions displayed in Figure 5 remain
largely unaffected by changes in β1.
Ch. 2: Emergence and Persistence of Extreme Political Systems 95
0
1
2
1
0 100 200 300 400 500
Setting 1
t
λt
0
1
2
1
0 100 200 300 400 500
Setting 2
t
λt
0
1
2
1
0 100 200 300 400 500
Setting 3
t
λt
Figure 4. Simulated time series of the model economy. Notes: Reforms are marked by “×”,
successful revolts are marked by “△”.
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Figure 5. Distribution of political systems after revolts and reforms.
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Figure 6. Likelihood of revolts and reforms.
different types of autocracies emerge after revolts: dictatorships, corresponding
to regimes that emerge after revolts against democracies, and autocracies which
emerge after succeeding other autocracies. From the right panel of Figure 5,
it becomes apparent that reforms lead to democratic political systems where
political power is shared among the majority of the population. Furthermore, it
can be seen that a large set of political systems around 1/2 is neither emerging
from reforms, nor from revolts.
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Stability The second observation that can be drawn from the simulations in
Figure 4 concerns the stability of political regimes. In line with Proposition 5, it
is evident that democracies are characterized by long episodes without political
change. In contrast, autocracies are subject to frequent regime changes. The
underlying transition probabilities are depicted in Figure 6. Here we plot the
likelihood of political transitions via revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel)
as a function of λt . It can be seen that both relations are decreasing in λt , such
that autocracies are more likely than democracies to experience transitions of
either type.
Turbulent and peaceful times Another interesting observation sug-
gested by the simulations in Figure 4 is that revolts tend to be serially correlated
over time. Underlying this observation is a statistical selection into autocratic
regimes after successful revolts, seen in Figure 5. Because succeeding autocracies
are frequently overthrown themselves, seen in Figure 6, the serial correlation
follows. A direct assessment of this effect is provided in Figure 7, which plots
the likelihood of a revolt at time t + s conditional on a successful revolt at time t
(represented by the downward sloping solid line).
The converse is true for reforms, which by Propositions 4 and 5 lead to demo-
cratic regimes, for which further political change is unlikely. Our model predicts,
therefore, that via selection into particular political systems, revolts lead to “tur-
bulent” times, while reforms lead to “peaceful” periods.
Persistence A side effect of the considerations in the preceding paragraph
is that despite their instability, autocratic systems are persistent over time. That
is, while individual autocracies are relatively short-lived, they are frequently
overthrown by small groups of insurgents, resulting in autocracies very similar
to their predecessors. Settings 2 and 3 of our simulations in Figure 4 illustrate
this implication further.
Long-run distribution Taken together, polarization to extreme regimes
and the persistence of these suggests that the long-run distribution of political
systems is polarized as well. In Figure 8, we plot the invariant distribution of
political systems for different values of β1. It can be seen that the distributions
are double hump-shaped, with most mass concentrated on extreme political
systems. Whether political systems are mostly democratic or autocratic depends
on the costs of reform as given by β1. For low values of these costs (Settings 1
and 2), reforms are commonly used to mitigate most subversive threats, revolts
are unlikely, and mass is mainly concentrated on democratic systems. If the costs
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Figure 7. Likelihood of a successful revolt at time t+ s conditional on a revolt s periods before
(solid) and unconditional likelihood (dashed).
of conducting reforms are high (Settings 3 and 4), less reforms are conducted,
revolts are more frequent, and most mass is concentrated on autocratic political
systems.
5. A look at the data
Our model predicts a number of properties about political transitions that are
in principle accessible to an empirical investigation. In this section, we take
an exploratory look at data that combines information on political transitions
and political systems to evaluate the model’s predictions. While we are able to
demonstrate that our predictions are consistent with descriptive statistics from
the data, wemake no claims of capturing causal relations, which would be beyond
the scope of this exercise.
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Figure 8. Invariant distribution of political systems.
5.1. Data construction
As a measure for the model’s political system, we use the polity variable, scaled
to [0, 1], from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), which ranks
political regimes on a 21 point scale between autocratic and democratic. In order
to examine themodel’s predictions, we combine this dataset with data on political
transitions.
To classify successful revolts, we use the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders
(Goemans et al., 2009). The dataset is available for the time period between 1919
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and 2004, such that we limit attention to political systems and transition in these
years. We record a successful revolt if a leader is irregularly removed from office
due to domestic popular protest, rebel groups, or military actors (defined by
Archigos’ exitcodes 2, 4 and 6), and if at the same time the leader’s successor takes
office in irregular manner (defined by an entrycode 1). Furthermore, we take a
revolt to be causal for a change in the political system if a change in the political
system is recorded in the Polity IV database within a two week window of the
revolt.
Finally, we use the dataset on the Chronology of Constitutional Events from
the Comparative Constitution Project (Elkins et al., 2010) to classify reforms.
We define reforms by a constitutional change (evnttype equal to new, reinstated,
or amendment) accompanied by a positive change in the political system (as
indicated by the variable durable from the Polity IV Project) which is notmatched
to a revolt or another irregular regime change from the Achigos Dataset.
The resulting dataset is a daily panel on the country level, which covers 175
countries and records 251 revolts and 97 reforms.
5.2. Empirical properties of political systems and transitions
Overview Table 1 summarizes the resulting dataset. Panel A displays average
political systems and annualized empirical likelihoods for a transition of either
type. It can be seen that on average, revolts are observed with a frequency of
2.8 percent per year and country, and reforms are observed with a frequency
of 1.1 percent. On average, this corresponds to a transition every 25 years per
country.
The mean polity is given by 0.49—almost exactly the midpoint of the polity
scale. As can be seen in the second column, however, the standard deviation
of political systems is quite large. The reason for this becomes clear in light of
Figure 1, which displays the distribution of political systems in our dataset: Only
a minority of regimes are located in the middle of the polity scale. Instead, in line
with our predictions, most mass is concentrated on extreme political systems.
More precisely, 44 percent of all regimes are rather autocratic with a polity index
of 0.25 and below, while 38 percent of all regimes are rather democratic with an
index value of 0.75 and above.
Our model identifies two reasons for why the distribution of political systems
is extreme: Polarization via the transition mechanism and persistence of extreme
political systems.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Observations
A. Regimes
Political systems 0.493 0.376 3 289 400
Annual likelihood of a revolt
Unconditional 0.028 3 289 400
If polity ≤ 0.25 0.030 1 452 533
If polity ≥ 0.75 0.012 1 238 720
Annual likelihood of a reform
Unconditional 0.011 3 289 400
If polity ≤ 0.25 0.018 1 452 533
If polity ≥ 0.75 0.001 1 238 720
B. Transitions
Resulting political systems
After revolts 0.316 0.235 251
After reforms 0.672 0.242 97
Notes.—Units of observation in Panel A are country-days. Units of observation in Panel B
are transitions.
Polarization To examine whether regimes are polarized via political tran-
sitions, consider Panel B of Table 1, which displays the mean polity index for
regimes emerging after revolts and reforms, respectively. As predicted by Propo-
sition 4, revolts on average lead to autocratic regimes with a polity index of 0.32,
while reforms lead to rather democratic political systems with a mean polity
index equal to 0.67.
Further insight can be gained from the conditional distribution of political sys-
tems emerging after either type of transition. Figure 9 displays these distributions.
From the left panel it is obvious that indeed the majority of political systems
that emerge after revolts is autocratic. In contrast, the evidence about political
reforms is less clear. On the one hand, the right panel of Figure 9 suggests that
the majority of systems that are established through reforms are democratic. On
the other hand, it also can be seen that, in contrast to the model’s predictions, a
significant number of reforms lead to regimes that are less democratic.
However, while some reforms are less democratic than predicted, Figure 9
still suggests that the majority of democratic regimes are established via reforms,
consistent with Proposition 4.
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Figure 9. Empirical distribution of political systems after revolts and reforms.
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Figure 10. Empirical likelihood of revolts and reforms.
Stability and persistence To examine the stability of political systems,
consider Figure 10. Here we plot the empirical likelihood functions for revolts
and reforms, derived from a local polynomial estimation. Both likelihoods are
hump-shaped in the polity index, with regimes in the middle of the scale being
most likely to be overthrown. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Panel A of Table 1,
autocracies with a polity index of 0.25 or below are more than twice as likely to
fall to a revolt than democratic regimes with an index value of 0.75 and above.
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Figure 11. Empirical likelihood of a revolt at date t + s conditional on a revolt s years before
(solid) and unconditional likelihood for all countries (dashed) and countries with at least
one transition (dotted).
Moreover, autocratic regimes are about 18 times more likely to conduct reforms
than democracies. Overall, autocracies survive for an average of about 21 years,
while democracies survive for an average of about 79 years. Hence, while in
contrast to Proposition 5 full-scale democracies face a nonzero probability to be
overthrown, they are nevertheless considerably more stable than all other regime
types, confirming the qualitative predictions made by the model.
According to our model, even though autocracies are more instable than
democracies, a serial correlation between revolts results in a persistence of auto-
cratic political systems. The descriptive statistics reported above already suggest
that the statistical selection mechanism underlying the persistence in our model
might also be at work in the data. That is, we have seen that revolts are likely to
result in autocracies, which are themselves likely to be overthrown again (see
the left panels of Figures 9 and 10). As can be seen in Figure 11, the suggested
correlation is indeed present in the data. The solid line in Figure 11 reflects the
likelihood of observing a revolt at date t + s conditional on that there was a
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successful revolt s years before. This likelihood is considerably larger than the
unconditional likelihood of revolts across all countries (dashed line) and also
compared to the unconditional likelihood in countries with at least one observed
transition (dotted line). Compared to the latter benchmark, the difference is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level for s ≤ 15.
Summary In summary, the moments and correlations predicted by our model
are consistent with the corresponding empirical moments and correlation. As
predicted by the model, transitions lead to a polarization of political regimes,
giving rise to autocracies after revolts and democracies after political reforms.
While democracies are found to be empirically stable, autocracies are found to
be short-lived. Yet, consistent with the model, a statistical selection gives rise to
autocorrelation of successful subversions, explaining persistence of autocracies
in the long-run. Consistently, as predicted by the model, the overall empirical
distribution has mass mainly concentrated on extreme political systems.
6. Concluding remarks
This is the first study, which explores the dynamic properties of political tran-
sitions in a general framework allowing for endogenous outcomes of reforms
and revolts. Our results suggest that transitions to democracy occur peacefully
via reforms under participation of the former ruling elites. In contrast, violent
transitions are driven by a small groups of insurgents and thus always lead to
autocratic political regimes. Furthermore, democratic political systems face only
a small opposition and are, hence, inherently stable, while autocratic regimes
are short-lived due to the significant threat of revolts and the resulting strong
incentives to conduct reforms.
These predictions are derived from a model in which the threat of revolt is the
driving force of political change. We enrich the pioneering work of Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000b) by allowing for arbitrary reforms conducted by the elite and
endogenous formation of revolts through coordination of outsiders. While the
predictions from this model fit descriptive statistics on political transitions quite
well, ourwork points out promising avenues for future research. In particular, one
simplifying assumption of our model is that the vulnerability of the incumbent
regime is independently drawn anew in each period. Relaxing this assumption by
allowing for serial correlation of the incumbents’ strength would allow outsiders
to learn about the prospects of revolting over time. A model, in which such
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endogenous learning is possible, could thus foster our understanding of the
dynamic processes which ultimately lead to transition events (revolts or reforms).
Another interesting question regards the existence of mass movements. While
from Figure 9 one can see that themajority of regimes that emerge after successful
revolts is indeed autocratic in the data, there is also a nonzero mass of demo-
cratic regimes emerging from revolts. In our model mass revolutions and, hence,
violent transitions to democracy are events off the equilibrium path. Therefore,
only strategic mistakes could trigger mass revolts within our framework. For
example, the elite may erroneously signal weakness by making small concessions,
or outsiders may rally because of a commonly held belief that the regime is weak
(for example due to information cascades as in Kuran, 1989 or Lohmann, 1994).
While it seems plausible that costly mass revolutions are the result of strategic
mistakes, there thus remains the challenge to find a rational explanation for the
emergence of mass revolutions when the regime has the power to counteract
them via reforms.
A. Mathematical appendix
A.1. Insiders never subvert, outsiders always join the regime
Insiders’ choice set includes xt ∈ [λt , 1]. It thus holds that (1 − p(⋅, xt))u(xt) ≥(1 − p(⋅, 1))u(1) = u(1) ≥ ψ(1) ≥ ψ(st) ≥ θˆ tψ(st), where the first inequality
follows from revealed preferences, the second inequality follows from h(⋅) ∈ [0, 1],
the third inequality follows from ψ increasing, and the last inequality follows
from θ t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, it is not attractive for any individual insider to support
a revolt against his own regime. As for outsiders we need to differentiate two
cases. First, outsiders that are targeted by a reform and would otherwise support
a revolt prefer to join the regime using exactly the same argument as above.
Second, outsiders that are targeted by a reform and would otherwise not support
a revolt prefer to join the regime since again by revealed preferences it holds that(1 − p(⋅, xt))u(xt) ≥ (1 − p(⋅, 1))u(1) = u(1) ≥ γit for all i and t.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
We first establish that any solution to the outsiders’ coordination problem is
a fixed point to equation (6). From our discussion in the main body of the
chapter it is clear that this is the case if and only if γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1 for all sˆt . From
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Assumption 1 it follows that γ¯ is increasing in sˆt , and therefore γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1 holds if
γ¯(1) = p(θˆ t , 1)u(1) ≤ 1. Since u(1) = 1 and p(⋅) ∈ [0, 1] this is indeed the case.
Hence, consider any fixed point to (6). Since f (0) = 0 for all (θˆ t , xt) ∈
Θ × [0, 1], there always exists a fixed point at sˆt = 0. Whether or not sˆt = 0 is
consistent with the concept of trembling-hand perfection, and whether or not
other fixed points exist, depends on the values of θˆ t and xt . We have to distinguish
two cases.
First, if θˆ t = 0 or xt = 1, then f (sˆt) = 0 for all sˆt , and therefore sˆt = 0 is
obviously the only fixed point to (6). To establish that sˆt = 0 is also trembling-
hand perfect, it suffices to show that for all i, ϕit = 0 is a best response to some
sequence of totally mixed strategy profiles {ωkjt ∶ j ∈ [0, 1] ∖ i}∞k=0 that converges
to the equilibrium profile where all i play ϕit = 0 with probability 1. Since for
θˆ t = 0 and xt = 1 playing ϕit = 0 is a (weakly) dominant strategy, this is trivially
true.
Second, consider the case where θˆ t ≠ 0 and xt ≠ 1. In this case the fixed
point at sˆt = 0 is not trembling-hand perfect. To see this let zk = mini{ωkit(1)}
denote the minimum probability with which any agent i plays ϕit = 0 in the
kth element of sequence ωkit . The requirement of trembling-hand perfection
that {ωkit} is totally mixed for all i and k implies that zk > 0 for all k. Hence,
skt = (1−xt) ∫i ωkit(1)d i ≥ (1−xt) zk > 0. However, from h(0) = 0 in combination
with Assumption 1(b) it follows that for any skt > 0, γ¯(skt ) = θˆ tψ(skt ) > 0 and,
hence, a strictly positive fraction of outsiders strictly prefers to choose ϕit = 1 in
response to {ωkjt ∶ j ∈ [0, 1]}. We conclude that sˆt = 0 can not be supported in
any trembling-hand perfect equilibrium if θˆ t ≠ 0 and xt ≠ 1.
Having ruled out sˆt = 0 as a solution to the coordination problem for θˆ t ≠ 0
and xt ≠ 1, we now show that there is a unique sˆt > 0 solving (6) for θˆ t ≠ 0 and
xt ≠ 1, which is also consistent with the concept of trembling-hand perfection.
From γ¯ ∈ [0, 1] it follows that f is bounded by its support, [0, 1 − xt]. Moreover,
by Assumption 1 we have that limsˆ→0 ψ′(sˆ) =∞, implying that limsˆ→0 f ′(sˆ) =∞.
Hence, there exists a s˜ > 0, such that f (s˜) > s˜. Together with continuity of ψ (and
thus of f ), it follows that there exists a strictly positive fixed point to (6), which
by concavity of ψ (and thus of f ) is unique on (0, 1].
Let s∗t = f (s∗t ) denote this fixed point. It remains to be shown that s∗t is
consistent with the concept of trembling-hand perfection. To show this, consider
the following sequences ωkit(1) = 1 − εk for all i ∈ { j ∶ γ jt ≤ γ¯(s∗t )} and ωkit(1) =
γ¯(s∗t )
1−γ¯(s∗t ) εk for all i ∈ { j ∶ γ jt > γ¯(s∗t )}, with some {εk}∞k=0 such that limk→∞ εk = 0.
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Then, by construction,
skt = (1 − xt)((1 − εk) γ¯(s∗t ) + γ¯(s∗t )1 − γ¯(s∗t ) εk(1 − γ¯(s∗t )))= (1 − xt) γ¯(s∗t )= f (s∗t ),
and hence {ϕit ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} being mutually best responses implies that {ϕit ∶ i ∈[0, 1]} are best responses to {ωkit ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} for all values of k.
The above arguments establish that st is uniquely determined by a (time-
invariant) function s ∶ (θˆ t , xt)→ st . It remains to be shown that ∂s/∂θˆ t ≥ 0 and
∂s/∂xt ≤ 0. Given that st is a fixed point to (6), we have that
π(st , xt) ≡ st − (1 − xt) θˆ t ψ(st) = 0.
Implicit differentiation implies that
∂st
∂xt
= −θˆ t ψ(st) × (∂πt∂st )−1
and
∂st
∂θˆ t
= (1 − xt)ψ(st) × (∂πt∂st )−1 ,
where
∂πt
∂st
= −(1 − xt) ∂γ¯∂st + 1.
Since ψ is bounded by ψ(1) = 1, (6) implies that limθˆ t→0 s∗t = limxt→1 s∗t = 0,
and therefore the case where θˆ t = 0 or xt = 1 is a limiting case of θˆ ≠ 0 and
xt ≠ 1. From the implicit function theorem it then follows that s is differentiable
on its whole support. Moreover, the previous arguments imply that f (s˜) > s˜ for
all s˜ < s∗t and f (s˜) < s˜ for all s˜ > s∗t , implying that f ′(s∗t ) < 1 or, equivalently,
∂γ¯/∂st < (1 − xt)−1 at s∗t . Thus ∂πt/∂st > 0 for all (θˆ t , xt) ∈ Θ × [0, 1], which
yields the desired results.
Finally, while we focused on pure strategies when proving the results above, it
is easy to see that the proposition generalizes to mixed strategies. By the law of
large numbers, anymixed strategy equilibrium beliefs about s are of zero variance
and, hence, the arguments above apply, implying that all outsiders, except a zero
mass i with γi = γ¯(s∗t ), strictly prefer ϕi = 0 or ϕi = 1. We conclude that there is
no scope for (nondegenerate) mixed best responses.
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A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds by a series of lemmas. To simplify notation, in what follows
we drop λt as an argument of x and θˆ where no confusion arises. Furthermore,
we use V˜ I(θ t , θˆ t , xt) = (1− θ th(st))u(xt) to denote insider’s indirect utility (up
to a constant u(λt)), as follows from st = s(θˆ t , xt) given Proposition 1.
Lemma 1: x is weakly increasing in θ t .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that x(θ′′) < x(θ′) for θ′ < θ′′. Let x′ ≡
x(θ′), x′′ ≡ x(θ′′), u′ ≡ u(x′), u′′ ≡ u(x′′), h′ ≡ h(s(θˆ(x′), x′)), and h′′ ≡
h(s(θˆ(x′′), x′′)). Optimality of x′ then requires that V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≤
V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′), implying u′h′ − u′′h′′ ≤ (u′ − u′′)/θ′ < (u′ − u′′)/θ′′, where
the last inequality follows from θ′ < θ′′ and u′ < u′′. Hence, V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≤
V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′) implies that V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) < V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′), x′), contra-
dicting optimality of x′′ for θ′′. ◇
Lemma 2: Suppose x is discontinuous at θ′, and define x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ′ + ε) and
x+ ≡ limε↓0 x(θ′ + ε). Then for any x′ ∈ (x−, x+), the only beliefs consistent with
the D1 criterion are θˆ(x′) = θ′.
Proof. Let θ′′ > θ′, and let x′′ ≡ x(θ′′). Optimality of x′′ then requires that
V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) and, thus for any θ˜,
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜ , x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) implies that
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜ , x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) .
Moreover, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 1,
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜ , x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) implies that
V˜ I(θ′, θ˜ , x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x+), x+) .
Hence, if V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜ , x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) = V¯ I(θ′′), then V˜ I(θ′, θ˜ , x′) >
V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x+), x+) = V¯ I(θ′). Therefore, Dθ′′ ,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′ ,x′ if θ′′ >
θ′. (For the definition of Dθ ,x , see Footnote 10.) A similar argument establishes
that Dθ′′ ,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′ ,x′ if θ′′ < θ′ and, thus, the D1 criterion
requires that θˆ(x′) = θ′ for all x′ ∈ (x−, x+). ◇
Lemma 3: There exists θ¯(λt) > 0, such that x(θ t , λt) = λt for all θ t < θ¯(λt).
Moreover, x(θ′′) > x(θ′) > λt + µ for all θ′′ > θ′ ≥ θ¯(λt) and some µ > 0.
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Proof. First, consider the existence of a connectedpool at xt = λt . Because for θ t =
0, xt = λt dominates all xt > λt , we have that x(0) = λt . It follows that there exists
a pool at xt = λt , because otherwise θˆ(λt) = 0 and, therefore, p(⋅, s(θˆ(λt), λt)) =
0, contradicting optimality of x(θ) > λt for all θ > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 1, x
is increasing, implying that any pool must be connected. This proves the first
part of the claim.
Now consider x(θ′′) > x(θ′) for all θ′′ > θ′ ≥ θ¯(λt) and suppose to the
contrary that x(θ′′) ≤ x(θ′) for some θ′′ > θ′. Since x is increasing, it follows
that x(θ) = x+ for all θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′] and some x+ > λt . W.l.o.g. assume that θ′ is
the lowest state in this pool. Then Bayesian updating implies that θ+ ≡ θˆ(x+) ≥(θ′ + θ′′)/2 > θ′ and, therefore, V˜ I(θ′, θ−, x+) > V˜ I(θ′, θ+, x+) for all θ− ≤ θ′.
Hence, because θ′ prefers x+ over x(θ−), itmust be that x(θ−) ≠ x+ for all θ− ≤ θ′
and, hence, x(θ−) < x+ by Lemma 1. Accordingly, let x− ≡ maxθ−≤θ′ x(θ−). Then
from continuity of V˜ I and θ+ > θ′ it follows that there exists an off-equilibrium
reform x′ ∈ (x−, x+) with V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θ+, x+). Hence, to prevent θ′
from choosing x′ it must be that θˆ(x′) > θ′. However, from Lemma 2 we have
that θˆ(x′) = θ′, a contradiction.
Finally, to see why there must be a jump-discontinuity at θ¯(λt) note that
V˜ I(θ¯(λt), θ¯(λt)/2, λt) = V˜ I(θ¯(λt), θ¯(λt), x(θ¯(λt))); otherwise, there neces-
sarily exists a θ in the neighborhood of θ¯(λt) with a profitable deviation to either
λt or x(θ¯(λt)). From the continuity of V˜ I and the non-marginal change in be-
liefs from θ¯(λt)/2 to θ¯(λt) it follows that x(θ¯(λt)) > λt + µ for all λt and some
µ > 0. ◇
Lemma 4: x is continuous and differentiable in θ t on [θ¯(λt), 1].
Proof. Consider continuity first and suppose to the contrary that x has a dis-
continuity at θ′ ∈ (θ¯(λt), 1). By Lemma 1, x is monotonically increasing in θ t .
Hence, because x is defined on an interval, it follows that for any discontinuity
θ′, x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ′) and x+ ≡ limε↓0 x(θ′) exist, and that x is differentiable on(θ′ − ε, θ′) and (θ′, θ′ + ε) for some ε > 0. Moreover, from Lemmas 2 and 3 it fol-
lows that in equilibrium θˆ(x′) = θ′ for all x′ ∈ [x−, x+]. Hence, V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−) =
V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x+), since otherwise there necessarily exists a θ in the neighborhood
of θ′ with a profitable deviation to either x− or x+. Accordingly, optimality of
x(θ′) requires V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x′) ≤ V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−) and, thus, V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−)must be
weakly decreasing in x. Therefore, ∂V˜ I/∂θˆ t < 0 and limε′↓0 ∂θˆ(x− − ε′)/∂xt > 0
(following from Lemma 3) imply that limε′↓0 ∂V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x−− ε′), x−− ε′)/∂xt < 0.
Hence, a profitable deviation to x− − ε′ exists for some ε′ > 0, contradicting
optimality of x(θ′).
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We establish differentiability by applying the proof strategy for Proposition 2
in Mailath (1987). Let д(θ , θˆ , x) ≡ V˜ I(θ , θˆ , x) − V˜ I(θ , θ′, x(θ′)), for a given
θ′ > θ¯(λt), and let θ′′ > θ′. Then, optimality of x(θ′) implies д(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≤
0, and optimality of x(θ′′) implies that д(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ 0. Letting a = (αθ′ +(1 − α)θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), for some α ∈ [0, 1] this implies
0 ≥ д(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ −дθ(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′))(θ′′ − θ′) − 12 дθθ(a)(θ′′ − θ′)2,
where the second inequality follows from first-order Taylor expanding
д(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around (θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) and rearranging the expanded terms
using the latter optimality condition. Expanding further д(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)), using the mean value theorem on дθ(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), and noting
that д(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) = дθ(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) = 0, these inequalities can be written as
0 ≥ дθˆ(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) + x(θ′′) − x(θ′)θ′′ − θ′ × [дx(θ′, θ′, x(θ′))+ 12 дxx(b(β))(x(θ′′) − x(θ′)) + дθˆx(b(β))(θ′′ − θ′)]+ 12 дθˆ θˆ(b(β))(θ′′ − θ′)≥ −[дθθˆ(b(β′)) + 12 дθθ(a)](θ′′ − θ′) − дθx(b(β′))(x(θ′′) − x(θ′)),
for b(β) = (θ′, βθ′ + (1 − β)θ′′, βx(θ′) + (1 − β)x(θ′′)) and some β, β′ ∈ [0, 1].
Because V˜ I is twice differentiable, all the derivatives of д are finite. Moreover,
continuity of x implies that x(θ′′) → x(θ′) as θ′′ → θ′ and, therefore, for
θ′′ → θ′,
0 ≥ дθˆ(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) + limθ′′→θ′ x(θ′′) − x(θ′)θ′′ − θ′ дx(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) ≥ 0.
By Lemma 3, x and, hence, θˆ are strictly increasing for all θ ≥ θ¯(λt). Arguing
similarly as we did to show continuity, optimality of x, therefore, requires that
дx = ∂V˜ I/∂xt ≠ 0 and, hence, the limit of (x(θ′′) − x(θ′))/(θ′′ − θ′) is well
defined, yielding
dx
dθ t
= −∂V˜ I/∂θˆ t
∂V˜ I/∂xt . ◇ (8)
Lemma 5: x(θ t , λt) = ξ(θ t) for all θ t > θ¯(λt), where ξ is unique and ∂ξ/∂θ t > 0.
Proof. From Lemma 4 we have that ξ is differentiable, and by Lemma 3, ∂ξ/∂θ t >
0. We thus only need to show that ξ is unique. By the proof to Lemma 4, dx/dθ t
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is pinned down by the partial differential equation (8), which must hold for all
xt ≥ x(θ¯(λt)). Moreover, whenever θ¯(λt) < 1, in equilibrium θˆ(x(1)) = 1 and,
therefore, it obviously must hold that x(1, λt) = argmaxxt V˜ I(1, 1, xt), providing
a boundary condition for (8). Because V˜ I is independent of λt , it follows that
x(θ t , λt) is uniquely characterized by a function, i.e., ξ ∶ θ t ↦ xt , for all θ t ≥
θ¯(λt). ◇
Lemma 6: θ¯(λt) is unique.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that θ¯(λt) is not unique. Then there exist θ¯′′ > θ¯′,
defining two distinct equilibria for a given λt . By Lemma 5, there is a unique ξ(θ)
characterizing reforms outside the pool for both equilibria. Optimality for type
θ ∈ (θ¯′, θ¯′′) then requires V˜ I(θ , θ , ξ(θ)) ≥ V˜ I(θ , θ¯′/2, λt) in the equilibrium
defined by θ¯′, and V˜ I(θ , θ , ξ(θ)) ≤ V˜ I(θ , θ¯′′/2, λt) in the equilibrium defined
by θ¯′′. However, V˜ I(θ , θ¯′/2, λt) > V˜ I(θ , θ¯′′/2, λt), a contradiction. ◇
This establishes uniqueness of x(θ t , λt), with all properties given by Lemmas 3
and 5, and the corresponding beliefs θˆ(λt , xt) following from Lemma 2 and
Bayesian updating. Again, for the purpose of clarity we have established this
proposition by focusing on pure strategy equilibria. In the following we outline
how the proof generalizes to mixed strategy equilibria; a detailed version of these
steps can be attained from the authors on request.
Replicating the proof of Lemma 1, it is trivial to show that if V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′) =
V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′), then V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′), x′) < V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) for all θ′ < θ′′
and x′ < x′′. It follows that (i) supports, X (θ), are non-overlapping, and (ii)
minX (θ′′) ≥ maxX (θ′). Moreover, noting that x˜(θ) ≡ maxX (θ) has a jump-
discontinuity if and only if type θ mixes in a nondegenerate way, (ii) further
implies that there can be only finitely many types that mix on the closed interval[0, 1]. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 then apply with minor changes, ruling out any jumps
of x˜ on [θ¯(λt), 1]. This leads to the conclusion that at most a mass zero of types
(i.e., θ t = θ¯(λt)) could possibly mix in any equilibrium (with no impact on θˆ)
and, thus, there is no need to consider any nondegenerate mixed strategies.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
From the discussion in themain body of this chapter it is clear that the equilibrium
is uniquely pinned down by the time-invariant mappings given by Propositions 1
and 2 if it exists. We are thus left to show existence, which requires us to verify
that the equilibrium mappings are consistent with the D1 and trembling-hand
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criterion. The first is a direct implication from the proof of Proposition 2 where
we apply Lemma 2 to restrict off-equilibrium beliefs, such that θˆ is necessarily
consistent with the D1 criterion.
To show consistency with the concept of trembling-hand perfection, we need
to show that {ϕi ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} and x are best responses to a sequence of completely
mixed strategy profiles {{ωki ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]}, σ k}∞k=0 that converge to a profile that
places all mass on {ϕi ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} and x, respectively.
Accordingly, for ϕi(θˆk(⋅, xt), xt) to be a best-response to xt and the perturbed
strategy profile {ωki ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} for the marginal outsider i with γi = γ¯(st),
we need that θˆk(⋅, xt)ψ(skt (xt)) = γ¯(st), requiring any change in beliefs along
the perturbation path to be offset by trembles of outsiders j ≠ i. Because for
x ∈ [ξ(1), 1], θˆ(⋅, x) = 1 can never be sustained in a completelymixed equilibrium
with a continuumof types, this implies thatwe need to adjust for θˆk(⋅, x) < θˆ(⋅, x)
by introducing asymmetric trembles, leading to sk(x) > s(θˆ(⋅, x), x). Hence, let
sk(x(1)) = s(x(1))+ εk for some {εk}∞k=0 such that limk→∞ εk = 0 and εk ∈ (0, ε¯)
for all k.
A necessary (and for θ ∈ (θ¯(⋅), 1) sufficient) condition for x ∈ [ξ(θ¯(⋅)), ξ(1)]
to be optimal against sk is that sk(x) satisfies the inverse differential equation (8)
for x(⋅, θ) fixed,
dsk
dx
= −∂V I/∂x
∂V I/∂s ∣s=sk , (9)
which in combination with sk(x(1)) pins down sk(x) for all x ∈ [ξ(θ¯), ξ(1)].
Note that sk(x(1)) > s(⋅, x(1)) implies that sk(x) > s(⋅, x) for all x ∈ [ξ(θ¯), ξ(1)]
since the indifference condition (8) is unique. Moreover, since optimality of x
requires that θ¯ is necessarily indifferent between λt and ξ(θ¯), sk(ξ(θ¯)) pins
down sk(λt) > s(⋅, λt).
For off-equilibrium x ∈ (λ, ξ(θ¯)) ∪ (ξ(1), 1] we are free to assign any sk(x)
that (1) assures optimality of x, and (2) converges to s(⋅, x). As to (1), we can for
instance set sk(x) = s(θ¯ , x) + sk(ξ(θ¯)) − s(⋅, ξ(θ¯)) for x ∈ (λ, ξ(θ¯)) (which is
continuous around ξ(θ¯) and has slope ds(θ¯ , x)/dx ≥ dsk(ξ(θ¯))/dx, so that
by (9) no type has an incentive to deviate), and sk(x) = s(⋅, x) + εk f k(x)
for x ∈ (ξ(1), 1] with some f k ∶ [ξ(1), 1] → R+ such that d f k(ξ(1))/dx ={dsk(ξ(1))/dx − ds(⋅, ξ(1))/dx}/εk and f k sufficiently convex for V I to be con-
cave on [ξ(1), 1], so that ξ(1) is the global optimum for θ = 1.
Note that these definitions imply that sk(x) ↓ s(θˆ(⋅, x), x) for all x and, hence,
θˆk(⋅, x) ↑ θˆ(⋅, x) for all x as implied by the indifference condition of the marginal
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outsider, θˆk(x) = γ¯(s(⋅, x))/ψ(sk(x)) ∈ (0, θˆ(⋅, x)). By construction, these
sequences assure optimality of {ϕi ∶ i ∈ [0, 1]} and x along the perturbation path.
To conclude the proof it therefore suffices to show the existence of {{ωki ∶ i ∈[0, 1]}, σ k}∞k=0 yielding {sk , θˆk}∞k=0.
Consider {sk}∞k=0 first. Define ε˜ such that maxx sk(x) < 1 − λ for εk = ε˜ and
suppose that ε¯ ≤ ε˜.17 Then any sk can be sustained by setting
ωki (1)(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 − ε
k for all i ∶ γi ≤ γ¯(s(θˆ(⋅, x), x))
ck(x)εk for all i ∶ γi > γ¯(s(θˆ(⋅, x), x)),
with ck(x) = {sk(x) − (1 − εk)s(⋅, x)}/{(1 − x)(1 − γ¯(x))εk}. Note that ωki is
completely mixed if ε¯ < 1 and εkck(x) ∈ (0, 1) ⇐⇒ ck(x) ∈ (0, 1/εk) ⇐⇒
sk(x)+εks(⋅, x) < 1−x. From sk(x) > s(⋅, x)we have that ck(x) > 0 and because
sk → s, using the same arguments as in Footnote 17, there exists some εˆ such that
ck(x) < 1/εk holds for all ε¯ ≤ εˆ.
Finally, consider {θˆk}∞k=0. It is straightforward to verify by Bayes rule that any
θˆk with θˆk(x) > 0 for all x can be sustained by setting
σ k(x)(θ , ⋅) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
εk if θ > θˆk(x) and (x > λt or θ > θ¯ t)
dk(x)εk if θ < θˆk(x) and x > λt
1 − Rk(θ) if θ ≥ θ¯(λt) and x = ξ(θ)
Tk if θ ≤ θˆk(λt) and x = λt
Zk if θ ∈ (θˆk(λt), θ¯(λt)) and x = λt ,
with dk(x) = (1 − θˆk(x))2/θˆk(x)2, Rk(θ) = ∫θ>θˆ(x) εk dx + ∫θ<θˆ(x) dk(x)εk dx,
Tk = inf θ<θ¯(λt)(1 − Rk(θ)), and Zk = {Tk θˆk(x)2 + εk[2(1 − θ¯(λt))θˆk(λt) −
1 + θ¯(λt)2]}/{θ¯(λt) − θˆk(λt)}2. With a slight abuse of notation, in the defini-
tion of σ k , Rk , Tk and Zk denote probabilities, while εk are understood to be
probability densities. Note that σ k is completely mixed if Tk , Rk(θ) ∈ (0, 1) and
Zk ∈ (0, Rk(θ)) for all θ. This is obviously true for some ε˘, such that ε¯ < ε˘. Finally,
note that the above definition is incomplete in the sense that Rk(θ) + Tk < 1 or
Rk(θ)+Zk < 1 for some types θ < θ¯(λt). In these cases the remaining probability
17 To see that ε˜ exists, note that s(θˆ(⋅, x), x) < 1 − x ≤ 1 − λt since otherwise γ¯t = 1, which
requires θ¯ t = 1 and st = 1, contradicting that s is strictly decreasing in x. Convergence of sk
to s then implies that one can always find some ε˜ that is sufficiently small.
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mass can be distributed (almost) arbitrary over atoms on (λt , 1] without impact
on the resulting beliefs.18
We conclude the proof by setting ε¯ = min{1, ε˜, εˆ, ε˘}.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider QR(λt , ( 12 , 1]) = 1 first. By Proposition 2, for any reform xt > λt ,
xt = ξ(θ t), with ξ increasing. To show the claim, it thus suffices to show that
x˜ ≡ ξ(θ˜) > 1/2 for θ˜ = minλ θ¯(λ). Also, define λ˜ = argminλ θ¯(λ). Then,
optimality of x˜ implies s∗ ≡ s(θ˜/2, λ˜) > s(θ˜ , x˜) ≡ s∗∗. Using (6),
s∗ = (θ˜/2)(1 − λ˜)ψ(s∗) ≡ w∗ψ(s∗), (10)
s∗∗ = θ˜(1 − x˜)ψ(s∗∗) ≡ w∗∗ψ(s∗∗). (11)
Note that, in analogue to the proof of Proposition 1, for a general wt ≡ θˆ t(1 − xt)
it holds that
∂st
∂wt
= −ψ(st) (∂πt∂st )−1 > 0.
Hence, s∗ > s∗∗ impliesw∗ > w∗∗, or (θ˜/2)(1− λ˜) > θ˜(1− x˜). Rearranging, then
proves the claim,
x˜ > 1 − 1 − λ˜
2
≥ 1
2
.
Now consider QS(λt , (0, 12)) = 1. Again, optimality of xt implies that
s(θˆ(λt , x), x) is decreasing in x. Hence, for all λt ,
s(θˆ(λt , xt), xt) ≤ s(θ¯(λt)/2, λt) ≤ s(1/2, 0),
where the last inequality follows since s is increasing in its first and decreasing in
its second argument. Hence, it suffices to show that s(1/2, 0) < 1/2.
Let s∗ ≡ s(1, 0) ≤ 1 and let s∗∗ ≡ s(1/2, 0). From (6), s∗ = ψ(s∗) and
s∗∗ = ψ(s∗∗)/2. Moreover, by Proposition 1, s∗ > s∗∗. Hence, since ψ is strictly
increasing,
s∗∗ = ψ(s∗∗)
2
= ψ(ψ(s∗∗)/2)
2
< ψ(ψ(s∗)/2)
2
= ψ(s∗/2)
2
< ψ(s∗)
2
= s∗
2
≤ 1
2
.
18 For instance, we can dispose of the atomic waste without any hazard by having each type θ
place the remaining probability mass on x = λt + θ(1 − λt)/θ¯(λt).
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A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
From Footnote 13,
ρS(λt) = ∫ θ¯(λt)0 θh (s (θ¯(λt)/2, λt))dθ + ∫ 1θ¯(λt) θh (s (θ , x(θ)))dθ , (12)
and
ρR(λt) = ∫ 1θ¯(λt) (1 − θh (s (θ , x(θ))))dθ . (13)
Also, note that θ¯(λt) ∈ (0, 1] is implicitly defined as the solution to
F(θ¯ , λt) ≡ V˜ I(θ¯ , θ¯/2, λt) − V˜ I(θ¯ , θ¯ , ξ(θ¯)) = 0, (14)
if an interior solution exists. Otherwise, for λt there is a corner solution θ¯(λt) = 1,
which implies V˜ I(1, 1/2, λt) > V˜ I(1, 1, ξ(1)).
First, consider λt > λ¯. Suppose that there exists λ¯, such that for all λt ∈ (λ¯, 1],
θ¯(λt) is a corner solution. Then clearly for all λt > λ¯, ∂θ¯(λt)/∂λt = 0, such
that ∂ρS(λt)/∂λt = ∂h(s(1/2, λt))/∂λt < 0, by Proposition 1. Furthermore,
∂ρR(λt)/∂λt = 0. Otherwise, if there exists no λ¯, such that for all λt ∈ (λ¯, 1], θ¯(λt)
is a corner solution, then there necessarily exists a λ∗, such that for λt ∈ (λ∗, 1],
θ¯(λt) is an interior solution. But then, because ρS(1) = ρR(1) = 0, continuity of
ρS and ρR implies that ∂ρS(λt)/∂λt < 0 and ∂ρR(λt)/∂λt < 0 for all λt > λ¯ and
some λ¯ < 1.
Now consider λt < ¯λ and θ¯(0) < 1. Then, F differentiable implies that θ¯(λt)has an interior solution and is differentiable for all λt ∈ [0, λ∗) for some λ∗ > 0.
Implicit differentiation of F, substituting for x′(θ¯) from (8), and using F(θ¯ , λt) =
0 yields
∂θ¯(λ)
∂λ
= −θ¯hp1 sp2up + (1 − pp)up1
θ¯
2 h
p
1 s
p
1 up + up−usθ¯ , (15)
where subscript i denotes the derivative with respect to the ith argument, and
superscripts p and s denote that the function is evaluated at the pooling or
separating values, respectively (where θˆ p = θ¯2 , x p = λ and θˆs = θ¯ , xs = x(θ¯)).
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Using this, the signs of ∂ρS/∂λt and ∂ρI/∂λt are given by
sign{∂ρS(λt)
∂λt
} = sign{uP ((pP − pS)(1 − 2pS)
1 − pS )+
+ (1 − pP)uP1 ((1 − λt) − 2(pP − pS)θ¯hP1 sP2 )} (16)
and
sign{∂ρR(λt)
∂λt
} = sign{−∂θ¯(λt)
∂λt
(1 − pS)} , (17)
where we have used that (1 − pP)uP = (1 − pS)uS from (14) and sP1 /(−sP2 ) =
2(1 − λt)/θ¯ by the proof of Proposition 1.
Evaluated at λt = 0, all terms except u1 in (16) are strictly positive.19 Thus,
∂ρS(0)/∂λt is weakly positive if and only if for λt = 0 it holds that
uP1 ≥ −uP ((pP − pS)(1 − 2pS)1 − pS )[(1 − pP)((1 − λt) − 2(pP − pS)θ¯hP1 sP2 )]
−1
. (18)
Likewise, note that the sign of ∂ρR/∂λt is the opposite sign of ∂θ¯(λt)/∂λt .
Hence, because all terms except u1 in (15) are strictly positive, ∂ρR/∂λt is weakly
negative if and only if
uP1 ≥ θ¯hp1 sp2up(1 − pP)−1. (19)
Let u′ and u′′ be the values of the right hand sides of (18) and (19) when
evaluated at λt = 0. Then, from our discussion above it follows, that ∂ρS(0)/∂λt >
0 and ∂ρR(0)/∂λt < 0 if u1(0) > u¯ ≡ max{u′, u′′}. The converse—that is,
∂ρS(0)/∂λt < 0 and ∂ρR(0)/∂λt > 0—holds true, if u1(0) < ¯u ≡ min{u′, u′′}.Differentiability of ρS and ρR around 0 thus establishes the claim for all λt ∈ [0, ¯λ]for some
¯
λ > 0.
19 Note that pS = θ¯h(sS) < 1/2 for λt = 0 is not obvious. To see that this is indeed the
case, assume to the contrary pS > 1/2 implying pP = θ¯/2 h(sP) > 1/2. By Proposition
4, sP = θ¯/2 h(sP)u(sP) = pP/2u(sP) < 1/2 and hence u(sP) < 1/pP < 2 by pP > 1/2.
Furthermore, optimality of ξ¯ ≡ ξ(θ¯) requires (1− pS)u(ξ¯) ≥ 1, since an indirect utility of 1 is
always attainable by setting x = 1. This implies u(ξ¯) ≥ 2 by pS > 1/2. Thus, pS > 1/2 implies
u(sP) < 2 ≤ u(ξ¯) for λt = 0. However, by Proposition 4, sP < 1/2 < ξ¯ such that u(sP) > u(ξ¯),
a contradiction.
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Abstract
This chapter of my dissertation analyzes optimal search when it is delegated to
an agent. There are two informational asymmetries. First, adverse selection:
ex ante, prospects of search are privately known by the agent. Second, moral
hazard: search itself cannot be observed by the principal. In this environment,
the principal’s problem is to bring the agent to reveal the optimal search policy
and, simultaneously, to induce him to actually search according to the revealed
policy. We show that the solution to this problem uses a screeningmenu, which is
exclusively comprised of simple bonus contracts. Search policies are almost surely
inefficient; either search is terminated prematurely, or it is completely undirected.
In contrast, if either of the two informational asymmetries is resolved, the first-
best outcome can be supported in equilibrium.
Keywords
Adverse selection, bonus contracts, delegating search, hidden action, optimal
search.
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1. Introduction
Searching is an important element of many types of agency relationships. Re-
cruiting agencies are hired to search for job candidates. Real estate agents are
contracted to search for prospective buyers or, alternatively, to search for attrac-
tive houses. Insurance brokers are often hired to find new clients. At a more
general level, many more agency relationships require agents to be “original”
rather than performing routine tasks and can be thought of as search agencies.
This includes all relationships where agents are expected to “think” and search for
“ideas” in order to provide a solution for a given problem; e.g., research centers
exploring new product designs, advocates searching for good defense strategies,
and business consultancies searching for promising business plans.
This chapter of my dissertation analyzes optimal searching when it is delegated
to an agent. For this purpose, we consider the canonical searchmodel introduced
by McCall (1970), in which a single agent sequentially samples “solutions” from
a time-invariant distribution. The framework gives rise to an optimal stopping
rule that determines at which point the agent stops sampling new solutions in
order to utilize the best available one.
Our study only deviates from this setting by assuming that the payoffs from
adopting a solution are not realized by the agent who operates the searching, but
from another agent—i.e., the “principal”. There are two informational asymme-
tries that govern the relationship. First, motivated by the agent’s role as an expert
in the aforementioned examples, the agent has an informational advantage over
the principal in assessing the prospects of searching. Specifically, we assume
that payoffs x are sampled from a time-invariant, but state-dependent distribu-
tion F(x∣θ), upon which θ is private information of the agent. Second, search
itself cannot be observed (or verified) by the principal, a natural assumption
given the soft and unverifiable nature of finding qualified job candidates, serious
buyers, or good “solutions”. In this environment, the principal’s problem is to
bring the agent to reveal the optimal search policy (which depends on θ) and,
simultaneously, to induce him to actually search according to the revealed policy.
Using this model we study how delegation affects the searching process, and
what contractual arrangements a profit maximizing principal would offer to opti-
mally delegate search to the agent. A key aspect of the analysis is the dealing with
the simultaneous presence of adverse selection and moral hazard and showing
how the interaction of these asymmetries affects the optimal contract design.
Not surprisingly, we find that searching is almost surely inefficient. Search
is either stopped too early (compared to the efficient solution) or is completely
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undirected (leading the agent to unconditionally adopt the first solution he finds).
These results lend theoretical support to recent empirical evidence provided by
Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) that the search effort by
real estate agents is inefficiently low.
The combination of the two informational asymmetries is crucial for the
inefficiency. If either adverse selection or moral hazard is shut down, then the
efficient benchmark can be implemented as a rational equilibrium outcome. Each
of the two asymmetries acts hereby as an “catalyst” for the other one: If search
is unobservable but the prospects of searching are known to the principal, then
the efficient benchmark could be achieved by the agent “buying” all prospective
benefits from searching. Once θ is hidden from the principal, this resolution
is undermined by the price being exposed to adverse selection. Conversely, if
the moral hazard is dissolved, then the principal could simply reimburse the
agent for his search efforts and thereby solve the adverse selection problem, a
strategy which is undermined by moral hazard forcing him to also provide search
incentives to the agent.
Regarding the optimal contract design, we show that search is optimally dele-
gated through the use of a screening menu, which is exclusively comprised of
simple bonus contracts. These contracts pay a fixed bonus to the agent when an
ex ante specified target is reached, and nothing otherwise. All other information
about the realized solution is optimally ignored. Underlying this result is the
adverse selection problem which causes any contracts that are more sensible
to the realized payoffs to increase the costs of bringing the agent to reveal the
prospects of search. On the other hand, moral hazard precludes the usage of even
simpler “fixed wage” agreements, since then the agent would not be induced to
provide any search effort.
Having in mind the general interpretation of search agencies as problem-
solving specialist-agents, the optimality of bonus contracts provides a novel
explanation for the observed popularity of this simple compensation scheme.1
This finding is related to a small but important literature that shows how in
environments that are more complex than baseline moral hazard models (e.g.,
Holmstrom, 1979) optimal compensation schemes can be simpler than the base-
line analysis would suggest. In particular Townsend (1979), Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987), and Innes (1990) have shown in their seminal contributions
1 See, for instance, Moynahan (1980) for a documentation of the widespread usage of bonus
contracts in many industries, and Oyer (2000) for specific evidence on the frequent usage of
bonus schemes for salesmen in the food manufacturing industry.
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that linear contracts (Holmstrom and Milgrom) and standard debt contracts
(Townsend and Innes) are optimal. More recently Herweg et al. (2010) have
used the idea that agents have nonstandard preferences that make them averse to
losses compared to an expectations-based reference point in order to explain the
usage of bonus schemes.2 Our approach deviates from these studies in that we
use a combination of adverse selection and moral hazard to argue that contracts
are simple because simplicity helps solving the adverse selection problem.
For surveys of the literature on optimal search, see, for example, Mortensen
(1986) and Rogerson et al. (2005). So far, this literature has primarily focused
on single agent decision problems. Two important exceptions are Lewis and
Ottaviani (2008) and Lewis (2012). In these related contributions, Lewis and
Ottaviani analyze delegated search problems that consist of multiple stages over
which a principal repeatedly interacts with the same agent. In contrast to this
study, these papers focus in informational asymmetries that emerge within a
repeated agency relationship that differs considerably from the standard search
model. While both studies also find that search is inefficient, the contracts that
are optimally used in these dynamic relationships are considerably more complex
than the simple contracts which we find to be optimal in our setting.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 provides the first-best benchmark and shows how it can be
implemented as an equilibrium outcome if either adverse selection or moral
hazard is shut down. Section 4 analyzes the solution to our model with both
informational asymmetries. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are deferred to the
Appendix.
2. A simple model of delegated search
In this section, we set up a simple search model, in which search is operated by
an agent and payoffs from search are realized by a principal. Both the principal
and the agent are risk-neutral. The “problem” of the principal is of generic nature.
In order to solve the problem, the principal hires an agent. The job of the agent
2 It is also known that the combination of risk-neutrality, limited liability and moral hazard
makes bonus schemes the unique optimal contract (see, e.g., Park, 1995; Kim, 1997; Oyer,
2000 and Demougin and Fluet, 1998. As demonstrated by Jewitt et al. (2008), this finding
breaks, however, down if agents are risk-averse to only the slightest degree. In contrast, even
though agents are risk averse in our setting, too, our results do not rely on the preferences of
the agent.
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is to first sample a selection of different solutions, and then to select a specific
one. Importantly, different solutions are also differently valued by the principal.
We denote the value of a solution by x, x ∈ X, where X = [0, B]. The agent can
sample solutions at constant costs c from a distribution F(x∣θ), which depends on
an exogenously given state of the world θ. We assume that F is twice continuously
differentiable in x and θ. The state of the world is randomly selected before the
principal contracts the agent, and has a support equal to [
¯
θ , θ¯], denoted by Θ.
The prior cumulative distribution function of θ is common knowledge, is denoted
by P, and has a differentiable density p such that p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Each time
the agent samples a new solution, he can either adopt that solution, or continue to
search for other solutions. The outside option from not adopting any solution and
not contracting is normalized to zero for both the principal and the agent. We
restrict attention to the case where, in the absence of informational asymmetries,
solving the problem is profitable in all states of the world, that is E{x∣θ} ≥ c for
all θ ∈ Θ.
To complete the model, we need to specify the information that is available
to the principal and the agent. We impose the following two informational
asymmetries.
Assumption 1 (Adverse Selection): The state of the world θ is privately
revealed to the agent before he contracts with the principal. The principal knows
the set of potential states Θ and their distribution P(θ).
Assumption 2 (Hidden Action): Search by the agent and the sampled selec-
tion of solutions cannot be observed by the principal. However, the value of the
adopted solution is observable and verifiable.
Assumptions 1 and 2 define the two uncertainties which the principal faces
in the main model. Assumption 1 states that the principal does not know the
state of the world. This implies that the principal relies on the agent to select the
optimal search policy, since optimal search generally depends on the state of the
world. Assumption 2 adds an additional dimension of uncertainty by assuming
that search by the agent cannot be observed. The principal learns the value of
the solution only after the agent adopts it. This implies that the principal has to
rely on the contractual arrangements to ensure that the agent not only reveals
the optimal search policy but also searches according to this policy.
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3. Preliminary analysis
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we briefly describe the first-best bench-
mark, and analyze themodel’s solutionwhen eitherAssumption 1 orAssumption 2
is relaxed.
Suppose that the principal is both able to observe the state of the world and to
monitor search by the agent. Then, in the first best, search by the agentmaximizes
the (joint) surplus of search. Therefore first-best search policies are identical to
the optimal search policies in the standard search model. We skip the derivation
and simply state the solution in the following observation. For details, see for
instance McCall (1970).
Observation: In the first best the agent searches as long as for all previously
sampled solutions it holds that x ≤ x¯FB(θ). Otherwise he stops search and adopts
the last-sampled solution. The first-best stopping rule is given by a function x¯FB ∶
Θ → X, which is defined pointwise, such that x¯FB(θ) for a given state θ is pinned
down by the following condition:
c = ∫ Bx¯FB(θ)(x′ − x¯FB(θ))dF(x′∣θ). (1)
In the first best, an agent who knows the world to be in state θ, searches for
better solutions until he finds one of at least a value of x¯FB(θ). The optimal
“stopping rule” x¯FB(θ) equates the marginal expected benefits of finding a better
solution than x¯FB(θ) with the marginal costs of searching c.
To better understand the mechanics of our model consider now a situation
where the principal is able to observe and verify the selection of solutions which
the agent has sampled, but faces uncertainty from not knowing the true state
of the world. This resembles a situation where assumption 1 holds, but 2 does
not. In this case, the first-best outcome, in which the agent pursues the first-best
optimal search policies in every state of the world, can be implemented by using
a simple contractual arrangement. Essentially all we have to do is compensate
the agent for his search costs independently from the search policy he pursues,
and then he finds it (weakly) optimal to search according to the first best. We
state the precise result in the following.
Proposition 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, but that the principal is able to
observe and verify the selection of solutions which the agent has sampled. Then the
first-best search policies can be implemented by paying a transfer T(N) to the agent
after he adopts a solution, where T(N) = N c, and N is the number of solutions in
the final sample.
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Proof Sketch. Since for the above described contract the agent breaks even in-
dependently of his search behavior, there exists a first-best equilibrium, where
the agent accepts the contract, pursues first-best search policies, and adopts the
solution that yields the highest value. This is trivially true as none of these choices
is payoff-relevant under the considered contract. Moreover, it is also trivially
true that the principal has no incentive to deviate from the first-best equilibrium
by offering another contract.
The point here is that by offering a contract that fully compensates the agent
for his search costs, the principal can provide a contract, in which the agent’s
private knowledge about the state of the world is not payoff-relevant to him. As
a result, the agent is willing to reveal the state of the world without any explicit
incentives. Critical to this contract is that the principal is able to verify the
sampled selection of solutions, allowing him to assess the actual costs of the
agent. This is not possible anymore once we introduce Assumption 2, preventing
the principal from differentiating bad luck while searching from a fundamentally
bad distribution. In this sense Assumption 2 catalyzesAssumption 1 by rendering
the agent’s private information necessarily payoff-relevant for any non-constant
contract.
Note, however, that also in the case where Assumption 2 holds but Assump-
tion 1 does not, there exists again a simple contractwhich implements the first-best
search policies. In this case it is sufficient that the agent is the residual claimant,
as it then will be in his own interest to pursue first-best search policies.
Proposition 2: Assume 2. Suppose that the principal learns the state of the world
prior to contracting the agent. Then first-best search policies can be implemented
by paying a transfer T(x) to the agent after he adopts a solution, where T(x) =−x¯FB(θ) + x, and x¯FB(θ) is the first-best stopping rule in state θ.
Proof Sketch. Since the agent effectively becomes the residual claimant under the
described contract, search obviously is efficient. The only question is, whether
both the principal and the agent would agree to the price x¯FB(θ) that the agent
pays to become the residual claimant. To see that this is indeed the case, note that
by condition (1), the first-best expected surplus, [F¯(x¯FB(θ)∣θ)]−1 ××(∫ Bx¯FB(θ) x′ dF(x′∣θ) − c), is equal to x¯FB(θ). Hence the principal reaps all
the surplus, and therefore happily proposes this contract, which the agent accepts
in equilibrium since he breaks even.
As before, this contract is not feasible anymore as soon as we introduce both
informational asymmetries simultaneously. The reason is that with θ unknown
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the price x¯FB(θ) will be subject to adverse selection, as originally pointed out
by Akerlof (1970). In this sense, adverse selection unleashes the moral hazard
problem, much alike risk aversion and limited liability do in other moral hazard
setups.
We conclude that whenever the principal is either able to perfectly monitor
search by the agent, or is equally well informed about the state of nature, delegated
search comes without any efficiency loss and is identical to search by a single
agent. Only when the agent has some informational advantage about the state of
world (e.g., because he is an expert) and search cannot be perfectly monitored,
delegated search may differ from the standard search model. The remainder of
the chapter analyzes how to optimally deal with such a situation.
4. Optimal delegation of search
The problem of the principal when, both, search and the state of the world is
unobservable is to bring the agent to reveal his information on the state of the
world θ, and simultaneously induce him to actually search according to the search
policies that the principal finds optimal given θ. An important feature of this
problem is that search has to be self-enforcing given the contractual arrangements.
That is, given Assumption 2, a contract is simply a function T ∶ [0, B]→ R, which
specifies, for every solution x, a transfer from the principal to the agent. For any
contract T , searching is then determined by the search policy which optimizes
the agent’s payoff given the state of the world θ.
Taking into account these search policies, the principal’s objective is to maxi-
mize her expected payoffs. By the revelation principle, a solution to this problem
may be obtained via a direct revelation mechanism in which the agent truthfully
reports the state of the world, and for each state θ is assigned a contract Tθ . The
principal’s problem is then to find the optimal set of contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ.
We approach this problem as follows. Since the search environment of the
agent is designed by the principal through the choice of {Tθ}θ∈Θ, we first charac-
terize the solution to the search problem of the agent for an arbitrary contract T .
With the solution to this problem at hand, we then turn to the optimization prob-
lem of the principal and obtain some defining properties of the optimal menu.
In particular, we establish the optimality of bonus contracts. After simplifying
the problem accordingly, we then compute the optimal menu and derive the
equilibrium search policies.
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4.1. Search problem of the agent
Once the agent has chosen a contract from the menu offered to him, sequential
rationality requires that he pursues the searchpolicywhich is then optimal forhim.
Since the agent is effectively facing a search problem over the transfers specified
by the chosen contract, equilibrium search is characterized by the solution to
this search problem. Because the underlying distribution F(x∣θ) is in terms of
solutions x rather than in terms of Tθ˜(x), we introduce an indicator function that
indicates whether for a particular x, Tθ˜(x) is smaller or larger than the optimal
stopping rule of the agent. Otherwise, search by the agent resembles the results
of standard search theory.
Lemma 1: An agent with distribution θ and contract Tθ˜ searches as long as for
all previously sampled solutions it holds that Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ). Otherwise he stops
search and adopts the last-sampled solution. Letψθ˜ ∶ X×R→ {0, 1} be an indicator
function, such that
ψθ˜(x , T¯θ˜(θ)) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩0 if Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ), and1 if Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ).
Then the stopping rule is given by function T¯θ˜ ∶ Θ → X, which is defined pointwise,
such that T¯θ˜(θ) is pinned down by
c = ∫ ({Tθ˜(x′) − T¯θ˜(θ)} ⋅ ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ)))dF(x′∣θ) (2)
whenever ∫ Tθ˜(x′)dF(x′∣θ) ≥ c. Otherwise the agent does not search at all.
Here the optimal stopping rule equates marginal costs of searching c and
the marginal expected benefits from finding a solution x′ which yields a higher
transfer T(x′) as given by the right hand side of equation (2).
Because the search policy of the agent simplifies to a stopping rule in terms
of payoffs Tθ˜(x) rather than in terms of the value of the underlying solution x,
the solution to (2) does not necessarily map back into a unique solution to the
principal’s problem. To ensure that Tθ is invertible, we impose the following
assumption.
Assumption 3: Contracts are monotonically increasing, i.e. Tθ(x′) ≤ Tθ(x′′)
for all (x′, x′′, θ) ∈ {X2 ×Θ ∣ x′ ≤ x′′}.
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It is well known that this assumption can be rationalized by free disposal.
That is, given free disposal, the agent can guarantee himself a payoff of T∗θ (x) ≡
maxx′∈[0,x]{Tθ(x′)}. Hence, w.l.o.g., one could replace Tθ by Tˆθ , which for all x,
pays Tˆθ(x) = T∗θ (x). It can easily be verified that Tˆθ is indeed increasing in x.
Intuitively, Assumption 3 thus requires that the agent can freely downscale any
realized solution.
Given that all contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ are increasing in x, we can reformulate the
optimal search policy of the agent in terms of the value of the underlying solution.
Then the stopping rule of the agent in terms of x is given by,
x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) = maxx {x ∶ Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ)} . (3)
Although (3) uniquely identifies x¯(Tθ˜ , θ), it will be convenient to formulate
the searchpolicies directly in termsTθ˜ . Because itmay be optimal (and indeedwill
be in equilibrium) to offer a contract that is discontinues at x¯(Tθ˜ , θ), equilibrium
searchmay be given by a corner solution. The following characterization accounts
for that.
Proposition 3: Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. LetM be the space of
monotonically increasing functions X → R. Then search by the agent is completely
summarized by function x¯ ∶M ×Θ → X, which specifies, for a contract Tθ˜ ∈M
and a state of the world θ ∈ Θ, a number x¯(Tθ˜ , θ), such that the agent searches as
long as for all previously sampled solutions it holds that x ≤ x¯(Tθ˜ , θ). Otherwise
he stops search and adopts the last-sampled solution. The stopping rule is given by
function x¯, which is defined pointwise by the following inequalities.
c ≤ ∫ Bxˆ (Tθ˜(x′) − Tθ˜(xˆ))dF(x′∣θ) for all xˆ ≤ x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) (4a)
c > ∫ Bxˆ (Tθ˜(x′) − Tθ˜(xˆ))dF(x′∣θ) for all xˆ > x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) . (4b)
Proposition 3 characterizes the search policies of the agent given Assumption 2.
Accordingly, (4a) and (4b) can be interpreted as hidden action constraints to the
principal’s problem.
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4.2. Optimality of bonus contracts
We are now ready to characterize the optimal menu. The optimal menu of
contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ is given by the solution to the followingmaximization problem:
max{Tθ}θ∈Θ { ∫θ∈Θ ∫ Bx¯(Tθ ,θ) ( x′ − Tθ(x′)F¯(x¯(Tθ , θ)∣θ))dF(x′∣θ)dP(θ)}
subject to the constraints,
1
F¯(x¯(Tθ , θ)∣θ)[ ∫ Bx¯(Tθ ,θ) Tθ(x′)dF(x′∣θ) − c] ≥ 0 (IRθ)
1
F¯(x¯(Tθ , θ)∣θ)[ ∫ Bx¯(Tθ ,θ) Tθ(x′)dF(x′∣θ) − c]≥ 1
F¯(x¯(Tθ˜ , θ)∣θ)[ ∫ Bx¯(Tθ˜ ,θ) Tθ˜(x′)dF(x′∣θ) − c] (ICθ ,θ˜)
for all (θ , θ˜) ∈ Θ2, where x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) is characterized by
c ≤ ∫ Bxˆ (Tθ˜(x′) − Tθ˜(xˆ))dF(x′∣θ) for all xˆ ≤ x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) (SP −θ ,θ˜)
c > ∫ Bxˆ (Tθ˜(x′) − Tθ˜(xˆ))dF(x′∣θ) for all xˆ > x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) . (SP +θ ,θ˜)
The objective of the principal here is to maximize her expected payoff subject
to three kind of constraints. First, constraints (IRθ) require that it must be
individually rational for the agent in state θ to accept contract Tθ , rather then
choosing his outside option. Second, constraints (ICθ ,θ˜) require that it must be
optimal for the agent in state θ to truthfully reveal the state to the principal by
choosing Tθ from the menu of all contracts {Tθ˜}θ˜∈Θ. These constraints stem
from the principal not knowing the state of the world. The third set of constraints
is due to the additional uncertainty from not observing search by the agent, as
analyzed in the previous subsection. Accordingly, (SP −θ ,θ˜) and (SP +θ ,θ˜) pin down
the agent’s search policies, x¯(Tθ˜ , θ), as given by Proposition 3.
The hidden action constraints also suggests that for an arbitrary contract Tθ ,
the search policy differs with the distribution θ˜. In particular, off-equilibrium
search policies of an agent with distribution θ˜ who chooses contract Tθ are not
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bound to be the same to the ones this contract Tθ implements for an agent with
distribution θ. A crucial question is therefore, what action should a contract
which is designed for state θ implement for the agent who knows the world to be
in state θ˜? An approximate answer here is that the principal wants to design a
contract Tθ which implements an action for all states θ˜ other than θ that makes
it as unattractive as possible for an agent in these states to choose contract Tθ .
As we will formally see below, this goal can be achieved by a menu of bonus
contracts.
To analyze themodel, we impose the following assumptions on the distribution
F(x∣θ). Let F¯ ≡ 1 − F, and let H ≡ ∂F¯−1/∂x. Then:
Assumption 4: ∂H/∂θ ≤ 0, and ∂2H/∂θ2 ≥ 0.
Assumption 5: ∂H/∂x ≤ 0, and ∂2H/∂x∂θ ≤ 0.
The first part of Assumption 4 states that distributions can be ordered accord-
ing to expression H. Since 1− F(x∣θ) is decreasing in θ, a sufficient condition for
H to be decreasing is the commonly used monotone likelihood ratio condition.3
The intuition of this assumption is that at any point of search, when one continues
search, one will do better—in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance—in
state θ′′ than in state θ′, θ′ < θ′′. The role of the first part of Assumption 4 in this
chapter is that it guarantees in a stochastical sense what is commonly referred to
as the single crossing property.4 The second part of Assumption 4 strengthens
this, such that H is convexly increasing in the state of the world. Intuitively this
requires that the benefit of being in a higher state of the world than θ is decreasing
as the state θ becomes better.
Assumption 5 is of more technical nature, ensuring that the objective function
of the principal is concave.
3 Another condition which is less strict than the monotone likelihood ratio condition, and
which is also sufficient to guarantee the first part of Assumption 4 is sometimes referred to as
the monotone hazard ratio condition.
4 More precisely, Assumption 4 implies that the agent’s indifference curves between expected
transfers and different stopping rules cross only once over different states. To see this, let T eθ ≡
E{T(x) ∣ x ≥ x¯ , θ} denote the expected transfers to the agent in state θ with a given contract
T , and let uθ(T eθ , x¯) ≡ T eθ − c/F¯(x¯∣θ) denote the expected utility of the agent when pursuing
stopping rule x¯. Then the single crossing property holds, if for any (θ , θ′) ∈ {Θ2∣θ > θ′},
− ∂uθ/∂x¯
∂uθ/∂T eθ ≤ − ∂uθ′/∂x¯∂uθ′/∂T eθ′ ,
which is equivalent to H(x∣θ) ≤ H(x∣θ′), as given by the first part of Assumption 4.
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To keep the results clear, we also impose the following two assumptions which
guarantee that the principal’s maximization problem has an interior solution that
can be characterized by first order conditions.
Assumption 6: ddθ ( p(θ)1−P(θ)) ≥ 0.
Assumption 7: ∂2∂x¯∂θ E{x∣x ≥ x¯ , θ} ≥ 0.
Assumption 6 is a standard assumption in adverse selection problems, which
states that the conditional density to be in state θ′, given that the state of the
world is θ′′ ≥ θ′ is increasing in θ′. In other words, for higher states it becomes
less likely, that the world is in a even better state. A sufficient condition for
Assumption 6 to hold is that the likelihood p(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Assumption 7 states that the marginal benefit of search is increasing in θ. As
mentioned before, together with Assumptions 4 and 6 this assumption guarantees
that the optimal solution is an interior one. In many cases this assumption will,
however, not be necessary at all. Whenever p(θ)/(1 − P(θ)) is increasing at a
sufficiently high rate, or whenever H is sufficiently convex, we can completely
drop this assumption. For details see the proof of Proposition 5.
In the following, we now argue that the principal optimally designs a menu of
contracts which exclusively utilizes a particular simple form of contracts, namely
bonus contracts as defined in the following.
Definition: Let τ be a nonrandom constant. Then a contract T is called a
bonus contract when it is of the following form:
T(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩0 if x < x¯τ if x ≥ x¯ .
Our argumentation establishes that a menu of such contracts implements
any set of equilibrium search policies in a weakly optimal way and, therefore,
any equilibrium can be implemented by a menu of such contracts. First, we
investigate the implications of a menu that consists exclusively of bonus contracts.
The following lemma asserts that in this case the optimalmenu resemblesmany of
the characteristics of a standard adverse selection problem. In particular, we have
that (IRθ), (ICθ ,θ˜), (SP
−
θ ,θ˜) and (SP
+
θ ,θ˜) in the principal’s maximization problem
can be replaced by (a), (b) and (c) below.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1–4 hold. Let {Tθ}θ∈Θ be a menu of bonus con-
tracts, let x¯(θ) be the search targets implemented by contract Tθ , and let τ(θ) be
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the transfer paid to the agent when x > x¯(θ). Then if {Tθ}θ∈Θ is a solution to the
principal’s optimization program, then it is also a solution to a program where the
principal maximizes her payoff subject to the following constraints:
(a) x¯(θ) is nondecreasing in θ,
(b) U(
¯
θ) = 0, and
(c) dUdθ = − ∂∂θ ( cF¯(x¯(θ)∣θ)),
where U(θ) ≡ u(x¯(θ), τ(θ), θ) denotes the agent’s indirect utility in state θ,
i.e. given contract Tθ = (x¯(θ), τ(θ)).
Given these results, which hold for any menu of bonus contracts, we can
now show that a menu of bonus contracts is at least as good as any other menu,
allowing us to restrict attention to such a menu.
Proposition 4: Suppose Assumptions 1–7 hold. Then to any equilibrium in
the game defined in Section 2, there corresponds an associated menu of bonus
contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ, which implements the same actions and is (weakly) preferred
by the principal.
The main argument in the proof is that, for an arbitrary set of actions that
are to be implemented, the utility of the agent in a menu of bonus contracts
that implements these actions is a lower bound for any other contract, resulting
in a weak optimality of bonus contracts. The intuition behind the result is that
an agent in state θ′′ will profit from choosing a contract designed for state θ′ <
θ′′, because he faces a “better” distribution F(x∣θ′′) than the agent in state θ′
(in the sense of Assumption 4). This stochastic advantage translates into an
expected utility advantage via two channels. First, expected costs of pursuing a
particular search policy are lower in state θ′′ than in state θ′. Second, given that
contracts are monotonically increasing, an increase in θ shifts probability mass
to those solutions x where payments to the agent are weakly higher. Since for any
x¯(Tθ′ , θ′) this effect is increasing in the slope of Tθ′ , a bonus contract minimizes
the information rents paid in state θ′′.
The usage of bonus contracts also answers the previously posed question,
which actions a contract should implement after every possible deviation in the
contracting stage. Specifically, as shown in the proof to Lemma 2, bonus contracts
imply that x¯(Tθ , θ˜) = x¯(Tθ , θ) in all relevant cases.5
5 Here, for any given contract Tθ , “relevant” are all states θ˜ in which it is necessary and
sufficient to prevent them from choosing contract Tθ .
136 Essays in Informational Economics
Corollary: Let {Tθ}θ∈Θ be a solution to the principal’s optimization program.
Then without loss of generality we may assume that x¯(Tθ , θ˜) = x¯(Tθ , θ) ≡ x¯(θ)
for all (θ , θ˜) ∈ Θ2.
In other words, we may assume without loss of generality that any given
contract Tθ implements the same stopping rule in all states of the world θ˜. Ac-
cordingly, we henceforth suppress the second argument of x¯(Tθ , θ′) and denote
with x¯(θ) the search policy which is implemented by contract Tθ in all states.
Furthermore, in combination with Lemma 2, Proposition 4 also pins down{Tθ}θ∈Θ as a function of the search policies {x¯(θ)}θ∈Θ which are implemented.
Corollary: The second-best optimum can be achieved by a menu of bonus
contracts of the following form. For all θ ∈ Θ,
Tθ(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩0 if x < x¯(θ)[F¯(x¯(θ)∣θ)]−1c +U(θ) if x ≥ x¯(θ) ,
where
U(θ) = ∫ θ
¯
θ
− ∂
∂θ˜
( c
F¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ˜))dθ˜
is the minimal rent which prevents an agent in state θ to deviate to another contract
than Tθ .
This last corollary gives us all pieces at hand in order to compute the second-
best optimal search policies. Specifically, it reduces the combined problem of
bringing the agent to reveal the state θ, while simultaneously inducing him to
pursue search policies that the principal finds optimal given θ, to a standard
adverse selection problem, which we can solve using standard techniques.
4.3. Equilibrium search policies
Using the results from the previous section, we can compute the second-best
optimal search policies {x¯θ}θ∈Θ using standard techniques.
Proposition 5: Suppose Assumptions 1–7 hold. Let Φ ⊆ Θ denote a set of states
for which “directed” search is implemented. Then for all θ ∈ Φ, second best optimal
search policies {x¯(θ)}θ∈Φ are characterized by,
c + Dθ(x¯(θ)) = ∫ Bx¯(θ) (x′ − x¯(θ))dF(x′∣θ) , (5)
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where function Dθ ∶ [0, B]→ R+ is defined as
Dθ(x) = − 1 − P(θ)p(θ) ∂H(x∣θ)/∂θH(x∣θ) c . (6)
For all θ ∉ Φ, search is “undirected”, that is x¯(θ) = 0.
Proposition 5 establishes that delegated search is either determined by equa-
tion (5), or is otherwise “undirected” (i.e., “non-sequential”). In the latter case,
the agent unconditionally adopts the first sampled solution. Because directed
search is efficient in all states, this is clearly inefficient. To evaluate the distortion
in the first case where search is directed, we need to compare equation (5) to the
first-best stopping rule given by (1). For the first-best case we have seen that the
optimal stopping rule equates (fundamental) costs of searching and benefits of
further search. While benefits of further search in the delegated search model are
the same, costs are now inflated by an additional agency cost term Dθ . Intuitively,
Dθ reflects the costs of learning the state θ from the agent. More precisely, Dθ
resembles the effect of a marginal increase in x¯(θ) on the information rents that
are to be paid to the agent in all states θ′ ∈ {θ′ ∈ Θ ∶ θ′ > θ}. Since Dθ is strictly
positive whenever x¯ > 0 and θ < B, it follows that the stopping rule is generally
inefficiently low.
Corollary: Delegated search is almost surely inefficient. That is, x¯SB(θ) <
x¯FB(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, B).
The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the case where search is still sufficiently
attractive to be conducted sequentially (θ ∈ Φ). Here x¯FB denotes the first-best
stopping rule that solves (1), and x¯SB denotes the second-best stopping rule that
solves (5). On the other hand, when the delegation costs increase the relevant
costs above the benefits of directed search (θ ∉ Φ), it will be optimal for the
principal to implement a stopping rule x¯ = 0, so that search is undirected. That is,
the principal prefers the agent to abstain from conditional sampling and instead
adopt the first sampled solution—no matter how bad (or good) it turns out to be.
This case is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1.
To complete the description of equilibrium we have to characterize the set
Φ ⊆ Θ, which tells us for which states search is directed in equilibrium. Search
will be undirected when either the state of the world in θ is sufficiently bad
compared to the better states θ′, or when a priori it is sufficiently unlikely to be
in state θ, such that it is not worth to distort more likely states from an ex ante
perspective. In these cases it will be optimal to abstain from sequential search in
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c
x¯SB x¯FB
Directed Search
x
∫ Bx¯ (x′ − x¯) dF(x′∣θ)
c + Dθ(x¯)
c
x¯SB x¯FB
Undirected Search
x
∫ Bx¯ (x′ − x¯) dF(x′∣θ)
c + Dθ(x¯)
Figure 1. Second-best search policies for θ ∈ Φ (left panel) and θ ∉ Φ (right panel).
state θ. Obviously, a sufficient condition for search to be directed, is that marginal
costs for an infinitesimal x¯ are sufficiently low, such that c + Dθ(x¯) ≤ E(x∣θ), or
formally,
c + Dˆθ(0) ≤ ∫ x dF(x∣θ), (7)
where Dˆθ(0) = limxˆ↓0 Dθ(xˆ).6
However, since the information rent in all states θ′ > θ is increasing in x(θ),
we may strengthen this results.
Proposition 6: Suppose Assumptions 1–7 hold. Then θ ∈ Φ if and only if θ
fulfills condition (7). When θ ∈ Φ, search is distorted according to Proposition 5.
Otherwise search is undirected, that is x¯(θ) = 0.
In particular, since x¯ is increasing in θ, Proposition 6 implies that Φ has the
following “monotonicity” property.
Corollary: Let θ′′ > θ′. Then it holds that (i) if θ′ ∈ Φ, then θ′′ ∈ Φ; and (ii) if
θ′′ ∉ Φ, then θ′ ∉ Φ.
6 Because delegation costs are discontinues at x¯ = 0, where Dθ(0) = 0, we need to consider
the limit of Dθ(xˆ) as xˆ approaches 0 from above. Details can be found in the proof of
Proposition 6.
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5. Concluding remarks
In this project we study how delegation affects the search for information when a
principal is both uninformed about the prospects of search and unable to observe
the searching of an agent. We find that searching is almost surely inefficient.
Search is either stopped too early (compared with the efficient solution) or is
completely undirected (leading the agent to unconditionally adopt the first solu-
tion he encounters). These results lend theoretical support to recent empirical
evidence provided by Rutherford et al. (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008)
that the search effort by real estate agents is inefficiently low.
The combination of the two informational asymmetries is thereby crucial for
the inefficiency. If either adverse selection or moral hazard is shut down, then the
efficient benchmark can be implemented as a rational equilibrium outcome. Each
of the two asymmetries thus acts as an “catalyst” for the other one. Furthermore,
the combination of moral hazard and adverse selection is also key to our finding
that search is optimally delegated via the use of simple bonus contracts. More
precisely, adverse selection precludes the principal from using contracts that are
more sensible to realized payoffs, since such types of contracts would increase
the costs of bringing the agent to reveal the prospects of search. On the other
hand, moral hazard precludes the usage of even simpler “fixed wage” agreements,
as then the agent would not be induced to provide any search effort.
As with any other framework, our analysis is based on a number of important
modeling choices. A key choice is the kinds of informational asymmetries that
we consider and, clearly, our results are linked with that choice. In particular, the
role of adverse selection as a key source of uncertainty may seem unconventional.
However, adverse selection is known to be relevant in many areas, and intro-
spection suggests that it is likely to be relevant in the case of agents specializing
on search services. Specifically, we feel that by an accumulation of expertise,
specialist-agents are likely to have an informational advantage in assessing the
prospects of search from an ex ante point of view. We therefore feel justified in
studying adverse selection as a key source of uncertainty.
The other key choice in our modeling is the process of searching itself. Here
our modeling strategy is aimed at resembling the “standard search model” (e.g.,
McCall, 1970) as closely as possible, deviating only in introducing asymmetric
information. This standard search model has been successfully applied to many
situations, motivating the use of this model as the point of departure for an analy-
sis of delegated search. Possible applications include recruiting agencies searching
for job candidates, real estate agents searching for buyers and properties, research
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centers searching for new product designs, and insurance brokers searching for
clients.
At a more general level, our model also lends itself to think about agency
relationships where the task of the agent tends to be original rather than routine;
i.e., when agents are expected to “think” and search for “ideas” in order to come
up with a solution for a given problem. Examples along these lines are advocates
who have to find a good defense strategy and business consultancies, searching
for promising business plans. With such a general interpretation in mind, an
important question is whether the findings of our model and, specifically, the
optimality of bonus contracts also extent to other specifications of the search
process.
In particular, relaxing our assumption that the distribution of search payoffs is
exogenously given seems to be a natural extension.7 Exploring which contractual
arrangements are optimal when the agent is able to either ex ante or ex tempore
control the quality of the distribution is thereby a promising direction for future
research.
A. Mathematical appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
LetV(x∣θ) be the indirect utility function of the agent in state θ who has sampled
solution x. Then the indirect utility function satisfies the Bellman equation
V(x∣θ) = max{Tθ˜(x), −c + ∫ V(x′∣θ)dF(x′∣θ)} , (8)
where the agent adopts solution x whenever the associated wage Tθ˜(x) exceeds
the expected utility from continuing search. Since this expected utility is indepen-
dent from x, we have that the agent adopts solution x whenever Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ),
where T¯θ˜(θ) = −c+ ∫ V(x′∣θ)dF(x′∣θ). Let ψθ˜ ∶ X ×R→ {0, 1} be an indicator,
such that
ψθ˜(x , T¯θ˜(θ)) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩0 if Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ) , and1 if Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ) . (9)
7 See Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) and Lewis (2012) for some work in that direction.
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Then, using (8), we can rewrite T¯θ˜(θ) as follows
T¯θ˜(θ) = −c+ ∫ ((1 − ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))) T¯θ˜(θ) + ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))Tθ˜(x′))dF(x′∣θ), (10)
or
T¯θ˜(θ) (1 − ∫ (1 − ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ)))dF(x′∣θ))= −c + ∫ ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))Tθ˜(x′)dF(x′∣θ), (11)
or
c = ∫ ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))Tθ˜(x′)dF(x′∣θ) − T¯θ˜(θ) ∫ ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))dF(x′∣θ)
(12)= ∫ ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ)) (Tθ˜(x′) − T¯θ˜(θ))dF(x′∣θ). (13)
Since an increase in T¯θ˜(θ) weakly decreases ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ)), the RHS of (13) is
strictly decreasing in T¯θ˜(θ). Thus whenever there exists a solution to (13), it is
unique. Moreover, since X is a compact interval, TMAX ≡ maxx Tθ˜(x) exists, and
therefore for all T¯θ˜(θ) ≥ TMAX , the RHS of (13) is equal to 0. Thus (13) uniquely
characterizes T¯θ˜(θ) whenever ∫ T(x)dF(x∣θ) ≥ c. Otherwise, marginal costs
of searching do always exceed the marginal benefits, and therefore, the agent
trivially abstains from search.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3
By construction of x¯(Tθ˜ , θ), for some x ∈ [0, B], Tθ˜(x) ≥ T¯θ˜(θ) (see the proof
to Lemma 1). Further, whenever search is directed, for some x ∈ [0, B], Tθ˜(x) ≥
T¯θ˜(θ). Thus for Tθ˜ strictly increasing and continuous, x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) ≡ T−1θ˜ (T¯θ˜(θ)) ∈[0, B] obviously exists, and is given by (4a) and (4b). To verify the remaining
cases, suppose that T¯θ˜(θ) is not attained by Tθ˜(x) on [0, B]. Then from (4a) and
(4b), x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) is assigned to the point of discontinuity where limx↑x¯(Tθ˜ ,θ) Tθ˜(x) <
T¯θ˜(θ) and limx↓x¯(Tθ˜ ,θ) Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ). So search given by x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) is identical
to search given by T¯θ˜(θ). Finally, suppose that T¯θ˜(θ) is attained on an interval[
¯
x , x¯]. Then from Lemma 1, the agent continues search for all x ≤ x¯ and stops
search for x > x¯. Thus x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) = x¯, identical to the rule given by (4a) and
(4b).
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A.3. Proof of Lemma 2
To proof this lemma, we first characterize the set of stopping rules x¯(θ) that are
implementable via bonus contracts. Though formally the choice of the stopping
rule is taken by the agent, the resulting problem shares the basic logic of a standard
mechanism design problem, and can be solved using similar techniques. Here
we proceed along the lines of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 257–68).
From (SP −θ ,θ˜) and (SP +θ ,θ˜) it follows that an agent with bonus contract Tθ˜ =(x¯(θ˜), τ(θ˜)) chooses a stopping rule
x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩0 if τ(θ˜) < [F¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)]
−1 c, and
x¯(θ˜) if τ(θ˜) ≥ [F¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)]−1 c. (14)
Accordingly, let u(θ , θ˜) ≡ max{0,−[F¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)]−1c + τ(θ˜)} denote the agent’s
indirect utility in state θ when he chooses bonus contract Tθ˜ = (x¯(θ˜), τ(θ˜)).
Note that (IRθ) implies that τ(θ˜) ≥ [F¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ˜)]−1 c, and thus we can ignore
(SP −θ ,θ˜) and (SP +θ ,θ˜) if (ICθ ,θ˜) holds.
Moreover, Assumption 4 implies that u(θ , θ˜) ≥ u(θ˜ , θ˜) for all θ ≥ θ˜. Thus,
u(θ , θ˜) = −[F¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)]−1c + τ(θ˜) for all θ ≥ θ˜. Therefore, for the agent in state
θ to not locally deviate, it must be that the first order condition
−H(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c + dτ(θ˜)
dθ˜
= 0 for θ˜ = θ , (15)
and the second order condition
d
dθ˜
(−H(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c + dτ(θ˜)
dθ˜
) ≤ 0 for θ˜ = θ (16)
hold locally at θ˜ = θ. Moreover, since (15) must hold for all θ ∈ Θ, it is an identity
in θ, and thus
d
dθ˜
(−H(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c + dτ(θ˜)
dθ˜
) − d
dθ
(H(x¯(θ˜)∣θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c) = 0 (17)
for θ˜ = θ. Substituting (16) in (17) together with Assumption 4 thus yields
dx¯/dθ ≥ 0. This establishes that any solution to the principal’s optimization
program implies condition (a).
Ch. 3: Optimal Delegated Search 143
Next we argue that (15) is also sufficient to prevent the agent from deviating
globally. First note that in the case where x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) = 0, u(θ , θ˜) = 0 ≤ u(θ , θ) and
thus we can restrict attention to the case where the agent chooses x¯(Tθ˜ , θ) = x¯(θ˜)
under contractTθ˜ . Suppose to the contrary that the incentive constraint is violated
in at least one state, i.e. u(θ , θ˜) − u(θ , θ) > 0 for some (θ , θ˜) ∈ Θ2, or by the
fundamental theorem of calculus,
∫ θ˜θ (−H(x¯(θ′)∣θ)dx¯(θ′)dθ′ c + dτ(θ′)dθ′ )dθ′ > 0. (18)
Suppose θ˜ > θ. Then, Assumption 4 implies that H(x¯(θ˜)∣θ˜) ≤ H(x¯(θ˜)∣θ), and
therefore (18) implies
∫ θ˜θ (−H(x¯(θ′)∣θ′)dx¯(θ′)dθ′ c + dτ(θ′)dθ′ )dθ′ > 0 (19)
since dx¯/dθ ≥ 0. However, equation (15) implies that the integrand in (19) is
equal to 0 for all θ′, contradicting that for any θ˜ > θ, contract Tθ˜ is preferred
over Tθ . The same logic establishes a contradiction for the case where θ˜ < θ.
Now, let U(θ) ≡ u(θ , θ). Then
dU
dθ
= −H(x¯(θ)∣θ)dx¯(θ)
dθ
c + dτ(θ)
dθ
− ∂
∂θ
c
F¯(x¯(θ)∣θ) . (20)
Thus (c) holds if and only if (15) holds. Therefore, (a) and (c) are both sufficient
and necessary for (ICθ ,θ˜) to hold. Moreover, as shown above, (ICθ ,θ˜) implies
(SP −θ ,θ˜) and (SP +θ ,θ˜). Thus we are left to show that (a), (b) and (c) are sufficient
and (b) is necessary for (IRθ) to hold. Consider sufficiency first. From (c) we
have that dU/dθ is increasing in θ (by Assumption 4 implies ∂F¯(x¯(θ)∣θ) ≥ 0).
Thus U(
¯
θ) = 0 implies (IRθ) for all θ ∈ Θ. That U(¯θ) = 0 is also necessary for asolution to the principal’s optimization program follows trivially from the above
analysis, since shifting U(
¯
θ) doesn’t affect any other constraints.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider an arbitrary menu of contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ, and let u(T , x¯ , θ) be the utility
of the agent in state θ when he chooses contract T and search policy x¯. Then
u(Tθ˜ , x¯(Tθ˜ , θ), θ) ≥ u(Tθ˜ , x¯(Tθ˜ , θ˜), θ), and therefore a necessary condition for
(ICθ ,θ˜) to hold is that
U(θ) ≡ u(Tθ , x¯(Tθ , θ), θ) ≥ u(Tθ˜ , x¯(Tθ˜ , θ˜), θ) for all θ˜ ∈ Θ .
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Hence θ˜ = θ maximizes the RHS of the inequality, with U(θ) also being the
value function of maxθ˜ u(Tθ˜ , x¯(Tθ˜ , θ˜), θ). The envelope theorem implies
dU
dθ
= ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂
∂θ
⎛⎜⎝ ∫
B
x¯(Tθ˜ ,θ˜) T(x′)dF(x′∣θ)
F¯(x¯(Tθ˜ , θ˜)∣θ)
⎞⎟⎠ − ∂∂θ ( cF¯(x¯(Tθ˜ , θ˜)∣θ))
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
RRRRRRRRRRRθ˜=θ , (21)
and since by Assumptions 3 and 4 the first term in (21) is positive, we have that
dU
dθ
≥ − ∂
∂θ
( c
F¯(x¯(Tθ , θ)∣θ)) . (22)
Moreover, (IRθ) impliesU(¯θ) ≥ 0. Thus for any x¯ that is nondecreasing in θ, theagent’s utility under a menu of bonus contracts as given by Lemma 2(b) and (c)
constitutes a lower bound on the agent’s utility under any menu of contracts that
implements x¯. As long as the restriction on x¯ is not binding for bonus contracts,
a menu of bonus contracts is therefore optimal. That the restriction that x¯ is
increasing is indeed not binding is established in the proof of Proposition 5.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5
Using {Tθ}θ∈Θ as given by the second corollary to Proposition 4, the principal’s
objective function is
∫ θ¯
¯
θ
( ∫ Bx¯(θ) x′F¯(x¯(θ)∣θ) dF(x′∣θ) − cF¯(x¯(θ)∣θ)
+ ∫ θ
¯
θ
∂
∂θ˜
( c
F¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ˜))dθ˜)dP(θ), (23)
or, after an integration by parts,
∫ θ¯
¯
θ
( ∫ Bx¯(θ) x′F¯(x¯(θ)∣θ) dF(x′∣θ) − cF¯(x¯(θ)∣θ)
+ 1 − P(θ)
p(θ) ∂∂θ˜ ( cF¯(x¯(θ˜)∣θ˜)))dP(θ). (24)
By Lemma 2 the only relevant constraint which we have to take care of is
that x¯(θ) is nondecreasing in θ. Ignoring this constraint for the moment, the
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maximizer of (24) is given by
c + Dθ(x¯(θ)) = ∫ Bx¯(θ)(x′ − x¯(θ))dF(x′∣θ), (25)
where function Dθ ∶ [0, B]→ R+ is defined by,
Dθ(x) = − 1 − P(θ)p(θ) ∂H(x∣θ)∂θ cH(x∣θ) . (26)
(From Assumption 5, (24) is concave at any x¯(θ) that satisfies (25), so (24) is
globally quasi-concave, and the second-order condition is satisfied.)
We still have to show two things. First, that x¯(θ) as given by (25) is indeed
nondecreasing. Second, we have to extend our analysis to the possibility that for
some θ ∈ Θ, a stopping rule of x¯ = 0 is preferred over an interior solution.
From Assumption 4, the RHS of (25) is increasing in θ, so x¯(θ) will trivially
be nondecreasing whenever Dθ(x¯(θ)) is nonincreasing in θ. This will be the
case whenever p/(1 − P) is increasing at a sufficiently high rate, and/or H is
sufficiently convex in θ. Otherwise, x¯(θ) will still be increasing if the RHS of
(25) is increasing at a sufficiently high rate. A sufficient condition for this to be
the case is that
H(x¯(θˆ)∣θ) ∫ Bx¯(θˆ)(x′ − x¯(θˆ))dF(x′∣θ) (27)
is increasing in θ at θˆ = θ. Assumption 7 ensures that this is always the case.
Hence, any interior solution to the principal’s program is characterized by equa-
tions (25) and (26).
As for x¯(θ) = B benefits of search (the RHS of (25)) are equal to 0, corner
solutions may at most be given by x¯(θ) = 0. Let Φ ⊆ Θ denote the set of states
for which the principal implements an interior solution. Our previous reasoning
implies that if θ′ ∈ Φ, then for all θ′′ > θ′, θ′′ ∈ Φ. Thus, for all θ ∈ Φ, Dθ does not
depend on Φ, and therefore, for all θ ∈ Φ, implemented search policies are given
by the interior solution characterized above. That x¯(θ) = 0 is optimal for all
θ ∉ Φ follows from ∂H/∂θ = ∂2F¯−1/∂θ∂x = 0 at x = 0 which implies Dθ(0) = 0.
Per assumption we have that E(x∣θ) ≥ c for all θ ∈ Θ, and therefore undirected
search is preferred over terminating search whenever x¯(θ) ≯ 0.
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A.6. Proof of Proposition 6
From Proposition 5 marginal costs of searching are given by c +Dθ(x¯). Differen-
tiating with respect to x¯ yields
− 1 − P
P
( ∂2H
∂x∂θ
1
H
− ∂H
∂θ
∂H
∂x
1
H2
) c ≥ 0 , (28)
by Assumptions 4 and 5. Moreover, marginal benefits are trivially decreasing
in x¯. Thus a necessary and sufficient condition for x¯(θ) to be optimally strictly
greater than 0, is that for xˆ ↓ 0 directed search is beneficial, or formally,
lim
xˆ↓0 { ∫ Bxˆ (x′ − xˆ)dF(x′∣θ) − c − Dθ(xˆ)} ≥ 0 . (29)
The only term which may not be continuous in the limit is Dθ , so we can write
(29) as
c + Dˆθ(0) ≤ ∫ x dF(x∣θ), (30)
where Dˆθ(0) = limxˆ↓0 Dθ(xˆ).
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Abstract
This chapter of my dissertation develops a theory of dynamic pricing in industries
with short-term capacity constraints. When supply is fixed in the short term,
firms price more aggressively in earlier periods in order to relax competition
in the future. This leads to intertemporal price differentiation in competitive
environments, even if firms are unable to commit to future prices. Applied
to the airline industry, this provides a novel explanation for the rise in ticket
prices close to the scheduled departure date. Importantly, when the number
of competitors increases, each firm benefits less from altering the competitive
environment, causing prices to become intertemporally less dispersed. Using a
hand-collected data set of 1.4 million airline ticket prices on 92 intra-European
routes, we successfully test our theoretical predictions.
Keywords
Airline industry, capacity constraints, dynamic pricing, price dispersion.
JEL Classification: D43, D92, L11, L93.
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1. Introduction
The fact that prices for airline tickets rise as the scheduled departure date ap-
proaches belongs to the most well-known regularities in airline pricing. While a
number of papers have shown that intertemporal price differentiation may be
an equilibrium even in competitive settings, such theories rely on the airlines’
ability to commit to future price schedules. Recent technological advances like
the arrival of online booking and dynamic pricing have, however, arguably un-
dermined airlines’ capacity to commit to price schedules and have thus led to a
need to reconsider such explanations. This chapter of my dissertation proposes a
simplemodel that shows that intertemporal price differentiation is an equilibrium
in oligopolistic settings, even if airlines can not commit to future prices. Using a
novel dataset of the European airline industry, we find that the empirical patterns
in airline pricing lend support to our model, while they do not confirm previous
theories of airline pricing.
Our model is based on a simple observation. Once an airline has made its
capacity choices, it is typically unable to change the number of seats available on
a particular flight, causing airlines to be capacity constraint in the short-term.
As a result, whenever all flights on a given route are at the verge of being sold out,
competition for customers will no longer ensure that airlines price close to their
marginal costs, so that airlines effectively have monopoly power over consumers.
This possibility of ending up with monopoly power makes it very attractive for
airlines to hold back capacity until shortly before departure. On the other hand,
the capacity an airline has available on the short term market will also affect the
chance that it gains monopoly power in the first place. In order to increase this
chance and relax competition in the future, airlines are thus inclined to price
aggressively in earlier periods, causing prices to be intertemporally dispersed.
Importantly, the propensity to price aggressively depends largely on the com-
petitive environment. While the cost of foregoing high last-minute returns in
favor of low advanced-booking prices is borne by each airline individually, the
benefit of reducing aggregate capacity on the late market is enjoyed by all airlines
serving a particular route. The lack of last-minute capacity can thus be seen as
a public good. Accordingly, as the number of airlines serving a route increases,
airlines have less incentives to sell capacity in early periods, and prices on the
early market increase relative to last-minute prices. This gives rise to the key
prediction of our model that differentiates it from alternative theories. While
the standard explanation for intertemporal increases in prices developed by the
previous literature (see below) predicts that the intertemporal slope of prices is
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increasing in the number of competitors, our model predicts that it is decreasing.
Using an extensive hand-collected sample of over 1.4 million ticket prices on
92 intra-European routes, we test this theoretical prediction. Consistent with
our model, the amount of intertemporal price differentiation is decreasing in the
number of competing airlines on a route. The effects we observe are economically
significant and have important policy implications. While on routes served by a
single airline prices increase by an average of 1.31 percent with every day that a
customerwaits to book, this slope is reduced to 1.19 percent on duopoly routes and
amounts to only 0.68 percent on routes with six competing airlines. Conversely,
our data rejects traditional theories of peak-load pricing such as Dana (1999a) for
the markets we study. While the observed patterns may also be caused by price
discrimination, based on rudimentary tests we are unable to find direct evidence
that airlines price discriminate against late bookers. In particular, we do not
find any effect of some measure of customer heterogeneity on a route on pricing
behavior. Finally, our results are robust to a variety of different specifications of
competition and subsamples.
Related literature In a seminal paper Borenstein and Rose (1994) have
empirically shown that price dispersion for airline tickets is substantial and
robust to competition, a finding that is inconsistent with the view that price
dispersion is the result of a price-discriminating monopolist. Even though the
empirical literature finds a variety of dimensions along which price differentiation
takes place, Advanced Purchase discounts and high prices for late bookings
have moved to the center stage of the theoretical debate. Some of the most
prominent explanations of Advanced Purchase discounts in both, monopoly
and competitive settings include Gale and Holmes (1992; 1993), Dana (1998;
1999a; 1999b; 2001), and Nocke et al. (2010). In most of these models, price
differentiation reflects differences in the cost of capacity. The last seats on a plane
sell with a low probability and must hence sell at a high price if the airline is
to recoup its marginal investments into capacity. In a competitive setting, this
requires firms to commit to price schedules before capacity investments are made,
since those investments are sunk afterward. This commitment power however
seems to have been undermined in recent years by the widespread use of online
booking and the possibility for airlines to change prices at will. The theoretical
contribution of this study is to provide a novel explanation for intertemporal
price differentation that does not require commitment power.
On the empirical front, this study also contributes to an extensive literature
that analyzes the factors determining price dispersion in the airline market (see
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for instance, Morrison andWinston, 1990, Borenstein and Rose, 1994, Stavins,
2001 or Puller et al., 2008). Most of these papers do, however, not differentiate
between different dimensions along which prices differ; e.g., Saturday-night stay-
over requirements, time of the day or Advanced Purchase discounts. In particular,
due to limitations in the available data, the intertemporal dimension of price
differentiation has so far received little attention. In this study, we overcome
these limitations by exploiting a novel three-dimensional dataset. Specifically,
we construct a panel of markets, where each market consists of all direct flights
offered on a particular day and route. For each of these markets, we then record
a time series of prices that ranges between 10 weeks and 1 day prior to the date of
departure.
Outline The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section,
we introduce a simple model of the airline industry, which is aimed at analytical
tractability, and yet gives rise to strategic pricing effects due to short-run capacity
constraints. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium. The key predictions
of the model are derived in Section 4, where we also contrast them with the
predictions of alternative models of price differentiation. Section 5 introduces
the data set, which we use to test our predictions. The baseline empirical analysis
is conducted in Section 6; and further robustness specifications are studied in
Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. A simple model of airline pricing
We consider a symmetric industry, in which airlines compete in prices. Each
airline operates on two markets, an early market in period t = 1 and a last minute
market in period t = 2. There are N ≥ 2 airlines active on each market.
In period 1, airlines have an overall capacity of X¯1 = 2, which is equally dis-
tributed amongst airlines such that for all airlines i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, first period
capacity equals x¯ i1 = x¯1 = X¯1/N .1 Given that an airline sells Q i1 seats on the early
market, its capacity on the last minute market is then given by x¯ i2 = x¯ i1 − Q i1 . As
long as airlines sell less than their available capacity, marginal costs of selling
a ticket are c. In case an airline sells more than its capacity, however, it has to
1 While the assumption that the installed capacity of an individual airline is smaller on
more competitive routes than on less competitive ones appears to be natural, one may also
think about an alternative, but formally equivalent setting, in which the size of the market is
proportional to N and each airline has a fixed capacity x¯1.
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reschedule some passengers and faces an increased marginal cost of c¯ > c. Below,
we will assume c¯ to be prohibitively high, so that no flight will be overbooked
in equilibrium. That is, rather than assuming capacity constraints to be “strict”,
we allow for the theoretical possibility of overbooking, but impose that airlines
never choose to do so. This assumption goes back to Maggi (1996) and ensures
that there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in prices, which wouldn’t be
the case if capacity constraints were strict (see Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).
In both periods, airlines offer differentiated products and are located in RK
where K ≥ N − 1. Hence, flights offered by different airlines differ in up to K
dimensions. For simplicity, airlines are positioned at the vertices of a regularN−1
simplex, ensuring that no matter which two flights one compares, they always
display the same degree of heterogeneity. Consumers are uniformly distributed
on the edges of this simplex and receive positive utility if and only if they buy a
flight from an airline located on either end of the relevant edge. Otherwise, they
receive zero utility. Henceforth, we also refer to these edges as segments. The
location of every individual customer is unobservable, so that airlines have to set
a single price for all customers.
Figure 1 illustrates the location of airlines and customers for N ∈ {2, . . . , 4}.2
As it can be seen, for N ∈ {2, 3} this setup is equivalent to competition on a
Hotelling Street and Salop Circle, respectively. The main difference is that for
N > 3, every airline still competes directly with all other airlines that are active
in the market. While a marginal increase in the price of a Salop oligopolist only
affects demand for the two adjacent products, in our setting any such increase
directly affects demand for all alternative products. In this respect our model is
similar to the Logit model of oligopolistic competition. Unlike the more general
Logit model, however, competition on a simplex is highly tractable and allows
us to derive closed-form analytic results. For a more detailed discussion of
competition on a simplex see Thompson et al. (2007).3
Because consumers in period t are only interested in buying a single airline
ticket, potential demand for airline tickets in t is given by the mass of consumers
in the market, denoted by µt . Suppose that consumers are distributed across the
2 Note that airlines’ location in Figure 1 are projected into R2, leading to a distortion in
the length of the edges. Per assumption, all the edges are of the same length when viewed
in RK . Furthermore, for N = 3 the edges are displayed as curves in order to illustrate the
conceptional equivalence to the Salop Circle.
3 Although the simple and symmetric structure of competition on a simplex helps in stream-
lining our analysis, the main results are robust to the two major alternatives for oligopolistic
competition in prices, Salop and Logit.
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N = 2 N = 3
N = 4 N = 5
Figure 1. Projection of airlines’ location for N ∈ {2, . . . , 4}
simplex with a constant density d that is inversely proportional to the number
of edges.4 Then the length of the edges of the simplex are pinned down to equal
µt , too. Without changing any of our results, we normalize first period demand
µ1 to unity. Last minute demand, on the other hand, is ex ante unknown and
is drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 2].5 It is worthwhile
pointing out that with this specification the length of the edges is independent of
N . Accordingly, without capacity constraints, adding additional airlines to any
market would not have an effect on prices.
Importantly, we require that from the perspective of each airline the set of its
competitors in period 1 is not identical to the set of its competitors in period 2.
Without this assumption, if airlines choose to serve all customers (i.e., if the
market is covered), then price changes by any airline only shift demand towards
its competitors, but do not affect overall sales—ruling out the possibility for
airlines to affect overall capacity in the last minute market. In fact, to simplify the
exposition, we make the extreme assumption that the set of competitors between
4 That is, 1/d = N(N − 1)/2.
5 Despite simplifying the exposition, keeping first period demand deterministic has no
qualitative effect on any of our results. That is, including demand shock to the first period
market neither adds additional insights, nor changes our predictions.
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the early and the late market is completely disjoint for all airlines.6 In an extended
version of the model, however, which is available from the authors on request,
we show that it is sufficient to allow for an imperfect overlap between the two
markets to generate results that are qualitatively identical to the simplified version
considered here.7 Such a situation would arise when some of the early customers
consider a different set of alternatives than the one considered by last-minute
customers. For instance, customers on the early market might be undetermined
with respect to the destination of travel or could consider using other means of
transportation, whereas customers on the late market are more determined on
buying a ticket for a specific route.
Preferences of a potential customer θ ∈ [0, µt] who is located on the edge
between airline i and j at time t are given by:
U(θ , pit , p jt) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩v − θ − αp
i
t if he buys from airline i
v − (µt − θ) − αp jt if he buys from airline j ≠ i ,
where µ1 = 1 and µ2 ∼ U[0, 2]. Note that because consumers in both periods
have the same valuation v for a ticket, there is no scope for price discrimination
between the two periods. The only way that different prices in t = 1 and t = 2 can
be sustained in equilibrium is through the strategic effects of capacity constraints.
The timing of events can be summarized as follows.
1. Airlines simultaneously choose period 1 prices and serve all consumers
willing to buy.
2. Period 2 demand µ2 is publicly realized and airlines observe the full vector(x¯12, x¯22 , . . . , x¯N2 ) of capacities available to their competitors.
3. Airlines simultaneously choose period 2 prices and serve all consumers
willing to buy.
6 To be precise, we assume the existence of N distinct markets in both periods. In any of the
N last minute market, there operates exactly one airline from each of the N early markets.
7 In the generalized version of the model, airlines end up competing on another market in
period 2 with an arbitrary (and potentially small) probability p ∈ (0, 1). Hence, there is some
positive probability that they face a different set of competitors on the last minute market.
While the equilibrium properties remain qualitatively unchanged, the analysis becomes quite
cumbersome due to a large number of asymmetric situations which arise off the equilibrium
path.
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Since airlines are ex ante identical, we will concentrate on symmetric subgame per-
fect equilibria throughout our analysis. Moreover, we will impose the following
two parameter restrictions.
Assumption 1: Airlines do not overbook their flights:
c¯ > v/α.
Following our discussion above, this assumption ensures that even though it
is theoretically possible to , an airline will never voluntarily do so, since the costs
are prohibitively high. Clearly, in reality airlines do regularly choose to overbook
their flights. Note, however, that in the context of our model customers never
choose to cancel a ticket. Accordingly, Assumption 1 merely implies that airlines
would not want to overbook a flight if they could be sure that all passengers who
bought a ticket will actually turn up at the gate.
Assumption 2: Airlines sell all available capacity if possible:
v > 4 + cα.
This assumption states that the valuation for tickets is sufficiently high, such
that airlines don’t let any seats go unsold whenever there is sufficient demand. In
particular, Assumption 2 implies that if an airline has monopoly power on the
last minute market, it decides to sell all of its seat inventory.
3. Equilibrium
We now examine the properties of optimal dynamic pricing. Starting in the next
subsection, we first characterize equilibrium prices in the early market, while
taking the shadow cost of capacity as given. The value of capacity is then derived
subsequently in Subsection 3.2 by solving for the equilibria in the last-minute
markets. The analysis of how competition effects the dispersion of prices over
time is deferred to Section 4.
3.1. The early market
First note that, since µ1 < X¯1, there can be no symmetric equilibrium where air-
lines are constrained by their capacity in the early market. Accordingly, consider
a candidate equilibrium where no airline is constrained by its capacity in t = 1
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and suppose that airlines set prices such that every customer finds it optimal
to buy a ticket. Just like in the case of Salop competition, we can derive the
demand for any airline by finding the customer θ who is indifferent between
purchasing from airline i and airline j for any j ≠ i. Solving the indifference
condition yields that demand for airline i on this particular segment is given by
qi1 = (1 − α{pi1 − p j1}) × d/2. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium with p j1 = p1
for all j, total demand per airline is given by Q i1 = (1 − α{pi1 − p1})/N , after
aggregating over all N − 1 segments of the market in which airline i operates.
In order to characterize equilibrium prices in the early market, we also need
to account for how expected profits Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2) in the late market change as a
function of airline i’s capacity, given that all other airlines j ≠ i are equipped with
the symmetric equilibrium capacity x¯ j2 = x¯2 = x¯1 − Q j1 . Taking the shadow value
of capacity into account, airlines choose their price pi1 to maximize Q i1(pi1 , p1) ×(pi1 − c) + Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2). It follows that as long as expected future profits Πi2 are
concave in their first argument, airlines’ best response functions are given by8
pi1(p1) = 12 [ 1α + c + p1 + dΠi2dx¯ i2 ] .
Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium all airlines set the equilibrium price,
pi1 = p1 = 1α + c + dΠi2dx¯ i2 ,
and share the early market,
Q i1 = Q1 = 1/N .
Hence, because x¯1 > 1/N , capacity constraints are indeed not binding in
the early market. Also, as long as the value of capacity in period 2 is not too
large, firms do set prices such that all customers want to buy a ticket and the
period 1 market is covered. We therefore conclude that, as long as Πi2 satisfies the
technical condition discussed above and prices in period 1 are sufficiently low,
any symmetric equilibrium in the early market will be uniquely pinned down by
the late markets.
8 To keep the presentation comprehensible, we do not require airlines to set positive prices
in the early market. In light of our results, it will become clear that this simplification is
without loss of generality and no airline will ever charge negative prices in equilibrium.
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Lemma 1: Fix any Πi2 ∶ [0, 2]2 → R+ and suppose that Πi2 is concave in its first
argument and that dΠi2(x¯2, x¯2)/dx¯ i2 < (v − αc − 32)/α. Then, in any symmetric
equilibrium, airlines split the early market equally and charge a price of
p1 = 1α + c + dΠi2dx¯ i2 (x¯2, x¯2), (1)
where x¯2 = 1/N.
Lemma 1 implies that airlines always enter the late market with the same
residual capacity x¯2 = 1/N , irrespective of how valuable capacity is in period 2.
Nevertheless, as the marginal value of capacity dΠi2/dx¯ i2 increases, airlines have
smaller incentives to underbid each other in the early market, leading to higher
equilibrium prices in period 1.
3.2. The late market
In order to fix ideas, consider the symmetric equilibrium situation, in which
all airlines have the same residual capacity x¯ i2 = x¯2 available at the beginning of
period 2. Airlines then end up to be capacity constrained in period 2whenever the
lastminute demand µ2 turns out to exceed the availablemarket capacity X¯2 = Nx¯2.
In this case, airlines can set monopoly prices and serve as many customers as they
have free seats available, without interfering with any of their competitors. By
Assumptions 1 and 2 airlines then find it optimal to sell off exactly their remaining
capacity and to extract the full surplus of the marginal customer by charging
p2(µ2) = (v − X¯2/2)/α.
On the other hand, in states of the world where market capacity X¯2 exceeds ag-
gregate demand µ2, airlines can no longer commit to charging monopoly prices
and enter into price competition. Because airlines now have an incentive to
marginally undercut their competitors in order to sell additional seats, prices are
determined by the same logic as in the early market and profits drop discontinu-
ously. In the unique equilibrium of the subgame, each airline sells µ2/N seats at
a price of p2(µ) = µ2/α + c each.
It follows that in any situation where all firms have the same capacity available
expected profits in the late market are given by
Πi2(x¯2, x¯2) = ∫ X¯20 µ2αN d(µ/2) + ∫ 2X¯2 (v − αc − X¯22 ) X¯2αN d(µ/2), (2)
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where the first term reflects states where airlines are in competition, and the
second term reflects states where industry demand exceeds industry supply and
airlines charge monopoly prices.
From Lemma 1, we know that the incentive to shift capacity from the early
to the late market is an important determinant of equilibrium prices in the first
period. Intuitively, the main benefit from selling an extra seat in period 1 lies in
restricting the overall capacity, which increases the probability of ending up with
monopoly power in period 2. Standing against this effect is that conditionally
on having monopoly power, having an extra seat available in the late market is
valuable since it allows airlines to sell this seat at a mark-up.
Formally, this tradeoff corresponds to the incentive for an airline i to unilat-
erally deviate from a symmetric equilibrium by selling one more seat in period
1. Because this incentive depends on the expected continuation payoff from all
reachable subgames off the equilibrium path, we can no longer restrict ourselves
to symmetric situations in period 2. In Appendix A, we show that (i) the expected
payoff Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2) resulting from the asymmetric equilibria in these subgames
is differentiable around Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2)∣x¯ i2=x¯2 as given by equation (2); and (ii) that
Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2) is globally concave in x¯ i2. Accordingly, we can characterize the in-
centives to deviate from the symmetric equilibrium by differentiating (2) with
respect to its first argument. The following lemma summarizes the discussion
and states the relevant conclusion.
Lemma 2: In any symmetric equilibrium, Πi2 is globally concave in its first argu-
ment, and marginal returns to an unilateral increase in second period capacity x¯ i2
are given by
dΠi2(x¯ i2, x¯2)
dx¯ i2
∣
x¯ i2=x¯2 = −(v − αc − 3X¯22 ) X¯22αN+ ∫ 2X¯2 α−1 (v − αc − X¯2)d(µ/2). (3)
Equation (3) reflects the previously discussed tradeoff. The first term stands for
the strategic benefit from restricting capacity in order to avoid price competition;
the second term defines the expected value of reserving capacity in order to serve
last minute customers in high demand states.9
9 There is another case, not reflected in (3), in which demand is so low that supply always
exceeds demand. In this case, however, having extra capacity available on the last minute
market is worthless, because airlines are already unable to sell their full capacity and any
additional seats will go unsold.
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3.3. Equilibrium prices and quantities
Equipped with Lemmas 1 and 2, we can now state the equilibrium predictions
for the full game. In particular, by Lemma 2, dΠi2/dx¯ i2 satisfies the conditions of
Lemma 1, so that we can characterize the equilibrium by substituting (3) into (1).
Proposition 1: There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
In this equilibrium, prices in the early market are given by
p1 = ( 1α + c) − v − αc − 3/22αN + v − αc − 12α , (4)
and airlines share the market, selling 1/N tickets each. In the late market, prices
are given by
p2(µ2) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩µ2/α + c if µ2 ≤ 1(v − 1/2)/α if µ2 > 1, (5)
and airlines sellmin{1, µ2}/N tickets each.
In equilibrium, first period prices ensure that airlines are indifferent between
selling tickets on the early and on the late market. The value of capacity in
period 2 is determined by the tradeoff discussed above and is captured by the
second and third term in equation (4). That is, as reserving capacity for the
period 2 market becomes more attractive, selling tickets on the early market
becomes less attractive, which increases the equilibrium price in period 1.
4. Competition and price dispersion
We are now ready to investigate the relationship between competition and price
dispersion. The next subsection states our main result. Subsection 4.2 compares
this result to the literature.
4.1. Price dispersion due to capacity constraints
From equation (4), it is obvious that the benefit of reserving capacity for high
demand states, represented by the third term, is independent of the number of
competitors. This is because these benefits only accrue conditionally on being in a
monopoly—in which case airlines are naturally not affected by their competitors.
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On the other hand, the strategic incentive to restrict capacity on the latemarket
in order to change the competitive environment is decreasing in the number
of competitors N . Intuitively, if the industry is fragmented and there is a large
number of competitors, each airline has a small market share and the benefit
of avoiding a price war is small. Put differently, a low level of capacity on the
late market can be seen as a public good. While the benefit of increasing the
probability of monopoly power is enjoyed by all airlines alike, the cost of loosing
out on revenues in high demand states is carried by each airline individually.
Accordingly, airlines in a more concentrated industry will be more tempted to
reduce period 2 capacity than airlines on more competitive routes.
Before proceeding, let us define the expected last-minute price as follows.
Definition: The expected last-minute price is the price that airlines are ex-
pected to post on the late market:
E{p2} ≡ ∫ 20 p2(µ)d(µ/2).
Note that this is not identical to the average price at which tickets are sold in
the market. This is because in the above definition prices are not weighted by the
amount of tickets that sell for a particular realization of µ2. Instead, E{p2} is the
model equivalent to the average offer that an airline makes, which is the variable
that we observe in our dataset.
We now turn to our key empirical prediction; namely that prices are expected
to be intertemporally less dispersed as the number of competitors increases. By
Lemma 1, airlines’ capacity at the beginning of the second period X¯2 is indepen-
dent of N . As established in Proposition 1, this causes prices in the second period
to be unaffected by the number of competitors, too. Any effect of N on the differ-
ence in expected prices over time (∆ ≡ E{p2} − p1) must therefore result from
changes in p1. As already discussed above, airlines’ incentive to price aggressively
in the early market in order to relax future competition decreases in the number
of competitors, causing first-period prices to increase in N . Hence, d∆/dN < 0.
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that expected last-minute prices exceed
those on the early market; i.e., ∆ > 0, so that the intertemporal dispersion of prices∣∆∣ decreases in N , too. The following proposition summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 2: The slope of expected prices over time is strictly decreasing in
the number of competitors:
d∆
dN
< 0,
where ∆ = E{p2} − p1 > 0.
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As a final note, mind that in our model all prices are weakly increasing in the
number of competitors since the attempt to restrict capacity in the late market
is self-defeating in equilibrium. However, while our main prediction in Propo-
sition 2 is robust to other competitive frameworks, price levels are unlikely to
increase in competition in alternative settings. This observation should there-
fore be regarded as a peculiarity of our framework, where the early market is
always covered and actual capacity in the late market is independent from airlines’
pricing choices in the early market.
4.2. Alternative explanations for price dispersion
Competitive price discrimination We have proposed one possible ex-
planation for why prices for airline tickets typically increase over time. Another
possible explanation are differences in the price elasticity of consumers. Arguably,
business travelers are more likely to make travel plans at short notice than more
price elastic leisure travelers. So the price elasticity of customers on the last
minute market is lower than the price elasticity of customers on the early mar-
ket and in an oligopolistic setting, airlines may discriminate against customers
that book their flights late. For a discussion of the equilibrium level of price
discrimination that we should expect in markets with and without free entry, see
e.g. Borenstein (1985); Holmes (1989) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001). For a
detailed discussion of third degree price discrimination in competitive settings
see Stole (2007).
Unfortunately, the literature on competitive price discrimination does not
yield clear-cut testable predictions on how price discrimination depends on the
level of competition in an industry. The relationship between competition and
price discrimination crucially depends upon the relation between cross-price elas-
ticities and the market elasticity of demand. Depending on these quantities, price
discrimination can be either increasing or decreasing in competition. However, if
price dispersion is due to discriminatory pricing, we should expect dispersion to
increase in the heterogeneity of customers on a route. In our empirical analysis,
we try to find evidence in favor of competitive price discrimination by looking at
routes where we expect customers to be rather homogeneous. If price discrimina-
tion plays a role in the determination of ticket prices, these routes should feature
less price dispersion than other itineraries.
Stochastic peak-load pricing A large body of theoretical literature has
been trying to explain price dispersion on the market for air travel by models
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of stochastic peak-load pricing. Under stochastic peak-load pricing, airlines
decide on a price schedule ex ante and are able to commit to it. Seats that are still
available on the last minutemarket sell with a smaller probability than the average
seat that an airline offers. So if investing into capacity is costly, an airline will
charge a higher price for the last seat than for the average seat in order to recoup
the cost of capacity in expectation. Dana (1999a) shows that if price dispersion
is due to peak-load pricing, we should expect intertemporal price differences
to be increasing in the number of competitors. The closer an industry moves
towards perfect competition, the more differences in costs are going to translate
into differences in prices. The expected cost of selling a ticket is given by the
cost of increasing capacity by one seat divided by the probability of selling this
particular seat. Since this expected cost is highest for seats available at the last
minute, these seats sell at a higher price and the price difference to the average
seat is strictly increasing in competition.
From a theoretical perspective, recent innovations of internet booking and
dynamic pricing systems are likely to have undermined airlines’ power to commit
to future price schedules. However, the question whether or not a model of
peak-load pricing is better suited to explain price dispersion than the one put
forward in this study is ultimately an empirical one. While a positive relationship
between price dispersion and competition lends support to peak-load pricing,
our model predicts an inverse relationship.
5. Description of the dataset
In order to test our theoretical predictions, we use a hand-collected data set of
ticket prices on 92 intra-European routes. The routes are randomly selected and
cover a variety of different regions, market characteristics, and different numbers
of competing airlines. A geographical overview of these routes is given by Figure 2,
and a full list of the routes is provided in Table 3 in the Appendix.10 On each
10 More specifically, our selection of routes reflects the following criteria. First, we include
all routes that connect the largest airports in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK (in
a randomly chosen direction). The remaining routes correspond to 100 randomly chosen
routes between European airports with international connections, excluding all routes that
are served by Ryanair, a major competitor who does not offer tickets through our data source
(see below). Hereby a route is defined as being served by Ryanair if Ryanair serves either the
main airport or a secondary airport located less than 35 miles from the city center at both
endpoints of the route.
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Figure 2. Routes
route, we record prices for all direct flights leaving on Friday and returning on
Sunday, as well as all flights leaving on Monday and returning on Thursday in
a given week. So for any given route there are two route-date pairs per week in
our sample. We refer to these route-date pairs as “markets”. For each market, we
record flights and prices once a week, starting 10 weeks prior to the departure
date. In the last week prior to departure, prices are recorded on a daily basis,
giving us a total of up to 17 different prices for each flight. A flight is hereby
defined as a roundtrip, which is uniquely characterized by a combination of two
individual flight numbers. For example, in our terminology one “flight” on the
route Paris–London would be using flight number BA 333 on the outbound leg
and flight number BA 334 on the inbound leg.
Our data set runs from October 31, 2010, to March 26, 2011, which covers
166 Essays in Informational Economics
the complete 2010/2011 European winter flight schedule.11 This corresponds to
41 distinct flight dates, or 3772 distinct markets (41 flight dates times 92 routes).
Each market averages 376 prices that are recorded over the 17 different dates prior
to departure, corresponding to an average of 22.1 flights per market. Overall, our
data set consists of 1.42 million individual prices (92 routes times 41 flight-dates
times 17 recorded prices per flight times on average 22.1 flights per market).12
Routes are on average 560 miles long and connect Metropolitan Areas with an
average of 3.9 million inhabitants.13 The share of domestic routes in our sample
is roughly 13 percent (12 of the 92 routes).
Prices represent offers by a leading website for airline ticket purchases, which
accounts for a major share of bookings on the Europeanmarket. While we cannot
rule out that pricesmay differ to those offered by other online retailers, differences
across retailers for intra-European flights are typically small. Moreover, unless the
influence of competition on intertemporal changes in prices consistently differs
across retailers, our empirical analysis is representative. The recorded prices in
our sample range from 27 to 2581 Euros, with an average of 409 Euros and a
standard deviation of 466.14Conditioning on the time remaining until departure,
prices increase from an average of approximately 280 Euros ten weeks prior to
departure to more than 500 Euros within the last week before departure (see
Figure 3 for a more comprehensive summary of the evolution of average prices
over the time remaining until departure).
To investigate the impact of competition on the observed pricing dynamics, we
measure competition as the number of airlines that compete in a given market.15
11 Flight schedules and routings within Europe are planned on a semiannual basis. Within
these periods, individual flight numbers serve as a unique identifier for individual flight
characteristics such as the exact route, time of departure and approximate flight length.
12 Not every flight was offered on every 17 dates prior to departure. Given the total of 1.42
million recorded prices in our sample, this increases the average flights per market, so that
22.1 should be more accurately interpreted as a lower bound on average flights per market.
13 The large average size of Metropolitan Areas is due to the over-sampling of large airports
(see also Footnote 10).
14 Because of the increased frequency with which we record prices in the last week prior to
departure, the average price in our sample does not equal the average price at which a ticket is
offered over the last 10 weeks prior to departure. Downsampling the last week’s observations
in each market, the 10 week average in our sample amounts to 364 Euros with a standard
deviation of 466.
15 In 7.9 percent of our sample, the number of airlines offering services on the outbound leg
differs from the number of firms offering services on the inbound leg. In these cases, we set
competition to the rounded up average.
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Figure 3. Average prices (in Euros) as a function of time remaining until departure
For these purposes, we treat airlines that are affiliated through cross-holdings as
single competitors. More precisely, an airline is matched to an affiliate group if
that group owns more than 25% of the airline’s equity. Table 1 summarizes the
distribution of competitors in the sample.
Table 1. Competition in the sample
Prices Markets
Competing airlines Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 229 218 16.17 905 24.06
2 648 371 45.74 1696 45.08
3 275 680 19.45 656 17.44
4 185 051 13.05 382 10.15
5 68 237 4.81 107 2.84
6 11 078 0.78 16 0.43
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6. Empirical specification and results
Let Pricei jtd denote the price for a round trip that involves the outgoing itinerary i
and the returning itinerary j (both identified by their flight numbers), which is
posted at date d, and for which the outgoing flight departs at date t. Further, let
Competitioni jt denote a vector of dummy variables that covers all competition
categories, and let Daysl e f ttd denote the difference between t and d in days. As
a baseline, we estimate the following equation:
log(Pricei jtd) = (α + βDaysl e f ttd) × Competitioni jt+ λi + µ j + νt + ξd + εi jtd , (6)
wherewe treat λi , µ j, νt , and ξd as fixed effects.16Here, α is a vector of competition-
specific constants and β is the relevant coefficient-vector on the interaction term
Competitioni jt × Daysl e f ttd . Note that λi and µ j both nest a complete set
of route specific fixed effects since any flight number uniquely pins down the
corresponding route. In particular, the specified set of fixed effects absorbs all
flight-related effects such as departure time or length of flight; all route charac-
teristics such as connected cities or alternative means of transportation; and all
time-related effects such as day of travel and day of price offer.
The impact of competition on the observed pricing dynamics is captured by
our estimates of β. Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients. Our estimates
for the corresponding standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the market
level. All reported coefficients are economically and statistically significant. It
can be seen that, consistent with our model, the amount of intertemporal price
differentiation is decreasing in the number of competitors. While on monopoly
routes prices increase by an average of 1.31 percent with every day that a customer
waits to book, this slope is reduced to 1.19 percent on duopoly routes and is
reduced to 0.68 percent for routes with 6 competitors.17
16 Because our sampling is weekly for all but the last week before departure, fixed effects for
d can not be separately identified from Daysl e f tdt on a daily level; ξd is therefore modeled
on a weekly level. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that flight numbers i and j are allocated
on a semi-annual basis and identify a particular flight leg flown by a particular airline at a
particular time within a weekly schedule. Because i and j remain constant across weeks, we
can identify β and control for i and j at the same time.
17 Note that the (unreported) competition-specific constants are only weakly identified in our
sample by variations across markets but within routes. This is because competition typically
does not vary within routes for a given flight schedule. Accordingly, the competition-specific
constants are statistically not significant.
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Table 2. The effects of competition on pricing dynamics
Dependent variable is log(Price i jtd)
Coefficient Clustered Std. Errors(Comp i jt = 1) × Daysl e f ttd -1.31 0.09(Comp i jt = 2) × Daysl e f ttd -1.19 0.09(Comp i jt = 3) × Daysl e f ttd -1.15 0.09(Comp i jt = 4) × Daysl e f ttd -1.07 0.09(Comp i jt = 5) × Daysl e f ttd -0.93 0.10(Comp i jt = 6) × Daysl e f ttd -0.68 0.12
Observations 1 417 635
R-squared (adj.) 0.58
Notes.— The estimation also includes a complete set of (weakly identified) competition-
specific constants, and fixed effects for both outgoing i and incoming flights j, the date where
prices are recorded d, and the date of departure t. Reported coefficients and standard errors
are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are clustered at the market level. All coefficients are
significant at the 5 × 10−7 percent level.
Note that even though we include routes that are served by only one airline in
our sample, we should not think of these routes as being completely protected
from competition. In fact, most itineraries are also offered by airlines that offer
indirect flights and that are subject to similar capacity constraints as airlines
offering direct flights. Hence, we think of markets served by only one airline
as markets with a particularly low number of competitors, rather than a proper
“monopoly”.
From the discussion in Section 4.2, we conclude that dynamic pricing under
capacity constraints appears to better explain intra-European airline pricing than
theories based on peak-load pricing (which predict that the absolute slope should
be increasing in the number of competitors). With respect to competitive price
discrimination, the inconclusiveness of theories whether the intertemporal slope
should be increasing or decreasing in competition prevents any final conclusions.
However, as discussed above, if price discrimination drives the intertemporal
differentiation, then one should expect intertemporal price differences to be less
pronounced on routes where there is less heterogeneity in customers’ willingness
to pay. One big source of heterogeneity is arguably the co-existence of business
and leisure travelers. Brueckner et al. (1992) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008)
have argued that a good proxy for the share of leisure travelers on a route are tem-
perature differentials between the destination and origin. In particular, we should
expect the share of leisure travelers to be higher, the warmer the destination is
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in comparison to the origin.18 Since the share of leisure travelers is in general
markedly larger than the share of business travelers, we would hence expect routes
with small or negative temperature differentials to have a more heterogenous
customer base and to exhibit more intertemporal price differentiation.19
In order to provide a rudimentary assessment to which extent discriminatory
pricing might be the source of intertemporal price dispersion, we split the data
set into three subsamples. The first subsample consists of all 30 routes in our
data set where the yearly average temperature in the destination city is more
than one degree Celsius above the average temperature in the departing city. The
second subsample consists of all 37 routes in the data set where the destination
city is more than one degree Celsius colder than the departing city, and the
third subsample consists of the remaining 25 routes, linking cities in which the
temperature is approximately the same.20
For all three subsamples, we again estimate equation (6). Figure 4 reports the
estimated coefficients. It can be seen that the relationship between the estimated
coefficients and competition is overall increasing in all three subsamples. More-
over, the coefficients are in a similar range as in our baseline estimation and there
is no clear correlation between our measure of customer heterogeneity and the
amount of intertemporal price dispersion. This holds true for any number of
competitors. While only rudimentary in nature, we thus find no strong support
for a discrimination based theory of pricing.
7. Robustness specifications
7.1. Nonlinear effect of days before departure
Our baseline regression imposes that prices linearly depend on Daysl e f ttd .
Clearly, as can be seen in Figure 3, this is not the case. To address this shortcoming,
we repeat the estimation, but replace Daysl e f ttd by a vector of dummy variables,
which covers all values of Daysl e f ttd . The resulting nonlinear relationships are
reported in Figure 5. In the figure, we normalize the estimated coefficients such
18 Recall that all prices in our sample are per round trip, allowing airlines operating on
route A–B to systematically discriminate between travelers visiting city A and those visiting
city B.
19 For example, leisure travelers accounted for 60% of departures at the Airport of Frankfurt
and for 68.7% in London Heathrow (Fraport, 2011; CAA, 2011).
20 For a full listing of the three subsamples, see Table 3 in the Appendix.
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Figure 4. Estimated coefficients for different levels of competition and different subsamples.
Notes: Reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. All coefficients are significant at the
5 × 10−5 significance level (using standard errors that are clustered at the market level). All
estimations control for all four fixed effects specified in the baseline regression and a full set
of competition-specific constants.
that prices one day before takeoff are set to zero. Accordingly, the numbers on
the y-axis report
log( pi jtd
pi jtd∣d=t−1) ,
which approximately amounts to the early-booking discount in percent of the
price charged shortly before takeoff. It can be seen that, although nonlinear, the
slopes are monotonically decreasing in the number of competitors. That is, the
relative discount for booking a flight in advance is less pronounced on routes
that are served by a larger number of competitors. This reinstates the conclusion
drawn from our baseline estimation.
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Figure 5. Empirical relationships between log(Price i jtd) and Daysl e f ttd by degree of com-
petition. Notes: Coefficients are multiplied by 100 and are normalized, such that prices 1 day
before takeoff are set to zero, so that the reported estimates approximately correspond to
percentage price changes relative to the price before takeoff. The estimation controls for all
four fixed effects specified in the baseline regression and a full set of competition-specific
constants.
7.2. Symmetric markets only
Another worry might be that our theoretical exploration is based on the simpli-
fying assumption that all competing airlines are symmetric, while markets in
our empirical analysis can be strongly asymmetric. To test whether our results
are driven by a correlation between market asymmetries and competition, we
repeat our baseline estimation (6) for symmetric markets only. For this purpose,
we define a market to be symmetric if the market share (total number of flights
offered by a competitor, as defined above, relative to the total number of flights
in the market) of the smallest competitor relative to the largest competitor is at
least 1/3. The resulting sample is approximately two thirds the size of our baseline
sample and has 995 903 observations. As can be seen from Figure 6, the estimated
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Figure 6. Estimated coefficients for different levels of competition—robustness specifications.
Notes: Reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. All coefficients are significant at the
5 × 10−7 significance level (using standard errors that are clustered at the market level). All
estimations control for all four fixed effects specified in the baseline regression and a full set
of competition-specific constants.
coefficients closely resemble those in our baseline estimation.
7.3. Alternative measures for competition
In the baseline estimation, we treat codesharing airlines as competitors. Accord-
ingly, if the same physical connection is marketed under different flight numbers
that correspond to different airlines, this increases our measure of competition.
The reasoning behind this choice is that in so-called “block space” codeshare
agreements, each of the codesharing partner still controls a distinct, ex ante fixed
amount of seats. In practice, by the pricing agreements between the carrier oper-
ating a service and the codesharing partner, the codesharer is usually granted
considerable freedom to set prices independently (European Commission, 2007).
Accordingly, prices are indeed often observed to differ across different codeshar-
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ers. Alternatively, one could also define competition as the number of airlines
that operate their own services on a particular market. To check the implications
of this approach, we re-estimate equation (6), using such an alternative measure
for competition.21 As can be seen from Figure 6, the estimated coefficients closely
resemble those in our baseline estimation.
7.4. Correcting for outliers
Since we do not observe transaction data but only posted prices, our dataset
includes some prices that are extremely high when compared to comparable
fares. Arguably, such offers are the result of mistakes by the respective airline
and are never taken up by consumers. To account for such “outliers”, we also
re-estimate the baseline regression (6) after dropping all observed prices that
exceed the mean price offered at any given date in a given market by more than
two standard deviations. The competition measure is adjusted accordingly. The
resulting sample is about 4 percent smaller than our baseline sample and has
1 360 748 observations. As can be seen from Figure 6, the estimated coefficients
again closely resemble those in our baseline estimation.
8. Conclusion
In this study, we introduce a novel argument forwhy intertemporal price-dispersion
can be an equilibrium, even if firms are unable to commit to future prices. In en-
vironments with short-term capacity constraints, firms price aggressively in early
periods in order to have less capacity available in later periods. Using this strategy,
firms thereby increase the probability that aggregate demand exceeds aggregate
supply on the last minute market and that they end up with monopoly power
over last-minute consumers, yielding them considerable profits whenever there
is excess demand. Importantly, this propensity to price aggressively decreases as
markets become more competitive, implying that prices differ less across time in
more competitive markets.
Using a unique data set, we find a high degree of intertemporal price dispersion.
Moreover, on routes with a large number of competing firms, intertemporal price
dispersion is less pronounced than on oligopolistic routes. This result is in line
21 To be consistent with this approach, we also pool all physically identical roundtrips into a
single observation, where at each date the pooled roundtrip is assigned the price offered by
the cheapest partner.
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with the predictions of our capacity-based model. In contrast, the standard
explanation used in the literature to explain intertemporal price differentiation—
peak-load pricing—is rejected by our findings. Regarding price discrimination,
the inconclusive predictions of theories of competitive price discrimination do
not allow us to effectively test whether price discrimination is a relevant cause for
intertemporal price dispersion. Based on a rudimentary argument, we, however,
find no support for discriminatory pricing.
A. Mathematical appendix
Let us examine the subgame on the last minute market more closely. Since we
are looking for a symmetric equilibrium in the full game, we can assume that all
but one firm have the same capacity at their disposal in period 2. We will denote
the deviating firm by the superscript i while all other firms will collectively be
referred to as type j. For notational simplicity we will often drop the superscript
for firms of type j.
In general, firms set monopoly prices if aggregate demand exceeds aggregate
supply and competitive prices otherwise. When firms do not have the same
residual level of capacity at the beginning of period 2, we also allow for asymmetric
equilibria in the off-equilibrium subgames. In the proof, we will consider the
case where N ≥ 3. The proof for N = 2 is very similar. The only difference is that
in case N = 2 some asymmetric cases can be ruled out. We will derive equilibria
that obtain for different realizations of µ2 first. In a second step, we will then
show that for any given µ2 the equilibrium on the period 2 market is unique. As
it will be seen, the resulting continuation value of capacity is identical to the one
in equation (2), allowing us to focus on the symmetric case in the main body of
the text.22
A.1. First case x¯ i2 ≤ x¯2
Consider the case where firm i deviates by choosing a smaller period 2 capacity
than in the symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, suppose that for µ2 ≤ Nx¯ i2 no
firm ends up capacity constrained in equilibrium and that firms of type j set a
22 In the following, we present the analysis by focusing on interior solutions, omitting some
cumbersome steps that show that also deviations to corner solutions are not profitable in the
unique equilibrium. The omitted steps are available from the authors on request.
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symmetric price of p j2 = p2. In this case firms choose prices according to their
best response functions
p2(pi2, p2) = 12 [ µ2α + 1N − 1 pi2 + N − 2N − 1 p2 + c]
pi2(p2) = 12 [ µ2α + p2 + c]
and in equilibrium all firms set symmetric prices of p2 = pi2 = µ2α + c and share the
market equally. So firms are indeed not constrained by their capacity. However,
once demand increases beyond Nx¯ i2 it can no longer be optimal for firm i to set
the same price as everybody else since its capacity constraint becomes binding.
Subcase A Suppose µ > Nx¯ i2 and suppose that in equilibrium firm i is capacity
constrained while nobody else is constrained. In this subcase firm i will set a
price that ensures that it doesn’t face any excess demand. If all customers decide
to buy a ticket, this yields the following best response function for firm i:
pi2 = 1α [µ2 − Nx¯ i2] + p2.
All firms other than i set prices according to their unrestricted best response
function, which yields the equilibrium prices
p2 = N(µ2 − x¯ i2)α(N − 1) + c
pi2 = (2N − 1)µ2 − N2x¯ i2α(N − 1) + c.
We can check that for v > 4 + αc all customers do indeed find it optimal to
purchase a ticket and firms other than i are not capacity constrained whenever
x¯ i2 + (N − 1)x¯2 = µˆi ≥ µ2. In order to verify that this is an equilibrium, note that
firms j set prices according to their unrestricted best response function. Firm
i on the other hand doesn’t have any incentive to reduce prices due to capacity
constraints. Increasing prices is not profitable, either: The marginal return to an
increase in prices is given by −α(pi2 − c)/N + x¯ i2 which is negative.
Subcase B Let us now consider the subcase where µ2 > µˆi , i.e. airlines are
unable to serve all customers without exceeding their joint capacity. We claim
that there is an equilibrium in which firms set prices that effectively amount to
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monopoly prices and sell all of their seats. However, the prices of firms other
than i need to account for the fact that capacity is unevenly distributed across
the market: Firms j serve all customers located on segments connecting two
firms of type j and share demand on those segments symmetrically. Additionally,
firms j have to set sufficiently low prices in order to attract customers that are
located in the vicinity of firm i but that firm i chooses not to serve due to capacity
constraints. Airlines j will never be able to cater to all customers that are not
served by firm i, so firm i is able to set monopoly prices.
As long as Nx¯2 ≥ µ2 firms set prices of
p2 = vα + (N − 2)µ2 − (N − 1)Nx¯22α
pi2 = vα − Nx¯ i22α .
while for Nx¯2 < µ2 all firms set monopoly prices and we get p2 = vα − Nx¯22α .
Firm i does not have any incentive to reduce prices due to capacity constraints.
Moreover, the return to increasing prices is strictly negative. Similarly, none of
he other firms has any incentive to deviate from this equilibrium due to capacity
constraints.23
Returns to capacity in case x¯ i2 ≤ x¯2 Summing up our results so far,
whenever firm i chooses a weakly smaller capacity for the late market than
everybody else, its expected profits are given by
Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2) = ∫ Nx¯ i20 µ2Nα f (µ)dµ + ∫ µˆ iNx¯ i2 [(2N − 1)µ − N2x¯ i2α(N − 1) ] x¯ i2 f (µ)dµ+ ∫ 2µˆ i [ 1α (v − Nx¯ i22 ) − c] x¯ i2 f (µ)dµ.
It is easy to see that the value of an increase in the capacity available on the
last minute market is given by
23 Generally, when checking for deviations inwhich a firm chooses a larger price it is sufficient
to check if the deviation is profitable for ∂q i2/∂pi2 = −α/(N(N−1)). While the responsiveness
of demand is strictly larger in absolute terms whenever the marginal customer is indifferent
between buying a ticket from firm i or not buying a ticket at all, using ∂q i2/∂pi2 = −α/(N(N −
1)) gives us sufficient conditions for prices to be part of an equilibrium.
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dΠi2(x¯ i2, x¯2)
dx¯ i2
= ∫ µˆ iNx¯ i2 [(2N − 1)µ − 2N2x¯ i2α(N − 1) ] f (µ)dµ− 1
Nα
[v − (2N − 1)x¯2 + (N − 22 ) x¯ i2 − αc]Nx¯ i2 f (µˆi)+ ∫ 2µˆ i [ 1α (v − Nx¯ i2) − c] f (µ)dµ. (7)
Evaluating equation (7) at x¯ i2 = x¯2 gives us expression (3). Moreover, if the
first period market is covered, we get x¯2 = 1/N and using the fact that f (µ) is
constant for all 0 < µ2 < 2 we can check that the second order condition
d2Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2)
d (x¯ i2)2 = N
2x¯ i2
α(N − 1) f (Nx¯ i2) − ∫ µˆ iNx¯ i2 [ 2N2α(N − 1)] f (µ)dµ
− ∫ 2µˆ i Nα f (µ)dµ − 1α [v − (2N − 1)x¯2 + (N − 2)x¯ i2 − αc] f (µˆi)− 1
α
[v − (2N − 1)x¯2 + Nx¯ i2 + 1(N − 1) x¯ i2 − αc] f (µˆi) (8)
is satisfied for all values of x¯ i2 ∈ [0, x¯2] since the sum of the first three terms is
negative.
Uniqueness Finally, let us show that the pure-strategy equilibria considered
above are unique for any given µ2. First, let’s establish that firms with the same
capacity must set the same price in period 2. In order to do so, let us assume
otherwise and order firms according to their prices:
p12 ≤ p22 ≤ p32 ≤ . . . ≤ pN2 ,
where at least two inequalities are strict. We define τN as the profit that firm N
wouldmake on a given segment if the competitor were to charge the same price. If
all customers were to buy a ticket on that segment we have τN = (pN2 − c) µ2N(N−1) .
But firm N might also charge monopoly prices which would result in some
customers dropping out. Similarly, firm 1’s profits under symmetry are denoted
τ1. Let us assume that neither firm N nor firm 1 is of type i. If firm 1 does not
serve all customers on the segment towards firm N , no segment can be at a
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corner solution. It is easy to see that if firm N doesn’t have an incentive to reduce
prices, firm 1 has a strict incentive to increase prices. If however firm 1 serves the
segment towards firm N fully, we must have Π12 − ΠN2 ≤ τ1: Otherwise firm N
would have an incentive to imitate firm 1 even if we account for the fact that they
would have to share demand on their joint segment. Similarly, if firm 1 has no
incentive to imitate firm N we must have ΠN2 −Π12 ≤ −τN . However, using the
fact that Π12 > (N − 1)τ1 and ΠN2 < (N − 1)τN this yields a contradiction. In case
firm N is of type i firm N might be capacity constrained when imitating firm 1.
However, in this case we can use similar reasoning for firms 1 and N − 1. If firm
1 is of type i, firm N might again be capacity constrained when imitating firm
1. In this case firm N could imitate firm 2. If firm 2 does not serve the segment
leading to firm N fully, firm N faces corner solutions on weakly less markets than
firm 1 and if firm N doesn’t have any incentive to reduce prices, firm 1 has an
incentive to increase prices. Hence, firms that have the same capacity available
must set the same prices in period 2.
In case aggregate supply exceeds aggregate demand it is straightforward to
see that the equilibrium is unique. Only the type of firm that has less capacity
available can be capacity constrained: Otherwise, the constrained firm would set
a smaller price and would have an incentive to increase its price. But if the set of
firms that are capacity constrained is uniquely defined and symmetric firms set
symmetric prices, the equilibrium derived above must be unique.
Let us now turn to the case where aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply.
Assume that firm i sets a larger price than the one prescribed above. In this
case firm i can not sell its full capacity and has an incentive to reduce prices.
Instead, assume that firm i charges a lower price. If firm i is not to exceed its
capacity, firms j have to set a price strictly below p2. But if firms j charge a price
below p2, firms face more demand than their joint capacity, so this can not be
an equilibrium. Similarly we can also show that for the given price pi2 the prices
charged by all firms of type j are uniquely determined.
A.2. Second case: x¯ i2 ≥ x¯2
Let us now turn to the case where firm i chooses a higher capacity than everybody
else. If Nx¯2 ≥ µ2 we again have a symmetric equilibrium in which no firm is
capacity constrained and all airlines set a price of p2 = µ2α + c.
Subcase A Let us assume that µ > Nx¯2 and in equilibrium, all firms except for
firm i are capacity constrained. In this subcase firms j sets prices such that they
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sell their full capacity while firm i prices according to its familiar best response
function. This gives us equilibrium prices of
p2 = 1α ((2N − 1)µ2 − 2(N − 1)Nx¯2) + c
pi2 = 1α (Nµ2 − (N − 1)Nx¯2) + c
if all customers decide to buy a ticket. We can check that this is indeed the case
whenever v > 4+αc. So we know that firm i sells a quantity ofQ i2 = µ2−(N−1)x¯2
and firm i is not capacity constrained in equilibrium as long as x¯ i2 + (N − 1)x¯2 =
µˆa ≥ µ2. Clearly, firms j have no incentive to lower prices, given that they are
capacity constrained. Firm i follows its unrestricted best response function and
will also have no incentive to change prices. So we are only left to check that
firms j do not find it worthwhile to increase prices: The return to a marginal
increase in prices is given by −α(p2−c)/N+ x¯2 which is negative in the candidate
equilibrium. Finally, we need to check that firm i does not sell more tickets that
there are customers on segments accessible by firm i: µ2 − Nx¯2 ≤ 2µ2/N . This
condition is always satisfied as long as deviations x¯ i2 − x¯2 are sufficiently small.
Moreover, if x¯2 = 1/N this holds true for any x¯ i2.
Subcase B We turn to the subcase where µˆa < µ2, so in equilibrium everybody
must end up capacity constrained. Our candidate equilibrium looks as follows:
Firm i prices as to sell all its capacity but anticipates that the marginal customer
will be indifferent between purchasing a ticket from i or its competitors. Firms
j on the other hand anticipate that a marginal customer located on segments
connecting two firms of type j is indifferent between purchasing from that firm
or not buying a ticket at all. This gives us the following equilibrium prices:
p2 = vα + 2µ2 − (N − 1)Nx¯2 − Nx¯ i22α(N − 2)
pi2 = vα + 2(N − 1)µ2 − (N − 1)Nx¯2 − (2N − 3)Nx¯ i22α(N − 2)
Note that this equilibrium requires that 12N (x¯2 + x¯ i2) = µˆb ≥ µ2 since otherwise,
firms j are no longer affected by the prices set by firm i. This implied that we can
only end up in this regime if N ≥ 3. It is easy to check that all customers between
firm i and a firm of type j purchase a ticket while some customers between two
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firms of type j abstain. Moreover, no airline has an incentive to increase prices
since prices are close to the monopoly level.
Subcase C Finally, assume that µˆb < µ2. In this subcase even if all firms sell
their full capacity, the marginal customer on each segment is indifferent between
buying a ticket from a given firm or not buying any ticket at all and we end up in
a standard monopoly setting where airlines set prices of
p2 = vα − Nx¯22α
pi2 = vα − Nx¯ i22α .
Returns to capacity in case x¯ i2 ≥ x¯2 Summing up our results so far, when-
ever firm i chooses a slightly larger capacity for the late market than everybody
else, its expected profits are given by
Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2) = ∫ Nx¯20 µ2Nα f (µ)dµ+ ∫ µˆaNx¯2 [ 1α (Nµ − (N − 1)Nx¯2)] (µ − (N − 1)x¯2) f (µ)dµ+ ∫ µˆbµˆa [ vα + 2(N − 1)µ − (N − 1)Nx¯2 − (2N − 3)Nx¯ i22α(N − 2) − c] x¯ i2 f (µ)d(µ)
+ ∫ 2µˆb [ 1α (v − Nx¯ i22 ) − c] x¯ i2 f (µ)dµ.
and the marginal return to capacity is given by
dΠi2(x¯ i2, x¯2)
dx¯ i2
= − 1
N
( v
α
− (4N − 1)x¯ i2 − (N − 1)x¯2
2α
− c)Nx¯ i2 f (µˆa)
+ ∫ µˆbµˆa [ vα + 2(N − 1)µ − (N − 1)Nx¯2 − 2(2N − 3)Nx¯ i22α(N − 2) − c] f (µ)dµ+ ∫ 2µˆb [ 1α (v − Nx¯ i2) − c] f (µ)dµ.
Evaluating equation (7) at x¯ i2 = x¯2 gives us expression (3), so Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2) is dif-
ferentiable at x¯ i2 = x¯2. So in any symmetric equilibrium firms must set period 1
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prices such that that all customers on the period 1 market buy a ticket, i.e. we get
x¯2 = 1/N . This implies that
d2Πi2(x¯ i2, x¯2)
d (x¯ i2)2 = −( vα − 2(4N − 1)x¯
i
2 − (N − 1)x¯2
2α
− c) f (µˆa)
− ( v
α
+ (N − 1)x¯2
2α
− 2Nx¯ i2
α
− x¯ i2
α(N − 2) − c) f (µˆa)
− (N − 1)N2x¯ i2(N − 2)4α f (µˆb) − ∫ µˆbµˆa [(2N − 3)N(N − 2)α ] f (µ)dµ − ∫ 2µˆb Nα f (µ)dµ
is negative for all v > 4 + αc. So expected period 2 profits are concave in x¯ i2 over
the interval [0, 2] and it is sufficient to look at local deviations in the price pi1.
Uniqueness Again, let us show that the equilibria are unique for the respective
values of µ2. The proof follows along the same lines as in case x¯ i2 ≤ x¯2. In particular,
firms that have the same capacity available must still charge the same price. In
case aggregate supply exceeds aggregate demand, it follows directly that the
equilibrium is unique. Instead, consider the case where µ2 > µˆa. Assume that
firm i charges a higher price. This can only be optimal if firm i is still able to sell
its full capacity in equilibrium. That requires firms j to set a strictly higher price,
too. But if all firms charge strictly higher prices, some firms are unable to sell
their full capacity and have an incentive to reduce prices. Instead, assume that
firm i charges a lower price. If firm i is not to exceed its capacity, firms of type j
have to set strictly smaller prices, too. But if firms of type j set prices smaller than
p2, firms sell more than their capacity, which can not be part of an equilibrium.
Again, we can show that the prices charged by all firms of type j are uniquely
determined, too.
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B. Routes
Table 3. Routes
Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination
Aberdeen Manchester† Lisbon Amsterdam‡ Paris Dublin‡
Malaga Madrid‡ London Bordeaux† Paris Hamburg‡
Amsterdam Barcelona† London Frankfurt Paris London
Amsterdam Zurich‡ London Hannover Paris Madrid†
Athens Budapest‡ London Prague‡ Paris Marseille†
Athens London‡ London Sofia Paris Prague‡
Barcelona Lyon‡ London Zurich‡ Paris Stockholm‡
Belgrade Vienna‡ Liverpool Amsterdam Paris Turin†
Berlin Helsinki‡ Lyon Madrid† Paris Valencia†
Berlin Vienna Madrid Barcelona† Paris Warsaw‡
Bilbao Paris‡ Madrid Copenhagen‡ Palermo Turin‡
Bologna Madrid† Madrid Lisbon† Prague Helsinki‡
Bordeaux Madrid† Madrid Milan‡ Prague Milan†
Bordeaux Nantes Madrid Stockholm‡ Prague Rome†
Brussels Leeds Madrid Valencia† Rome Nice
Brussels London Madrid Zurich‡ Rome Vienna‡
Budapest Munich‡ Milan Copenhagen‡ Stockholm Berlin†
Bucharest Milan Milan Duesseldorf‡ Stockholm Duesseldorf†
Copenhagen Geneva Milan Frankfurt‡ Stockholm Oslo
Copenhagen Helsinki‡ Milan Lyon Stuttgart Milan†
Duesseldorf Athens† Milan Paris Strasbourg Paris
Edinburgh Manchester Moscow Budapest† Toulouse Brussels‡
Frankfurt Innsbruck‡ Munich Athens† Toulouse Paris‡
Frankfurt Istanbul† Munich Madrid† Vienna Amsterdam
Frankfurt Madrid† Munich Paris† Vienna Barcelona†
Frankfurt Moscow‡ Munich Vienna Vienna Frankfurt
Frankfurt Paris Naples Milan‡ Vienna Lyon†
Frankfurt Toulouse† Nice Brussels‡ Vienna Paris
Hannover Amsterdam Nuernberg Amsterdam Zurich Frankfurt†
Hamburg Warsaw‡ Oporto Paris‡ Zurich Mallorca†
Leipzig Munich Paris Copenhagen‡
Notes.— †marks routes in the subsample where the destination is one degree Celsius
warmer than the origin; ‡marks routes in the subsample where the destination is one degree
Celsius colder than the origin.
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